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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses the delicate relationship between Religious Free Speech and
Australian Anti-discrimination laws. There are an increasing number of conflicts
arising between religious and secular speech. Different opinions related to
sensitive matters often result in social and legal disputes. Some of these disputes
become complaints under Anti-discrimination laws and arguably lead to less
freedom of conscience and speech.

This thesis focuses on ‘the relationship between Religious Free Speech and Antidiscrimination laws’. This is done though critical analysis of relevant literature,
cases and legislation, contextualising them in response to the questions proposed
in the research paper.

Keywords: Religious Freedom, Religious Free Speech, Freedom of Speech,
Secularism, Anti-Discrimination laws, Freedom of Conscience, International
Standards, Human Rights.
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1ST CHAPTER: INTRODUCTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Religious conflicts are fertile ground for disagreement and have seeded
numerous wars in the past.1 Many international treaties include provisions that
protect Religious Freedom in order to minimise animosity and prevent conflict.
Religion and personal belief are controversial subjects. Since medieval times
different religions have clashed, especially the religions of The Book.2 Reconciling
those religious differences has proven to be a challenge.

There is a connection between the success of a society and the level of Religious
Freedom it has.3 Furthermore, the current tendency to trivialise religious values
under the guise of a secular neutrality discourages religious people from taking
part in regular activities in their societies and from expressing their opinions.

This thesis analyses the literature, legislation and cases concerning Religious Free
Speech and reviews the historical and international background as context for
the research. It considers how the issue has been addressed and developed in
current Australian Anti-Discrimination laws and defines the parameters of
Religious Free Speech for the study of its importance in the diverse Australian
environment.

See, eg Carolyn Maree Evans, Legal Protection of Religious Freedom in Australia (Federation Press,
1 vol, 2012); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief, GA Res 36/55, UN GAOR, 36th sess, 73rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/PV.73 (25
November 1981), preamble.
2 Commongly recognised as religions with sources in the bible: such as Christianity, Islam and
Judaism.
3 See US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2015 (2015), 31 May
2018 <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper>; Brian J. Grim,,
Greg Clark, and Robert E. Snyder, “Is Religious Freedom Good for Business? A Conceptual and
Empirical Analysis,” (2014) 10, Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion.
1

st
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Religion has contributed to the development of society and should be
acknowledged rather than silenced.4 By considering and analysing ‘Religious
Free Speech and Anti-Discrimination laws’, this study seeks to identify conflicts
and help increase the protection of Religious Free Speech. The conflict between
Religious Free Speech and Anti-Discrimination laws is best seen by analysis and
comparison of cases. Some international comparison and critical analysis is used
to suggest future solutions to the current Religious Free Speech concerns in
Australia. After analysing the conflicts, this thesis recommends how those
concerns can be mitigated.

The suppression of Religious Free Speech has commonly been justified as
necessary for the defence of the liberties of newly privileged groups. This repeats
a cycle of supressed freedoms. The study of the intersection between Religious
Free Speech and Anti-Discrimination laws helps to identify the change required
so that Anti-Discrimination laws do not negatively interfere with Religious Free
Speech.

See generally Alvin J. Schmidt, How Christianity changed the world (Zondervan, 2009); Rodney
Star, The victory of reason : how Christianity led to freedom, capitalism, and Western success (Random
House,1st ed, 2005).
4
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II.

THE ENQUIRY

The right of religious manifestation is fragile as it has both private and public
dimensions. The expression of minority views in the public square can be
interfered with by passing temporary sociological factors. John Rawls would
invalidate any public argument that has a religious dimension. It is a restrictive
and unrealistic view to believe that people can isolate their metaphysic beliefs
from the other areas of their lives.

Religious values often have more influence on the observance of law than the law
itself.5 Metaphysical beliefs influence life choices and affect the decision-making
process of the individual. The development of protection for Religious Freedom
has become important because of the cultural tendency to undermine it.6 As
Carolyn Evans said:

the right to freedom of religion or belief is not limited to internally held
beliefs, which the state can only interfere with in a very limited way even if
it desired to do so. It also protects manifestations of religion. Manifestations
include ‘teaching, practice, worship and observance’ and thus go beyond
merely participating in religious rituals, but they do not cover every act
motivated by religion.7

There is a gap in the literature concerning whether Religious Free Speech is
adversely affected by Anti-Discrimination laws. There is also not enough

And yet Latham CJ in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth [1943] 67 CLR
116 said that laws suppressing complete freedom of religion can be easily justified since without
such control laws, every religious believer would be a law unto herself.
6 See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
7 See Evans, above n 1, 25.
5
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discussion about how to minimize existing conflicts. Restricting people’s speech
as a way of changing their minds about specific topics is arguably less reasonable
than engaging in a free discussion about it. Suppressing speech stops discussion
and development of ideas whether reasonable or unreasonable. Intolerant
thoughts are arguably better challenged by ideas and debate.8

Durham and Scharffs says that religion works as a social glue and:

`In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke rejected the prevailing notions of
church and state in his time. He offered powerful arguments that state
coercion is ineffective in matters of religion, that the state can force no person
to heaven. At best, state coercion can only derive outward hypocrisy.
Moreover, he contended that rather than destabilizing a regime, toleration
and respect could have the opposite effect, creating of minority groups a
source of social stability rather than social disintegration. Locke profoundly
influenced many American thinkers, most notably Thomas Jefferson and
James Maddison, who drew upon his work in building their case for a broad
understanding of religious freedom. Locke`s insights laid the foundations of
modern regimes of religious liberty. `9

If Locke`s rationale is accepted, it is valid to question what happens to society if
the Religious Free Speech, important part of Religious expression and therefore
of religion, is undermined to protect popular current minorities. The author
argues that even though thoughts held by a group might seem absurd, they still

See eg, Brazeal, Gregory, 'How Much does a Belief Cost? Revisiting the Marketplace of Ideas'
(2011) 21 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 1; Milton, John and John W. Hales,
areopagitica. (Clarendon Press, 1898); Jefferson, Thomas and Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural
Address (Infomotions, Inc, 2000).
9 Durham, W. Cole and Brett G. Scharffs, Law and religion: national, international, and comparative
perspectives (Aspen Publishers, 2010), 14.
8
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should be tolerated.10 Considering this, the object of study of this thesis becomes
extremely relevant for addresses the protection of the religious expression.

International instruments that deal with Religious Freedom are usually made to
accommodate different cultures and systems. To achieve ecumenical and broad
minority accommodation, such instruments are drawn with a generous scope.
This is so that they can protect theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs and can
become a relevant source of law regarding Religious Freedom in different
cultures.

Considering this, the main research question of this thesis is: ´Does AntiDiscrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´ In order to adequately
answer this, the sub-questions ´Why is it important to protect Religious Free
Speech? ` and `Why is it important to protect Religious Free Speech in Australia?
` are addressed to establish the foundational ground of the thesis. The final subquestion, ´How can the conflicts between Religious Free Speech and the AntiDiscrimination body of law be minimised? ´, was also necessary for a complete
analysis of the primary research question. These questions will be answered
through analysis of relevant cases and statutes.

Though the full exhaustion of this topic is not possible in a Master`s thesis, this
work aims to enrich the academic debate on the topic. It is hoped that it will
encourage further research and questioning regarding the protection that
Religious Free Speech has in Australia.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966,
999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).art 18(3).
10
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III.

METHODOLOGY

The thesis presents academic legal research through a critical analysis of relevant
literature, cases and legislation. As qualitative research, this thesis contextualises
the topics, concepts and legislation covering the field, with insight added by the
author.11 . This is done in order to place the reader into the context of the laws
and historical origins of the subject matter.

In terms of the doctrinal perspective in the present research, primary and
secondary sources of law are introduced by historical analysis. However, the
analysis deals with non-doctrinal methodology, and criticizes the current AntiDiscrimination legal premises.12

The first chapters address the two key concepts for the discussion of the thesis:
´Religious Free Speech´ and ´Anti-Discrimination laws´. The first is accomplished
by defining Religious Free Speech in general, in the international sphere and
determining whether Religious free Speech is the same in Australia as it is in the
rest of the world. The second is accomplished by identifying the nature of Antidiscrimination law, their rationale and general structure and then placing them
in the context of recognised Human Rights instruments. In approaching
Religious Free Speech, this thesis moves from the general to the particular. When
considering Anti-Discrimination laws, it approaches from the particular to the
general, discussing the international parameters of Human Rights before
narrowing the scope to analyse Human Rights instruments in Australia.

Michael McConville, Wing Hong Chui and Inc ebrary, Research methods for law (Edinburgh
University Press, 2007), 21.
12 Ibid 23.
11
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The middle chapters of this thesis (4th and 5th) deal with domestic and
international case law, both in light of the research topic and of each other, to
answer the main research question of ´Does Anti-Discrimination legislation limit
Religious Free Speech? ´ The Australian cases and discussion present in the 4th
Chapter are foundational to the international analysis contained in the 5th
Chapter.

In the last part of this paper, possible solutions to the conflict between Religious
Free Speech and Anti-Discrimination laws are presented, answering the question
´How can the conflicts between Religious Free Speech and the AntiDiscrimination body of law be minimised? ´. The advantages and disadvantages
of each solution are addressed. The intention is to bring a tangible perspective to
the problem, providing a possible solution instead of mere criticism.

The methodology requires a review of databases listed in the end of the
bibliography.

19

IV.

THESIS OUTLINE

The 2nd Chapter investigates the first key element of the thesis, ‘Religious Free
Speech’, answering the specific questions: `Why is it important to protect
Religious Free Speech?` and `Why is it important to protect Religious Free Speech
in Australia?` The first is addressed by identifying the importance of Religious
Free Speech in existing academic literature, explaining how Religious Free
Speech is currently used and protected in the Australian legal system, before
discussing whether the existing protection in Australia is adequate. To achieve
this, the chapter is divided in three parts: ´The importance of Religious Free
Speech´ (I); ´The international standards (II); and ´The importance of Religious
Free Speech to Australia´ (III).

Complementing the research question of ‘Why is it important to protect Religious
Free Speech in Australia’, the 3rd Chapter identifies the nature of the AntiDiscrimination laws that currently operate in Australia and interact with
Religious Free Speech. To complete this objective, the chapter is divided into
three main sections: ´Australian Anti-Discrimination law: an overview of the
rationale and general structure´ (II), ´How the Australian Anti-Discrimination
law relate to the recognised international Human Rights´ (III), and ´Do the
existing Human Rights instruments of the ACT and Victoria provide adequate
protection for Religious Free Speech (IV).

The 4th Chapter advances the discussion by approaching the research question
´Does Anti-Discrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´ This is done
by examining the conflict between Religious Free Speech and AntiDiscrimination norms in the provision of goods and services in Australia. The
chapter is structured thematically by case studying section II: ´Goods and

20

services´ (B), ´Life expression and employment´ (C), and ´Life expression and
speech´ (D).

After identifying conflicts between Religious Free Speech and AntiDiscrimination norms in the 4th Chapter, the 5th Chapter discusses the nature of
the apparent conflict in an international context and identifies the extent to which
it is a real conflict. This chapter builds on the thematic structure seen in the 4th
Chapter, considering: ´Goods and services: artistic manifestation and the samesex wedding dilemma´ (B); ´Life expressions and employment´ (C); ´Life
expressions and speech´ (D); followed by a consideration of the consequences of
a conflict between Anti-discrimination legislation and Religious Free Speech (E).

The 6th Chapter finalises the reflection on the problems addressed in this thesis
and answers the last question: ´How can the conflicts between Religious Free
Speech and the Anti-Discrimination body of law be minimised?´ The possible
solutions which are discussed are: ´Making s 116 of the Australian Constitution
binding for the states´ (B), ´Extinguish all the Anti-Discrimination laws´ (C), ´
Pass federal legislation implementing the international Human Rights
instruments ratified by Australia in a way that would trump inconsistent law´
(D), ´Pass a Bill or Charter of Rights (E), and ´Detailed Religious Freedom Act´
(F).

21

2ND CHAPTER: RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis discusses the relationship between Religious Free Speech and AntiDiscrimination laws, analysing the conflicts between both and suggesting
possible solutions to prevent such conflict. In order to answer: ´Does the AntiDiscrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´, it is prudent to first
identify and define ´Religious Free Speech´ and ´Anti-Discrimination law´. This
chapter focuses on Religious Free Speech, by answering two key questions: ´Why
is it important to protect Religious Free Speech? ` and `Why is it important to
protect Religious Free Speech in Australia? `

This chapter begins by identifying the importance of Religious Free Speech from
existing academic literature, measuring existing Australian protections (of
Religious Free Speech) against international standards. This discussion is
structured in three parts: the importance of Religious Free Speech as described in
academic literature (II); the international standards (III); and the importance of
Religious Free Speech (IV).
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II.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH

The necessity of framing Religious Free Speech and concepts such as Religious
Freedom, Human Dignity, Human Rights and Freedom of Speech is
fundamentally necessary, as they remain abstract concepts with vastly different
interpretations and perceptions. The importance of Free Speech must be
defended and justified because it is no longer universally assumed to be a human
good. Although Religious Freedom ‘is the bedrock for every human right´13 and
´provides a sturdy foundation for limited government’,14 many now doubt that
religion is a human good15 and, accordingly, do not think that speaking about it
serves any good human purpose and should not warrant protection.

The object of this section, however, is not to extensively develop the
philosophical concepts of Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech, despite
their importance to an understanding of Religious Free Speech. In order to
narrow the broad concept of Religious Freedom for the scope of this work, this
thesis accepts it as a good accordingly to the UDHR and adopts the Australian
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) that ‘[r]eligious freedom encompasses
freedom of conscience and belief, the right to observe or exercise religious beliefs,
and freedom from coercion or discrimination on the grounds of religious (or nonreligious) belief.’16

Jennifer A. Marshall, ´Why Does Religious Freedom Matter?’ (20 December 2010) The Heritage
Foundation
<https://www.heritage.org/religious-liberty/report/why-does-religious-freedommatter>
14 Ibid.
15 See Lori G. Beaman, Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity (Oxford University Press, First
ed, 2017), 29-30; Eliyabeth Shakman Hurd, ´The International Politics of Religious Freedom´
(2013) 40 India international Center Quarterly 225.
16 The Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms— Encroachments by
Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2015) 1.28.
13
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Religious Freedom is closely connected to the right to Freedom of Speech.
According to Campbell and Whitmore,17 Freedom of Speech is the freedom
without which no other freedom could survive and by such is the freedom par
excellence. The UDHR, defines the right to Religious Freedom as `freedom to
change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance. `18 From this interpretation Religious Freedom
includes the right to manifest one’s religious views.19 This is expressed primarily
through Freedom of Speech.

Barendt argues that Freedom of Speech is important in the realisation of other
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion, thought, and conscience freedoms that reflect what is to be human.20 By extension, Freedom of Speech can
be considered the highest freedom upon which western society rests, for it
encompasses the externalisation of all these interior autonomies. It may be
reasoned that Freedom of Speech, association and conscience are inseparable
freedoms, being collectively the highest freedom.21

Harry Whitmore and Enid Campbell, Freedom in Australia (Sydney University Press, 1966), 113.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd session, 183 plen mtg,
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948).
19 See, eg, Jay Newman, On Religious Freedom (University of Ottawa Press, 1991) 100; Lindholm,
Tore, Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Ringgold, Inc, 2004) vol 19.
20 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 13.
17
18

21

“the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom
of religion and belief.”, “the fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the fact
that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency,” In General
Comment No. 22 (Article 18) in UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations adopted by Human Rights Bodies, p. 144.
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Religious Freedom, Free Speech and Religious Free Speech are deeply
intertwined. The protection of either Religious Freedom or Freedom of Speech
necessarily contains the protection of the Religious Free Speech.

In simplified terms, Religious Freedom includes all the areas of religion, from the
choice of which religion to follow (or not), to the external expressions of religious
or non-religious choice. This means that Religious Freedom is broader than
Freedom of Religious Speech (the external expression of one’s inner religious
beliefs and the following of religious and moral customs), nevertheless it contains
all expressions of Religious Free Speech as demonstrated in Graph 1.

Graph 1: Religious Freedom

Freedom of Speech also incorporates a wider parameter than the expression of
religious beliefs. It contains the expression, verbal or non-verbal,22 of essentially
everything that translates the thought and essence of the individual. That is from
the manifestation of trivial thoughts up to the expression of religious or political

22

See Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579
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views. Consequently, Religious Free Speech is contained within Freedom of
Speech, as demonstrated in Graph 2.

Graph 2: Freedom of

Speech

Religious Free Speech is the intersection of both of those concepts. Referred to as
the verbal expression of religious manifestation, it is contained inside the
parameters of both Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech. This intersection
is demonstrated in Graph 3.

Graph 3: Religious Free

Speech
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Accordingly, the protection of Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech
necessarily requires the protection of the Religious Free Speech.

In order to properly identify and consider the importance of Religious Free
Speech, it is necessary to frame the concept of Human Dignity, as the justification
of one concept is intimately connected to the other. This is because to the extent
that Religious Free Speech exists as a Human Right, is derived from two
fundamental Human Rights (Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech). Both
of these rest on the idea that all human beings have inherent dignity because they
are human. The existence of Human Rights that are universal and applicable to
every human being regardless of their social, physical, psychological or any other
factor requires the assumption of a fundamental equality among human beings.

There are two main justifications for the equality of human beings that are
adopted in this thesis. The first can be traced to Judaeo-Christian concepts that
all man were made equal by God.23 Even if the philosophical aspect of such a
construction alone is considered, its structural result of equality among people is
an important common ground on which western society rests

The second justification is the practical experience of the 20th Century. Even for
those who reject philosophical concepts grounded in religious sources, recent
history points towards the necessity of the assumption of equality among all
human beings. The mass destruction of human life of the first and second World
Wars demonstrated the relevance of such concepts, to ensure the mistakes of the
past are not repeated in the future. The extension of this assumption bears
directly on the consequential Human Rights construction from the historical
experience of western society.
Augusto Zimmermann, Christian Foundations of the Common Law - Volume 3: Australia (Connor
Court, 2018), forthcoming.
23
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Human dignity is understood here as the inherent irrevocable respect owed to
every human being for simply being human, and from which the right to exercise
freedom is inseparable.24 For this reason human beings owe to each other the
intrinsic respect to freely seek their own choices, including Freedom of Religion
and Speech.25 These were among the first Human Rights to be formally
recognised by the international community, known as blue Human Rights or first
generation Human Rights, core to assuring other rights.26 It must be recognised
that Religious Free Speech, as a Human Right, transcends Australian ground.

As a fundamental Human Right, Religious Free Speech as a fundamental Human
Right goes further than the national experience. It is a right of all human beings.
This universality justifies the introjection of international law and experiences of
other jurisdictions in this thesis.27 This logic is corroborated in Kateb`s work,28 for
it can be observed in it that Human Dignity is important regardless of the societal
structure for its existence and is correlated to the human existence.

David Little argues that there are difficulties involved in attempting to
understand the language of Human Rights apart from religious perspectives,
manifesting a deep suspicion to the idea of considering Human Rights as a purely
secular system. The scholar reports that many take issue with a view of Human

See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Westview Press, 2nd ed, 1998); Vatican II,
Declaration on Religious Freedom: Dignitatis Humanae – On the Right of the Person and of Communities
to
Social
and
Civil
Freedom
in
Matters
Religious
(7
December
1965)
<www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/
documents/vatii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html>
25 See also Barendt, above n 20, 13; Rex Ahdar, and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State
(Oxford University Press, Second; Second ed, 2013) 128.
26 See also Whitmore and Campbell, above n 17, 113.
27 The concrete existence of Human Rights does not form a consensus in political-philosophical
discussions See eg, Robert Alexy, 'Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights' (2012) 25
Ratio Juris 2.
28 George Kateb, Human dignity (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011)
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Rights as superior rights ‘thereby encouraging a secularist form of intolerance
and, consequently, creating the risk that the very system designed to protect
persecuted religious believers might itself become their oppressor’.29 Going
further, Habermas says that Human Rights are the normative language adopted
to spell out the equal dignity of all man.30 If the previous religious routes of
Human Dignity are an unpleasant idea to those who are more pragmatic, this
same concept can be corroborated by this authors work.

Religious Free Speech is a Human Right because it is a part of both Freedom of
Religion and Freedom of Speech under international Human Rights instruments.
As previously explained, Human Rights have their source in Human Dignity. By
building on this principle of human dignity, this thesis argues that Religious Free
Speech is necessary for a pluralistic society, regardless of the specific protections
provided, or not provided, by different legal authorities.

One of the essential foundations of a democratic society is this Freedom of Speech
from which Religious Free Speech is derived.31 Accordingly, Freedom of Speech
is one of the necessary conditions for the progress and development of every
man.32 Freedom of Speech is not only applicable to speech that is ´favourably
received´, ´regarded as inoffensive´ or ´a matter of indifference´. It extends even
to those views that ´shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population´.33

John Witteand M. Christian Green, Religion and human rights: an introduction (Oxford University
Press, 2012), 136.
30 Jürgen Habermas, 'the Concept Of Human Dignity And The Realistic Utopia Of Human Rights (2010)
41 Metaphilosophy 464, 464-467.
31 See Handyside v the United Kingdom (1976) Eur Court HR (ser A) 737, 754.
32 Ibid.
33Ibid.
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This is a precondition for the pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness which
are essential for a democratic society such as Australia.34

Intolerance towards religion breeds social and economic instability in any society
and should ultimately be avoided.35 This is exemplified by the religious
persecution that has spanned across history. Considering the extent of religious
persecution globally, and its effect on human life, the international community
has makes an effort to protect Religious Freedom through diplomacy,
international legislation and case law interpretation.

Separating religious manifestation from the public square divorces religiosity
from its public expression.36 As expressed on Michael Bird´s37 submission to the
Ruddock Religious Freedom Review Committee:38
When it comes to religion, confident pluralism will not allow us to take
punitive actions against religious groups with beliefs that we do not care for,
whether that is the Church of Scientology, Islam, the Roman Catholic
Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or Australian Baptists. Any attempt by an
over-reaching state to create social homogeneity by compelling religious
groups into ‘sameness’ or punishing religious groups for their dissent or

In John Sandeman, ´Religious freedom panel gets a diverse response´, Eternity News (online), 4
April 2018 <https://www.eternitynews.com.au/australia/religious-freedom-panel-gets-a-diverseresponse/> Australian MP Tim Wilson writes: ‘A free society does not seek to homogenise belief
or conscience but instead, affirms diversity and advocates for tolerance and mutual respect.´
35 See, eg, Frank B. Cross, Constitutions And Religious Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 2015),
5-7.
36 See Anthony Gray, 'The reconciliation of freedom of religion with anti-discrimination rights'
(2016) 42 Monash University Law Review 72, 122; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia
University Press, 1993) 212–22; Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson, Law and Religion in
Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge University Press, First Paperback ed, 2011.
37 In Sandeman, above n 32.
38 In late 2017, the Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, announced the
appointment of an Expert Panel to examine whether Australian law adequately protects the
Human Right to Religious Freedom.
34
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difference from public policy rests on a deliberate undermining of religious
liberty.39

Giving a particular group special rights or benefits cannot be allowed if it
requires the fundamental rights of others, such as their Religious Freedom, Free
Speech, and consequential Religious Free Speech, to be ignored. In practice, not
all people are able to enjoy all their Human Rights, let alone enjoy them equally.
Nonetheless, all human beings have the same Human Rights and hold them
equally and inalienably. For that reason, to deny Religious Free Speech is
incompatible with dignity and the zeal for the welfare of mankind. For that
reason,

Prohibiting religious speech in the public square denies an aspect of human
identity40 which informs the worldview of most people. The public expression of
every person includes the public expression of beliefs, including religious beliefs,
and to suppress them is to disrespect their Human Dignity, is damaging to the
social structure and ultimately suppresses freedom.41 To deny human beings the
ability to express themselves in the public square is to deny them part of their
Human Dignity.

The expression of an individual must include the expression of their religious
beliefs as part of their essential human identity. Without this, freedom of

In Sandeman, above n 34.>
R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment; ex parte Williamson [2005] 2 AC
246, [15] (Nicholls LJ). ‘Religious and other beliefs and convictions are part of the humanity of
every individual. They are an integral part of his personality and individuality. In a civilised
society individuals respect each other’s beliefs. This enables them to live in harmony’
41 See Frank Brennan, Acting on Conscience: How Can We Responsibly Mix Law, Religion and Politics?
(University of Queensland Press, 2007), 9.
39
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expression is sterile and meaningless.42 Freedom of Speech has been protected in
international instruments as a means to avoid conflicts and wars that are often
the consequence of religious persecution. Denying religious manifestation in the
public square43 is inconsistent with Freedom of Speech in general and the aims
and intentions of these international instruments.

“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of [a democratic] society,
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. . . it is
applicable not only to "information" or "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State
or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society". (Mänskliga Danelius,
rättigheter i europeisk praxis, 2nd edition, p. 306, citing the judgment of the European Court
dated 25 May in the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece, p. 31, Publications Series A, No. 260-A)
43 The place of religion in the public square can be vastly seen in the literature: See, eg, Brennan,
above n 41; Gray, above n 36; Cane, Evans and Robinson, above n 36.
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III.

THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

There are diverse international instruments that relate to fundamental Human
Rights. This subchapter addresses the UDHR, the `Religion Declaration` and
three of what the Commonwealth Attorney-General`s Department has called `the
seven core human rights instruments´44 which have been ratified by Australia.45
The protections given to international Human Rights can influence and be used
in the development of the common law decisions particularly in accord with ‘the
principle of legality’ in Australia although valid Commonwealth statutes can
change the law in an instant. It must be added that the Commonwealth has the
power to domesticate international Human Rights norms by statute under s
51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution but this has not been done in the area of
Religious Freedom.46

A declaration, such as the UDHR does not, by its nature, enforce legal obligations
on the signatories. Signing a declaration is prima facie a public expression of the
values shared by the countries who chose to sign it.47 Nevertheless, this

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January
1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969); Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 18 December 1979,
1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading. Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984;
Convention on the Rights of a Child, opened for signature 20 November 1987, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered
into force 2 September 1990); Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for
signature 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
45
See
Attorney-General's
Department,
International
Human
Rights
System
<https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/Pages/International-HumanRights-System.aspx>,; See also Australian Government, Australia´s Human Rights Framework
(2010), 8.
46 Evans, above n 1, 40. According to the author, the closest case on point is Evans v New South
Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 (French, Branson and Stone JJ).
47 To choose to be bound to an international human rights treaty does not automatically make it
part of domestic law. According to Brennan J in Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 42:
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declaration is important and is used as source of human rights instruments all
over the world.48 It must also be mentioned that, not only have numerous nations
signed in agreement with its principles, the ICCPR and ICESCR Covenants were
enacted to implement its aspirations and to make them binding on the nations
which accept and domesticate them.

According to Evans, the modern approach to the protection of Religious Freedom
can be traced to UDHR. In the research theme that connects to the defense of the
Religious Free Speech, a fundamental Human Right,

must address the

declaration as one of its main sources. The Commonwealth of Australia had an
active role in the production and declaration of the UDHR. The UDHR justified
the latter international covenants ICCPR and the ICESCR. These covenants have
binding force in international law and have been signed by many nations,
effectively making legal promises to the international community49 to abide by
those principles and implement and protect them in their domestic law.

The UDHR is a document that has value in international politics, and its existence
illustrates the development of the international community.

50

Protecting

religious belief, expression and action is part of the foundation of the whole

‘international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common
law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights’.
48 For more see Australian Human Rights Commission, What is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/what-universal-declaration-humanrights>
49 There are a number of authoritative authors who suggest that these rules have achieved binding
status as customary international law even if countries have not accepted them. See, eg, Triggs,
Gillian Doreen, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (LexisNexis Butterworths,
2nd ed, 2010)
50 Australia was not only one of the founding members of the UN but was one of the eight
countries responsible for the draft of the Declaration largely due to the leadership of Dr Herbert
Vere Evatt, head of Australia’s delegation to the UN who later in 1948 became the President of
the UN General Assembly.
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Human Rights project. For this purpose, article 18 of the UDHR51 deals not only
with religious matters,52 but also has regard to freedom of thought and
conscience. Limitations may be imposed upon the rights mentioned in the
Declaration,53 but these can only be held in order to assure other rights.

The ICCPR is the first instrument on the list of the international treaties on
Human Rights that Australia has agreed to be bound by.54 It turns the affirmation
of freedom of religion, present in the UDHR, into a positive covenant. By
ratifying it, Australia accepted obligations to implement Human Rights,
including Religious Free Speech: committing to actively protect religious beliefs
and practices of citizens, where they neither harm others nor interfere with the
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms of others.55

Limitations may be imposed on the right to manifest religion or belief. Evans
highlights that the ICCPR specifies limitations, and attaches them to each right,
rather than imposing a general limitation.56 The key concept to be understood

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.
52 See, eg, Dr Peter W. Edge et al, Religion and Law (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2006) 48.
53 (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his
personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society. (3) These rights and
freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
54 See Australian Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Explained: Fact Sheet 7: Australia and
Human Rights Treaties <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/human-rights-explained-fact-sheet7australia-and-human-rights-treaties> ; Australia has reservations to the ICCPR regarding
articles 10, 14 (6), and 20.
55 ICCPR Article 18(3).
56 Evans, above n 1, 29: ‘[t]he state must demonstrate that the measures that it has taken to restrict
religious freedom are proportionate to the legitimate ends that it seeks to protect.’; and ‘Article
18(3) only permits the state to limit ‘manifestations’ of religion or belief and not the internal right
51
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here is that the legal limitations on manifestation of religion must be necessary.
It is not enough for limitations to be supported only by an internal logic, popular
demand, or convenience.57 Limitations on religious manifestation must be strictly
proportional to the extent to which other Human Rights need to be protected
when in conflict with it.58 Such limitations can be made by law if that law is
objectively necessary to protect public safety or to protect other Human Rights.

The legal consequences of failing to adequately implement protection of Human
Rights, such as Religious Free Speech, are limited. The enforceability of
international instruments is connected to the delicate balance in the international
sphere, currently being connected more to political developments. Nevertheless,
considering that Australia is immersed in a globalized world, political
consequences to a nation have importance.

According to the High Court of Australia, international legal obligations do not
have effect in Australian domestic law before being assimilated into domestic
legislation.59 According to the understanding expressed by the High Court in
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,60 international treaties regarding
Human Rights should be considered when domestic legislation is ambiguous,
and the interpretation given by the courts should try to follow to the best

to religion itself. The limitations must be ‘prescribed by law’, which requires that there be a
sufficiently clear law regulating the area, and must be ‘necessary’’.
57 Ibid 34.Necessity is a strict test and requires states to demonstrate serious cause rather than
mere convenience. Any restrictions placed on religion or belief must be proportionate to the end
served. Thus, even if there is sufficient reason to limit religious freedom, that does not give the
state a carte blanche to undertake measures that go beyond what is needed.
58 See Patrick Parkinson, ´Christian Concearns about an Australian Charter of Rights´, (University of
Adelaide Press, 2012) 117.
59 In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, Dixon J held that the fact that Australia has
ratifies a treaty has “no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the Crown” (ibid
477-478). This view subsisted in other opportunities such as Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR
292 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J) and Kiao v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (per Gibbs CJ).
60 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.

36

application of the international commitments that have been made.61 This
understanding was latter scaled back62 in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs; Ex parte Lam.63. In order to comply with international treaties, legislation
must be enacted to internalize them and make them domestically binding.

Australia periodically produces a report to evaluate its performance in this area
and demonstrating what has been done to honour the ICCPR. This document
shows what efforts Australia has made to internalise the commitments made
internationally to protect Human Rights, reflecting on its performance and
considering whether or not the restrictions made to the Covenant are still
necessary.64Protecting the right to Religious Freedom, as set out in the ICCPR, is
important. The Anti-Discrimination laws discussed in the next chapter are
expressed as the main mechanism through which Australia internalises its
international commitments regarding the protection of Human Rights.65

As previously mentioned, international law has to be legislated domestically, it
does not automatically become part of Australian law. Nevertheless, a
commitment is made to protect the rights upheld in the ratified treaties. 66 This
goes to the heart of this thesis, as it addresses the conflict between Religious Free

See Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287; Momcilovic v The
Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, [18]; Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’Association (1908) 6
CLR 309, 353.
62 Matthew Groves, 'Treaties and Legitimate Expectations - The Rise and Fall of Teoh in Australia'
(2010) 15 Judicial Review 323.
63 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1
64Attorney-General's
Department,
United
Nations
human
rights
reporting
<https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/HumanRights/United-Nations-Human-RightsReporting/Pages/default.aspx>.
65 Australian Human Rights Comission, UN Human Rights Committee report on Australia´s Human
Rights Records, 10 November 2017 <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/un-humanrights-committee-report-australia-s-human-rights-record>.
66 Evans, above n 1, 44.
61
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Speech and Anti-Discrimination laws. Both of these qualify under the Human
Rights mechanisms guarded by the ICCPR.

Some of the protections found in the Anti-Discrimination laws derive from
international instruments. Although relevant for the protection of Human Rights,
from the remaining of the so called ´seven core human rights instruments´, only
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination and the Convention on the Rights of the Child touch on religious
matters.67 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination68 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child69 both assure the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion within the scope of assuring
protection for groups that are the target of racial discrimination.

The ‘Religion Declaration’70 is a relevant instrument in regards to Religious Free
Speech, which is applicable in Australia.71 The Declaration reaffirms the standard

The Convention on the Rights of the Child also protects against discrimination for the parents
or guardians religion in its article 2 and when not in the company of those to be kept in the
cultural teaching in its article 20. Article 14 protects the freedom of thought, conscience and
religion and in its third part do emphasizes that the restriction to such must be justified by
necessity. If the protection for parents in this Convention is implemented, they will be allowed to
raise their child/children in a faith of their own choice without state or private interference seen
in article 14.
68 Article 5 (d) (vii) assures the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion
69 Article 30 In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of
indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be
denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own
culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.
70 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, (the ‘Religion Declaration’) Proclaimed by General Assembly of the United Nations on 25
November 1981 (resolution 36/55); reaffirmed by the United Nations by resolution 48/128 in 1993,
and declared “an international instrument relating to human rights and freedoms for the
purposes of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) by Michael John
Duffy as Commonwealth Attorney-General on February 8, 1993.
71 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, (the ‘Religion Declaration’) Proclaimed by General Assembly of the United Nations on 25
November 1981 (resolution 36/55)- see full reference how to
67

38

of necessity in its very first article72 and is considered an international instrument
relating to Human Rights and freedoms for the purposes framed in the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth).73 While it was
recommended that legislation should be introduced to implement the ICCPR’s
standard into domestic law, this has not yet been accomplished.74

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief
of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Article 4
1. All States shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the grounds
of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in all fields of civil, economic, political, social and cultural life.
2. All States shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where necessary to prohibit any
such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures to combat intolerance on the grounds
of religion or other beliefs in this matter.
Article 5
3. The child shall be protected from any form of discrimination on the ground of religion or belief.
He shall be brought up in a spirit of understanding, tolerance, friendship among peoples, peace
and universal brotherhood, respect for freedom of religion or belief of others, and in full
consciousness that his energy and talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.
73 This was said by the than Commonwealth Attorney-General Michael John Duffy on February
8, 1993. Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission, Australia, 1998.
74 George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Blackshield & Williams Australian
Constitutional Law & Theory, 6th ed., The Federation Press, 2014, 1134-1135 discuss how “[M]any
international lawyers argue that the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] has come to form
part of customary international law and in this way can be seen as binding on all
nations…Australia has ratified both Covenants [the ICCPR and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and thereby agreed to assume the obligations they set out.”
72
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IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH TO AUSTRALIA

This subchapter identifies and considers the mechanisms relevant to Religious
Free Speech in the Australian legal system. The first relevant instrument that
deals with Religious Freedom is s 11675 of the Australian Constitution.76 This
section was inspired by the First Amendment of the US Constitution but has been
interpreted differently. Australia is a common law system and can use alien
sources to assist with the formulation of its legal approach. Those sources are
especially, but not limited to, other Commonwealth countries.77 This does not
mean that Australia adopts the interpretation of any other country, including the
US.78 Unlike the US, where the first Amendment is binding upon the states, s 116

The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any
religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall
be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
76George Williams, the Dean of Law at the University of NSW wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald,
“Section 116 has proved to be a frail and ineffective shield. Despite several attempts, the High
Court has never been convinced to use this section to strike down a law.” Williams adds,
“Australian law fares poorly when it comes to religious liberty. The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights spells out the international consensus on the need for protection. This
is reflected in the national laws and constitutions of every democracy except Australia.”.
77 Isabel Regina Rocha de Sousa, A circulação e intercâmbio jurisprudencial no direito comparado:
as State Supreme Courts Australianas. (Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso (Graduação em Direito,
Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2014); Russel Smyth, 'Citations of Foreign Decisions in
Australian State Supreme Courts Over the Course of the Twentieth Century: An Empirical
Analysis' (Monash University, 2008); Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic)
1983 154 Clr 120, 131: Of course, when Australian courts are engaged in clarifying concepts
important to Australian law, they may be aided by appropriate citation from the judgments of
courts outside the Australian hierarchy if there is no binding or sufficiently persuasive Australian
authority.
78 Although recognised in many judgments, Australia renounced US precedents before the
Engenieers Case in 1920. In the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and Adelaide Steamship Company
Limited 28 CLR 129 on Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ (delivered by Isaacs J) in pg 146 ‘For
the proper construction of the Australian Constitution it is essential to bear in mind two cardinal
features of our political system which are interwoven in its texture and, notwithstanding
considerable similarity of structural design, including the depositary of the residual powers,
radically distinguish it from the American Constitution.’ Comments about the DOGS precedent
are located further in this thesis case in 1981 where the majority of the HC rejected the argument
that the establishment clause in s 116 should be interpreted in exactly the same way as a similarly
worded provision is in the US Constitution.
75
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of the Australian Constitution is not.79 Section 116 of the Australian Constitution
does not provide restriction upon the states in their legislative measures
regarding religious matters, only limiting ‘the Commonwealth’ or Federal
Parliament.80
Note that s 116 of the Australian Constitution can be divided into four parts: that
the Commonwealth shall make no law ‘for establishing any religion’, ‘for
imposing any religious observance’, ’for prohibiting the free exercise of any
religion’ and ‘no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office
or public trust under the Commonwealth’. The protection provided by s 116, as
will be seen ahead, provides little protection for Religious Free Speech in
Australia and, it must be emphasized, only restricts the legislative and executive
powers of the Commonwealth within a very narrow range.81

‘Establishment’ is an elastic term,82 hence the various understandings of the term
in different jurisdictions (such as the Australian and American, despite the fact
that the latter inspired the former). 83 From these four main themes in s 116, the
one that has the most relevance to Religious Free Speech is the free exercise of

Nicholas Aroney et al, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia: History, Principle and
Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 341, 342.
See also, Annemarie Devereux, Australia and the birth of the International Bill of Human Rights 19461966 (Federation Press, 2005), 173-174.
80 See Attorney-General (Vic) Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (DOGS Case) (1981) 146 CLR 559, 652
(Wilson J).
81 Ibid (Barwick CJ)[Section 116] is directed to the making of law. It is not dealing with the
administration of a law. But, if that administration is within the ambit of the authority conferred
by the statute, and does amount to the establishment of a religion, the statute which supports it
will most probably be a statute for establishing a religion and therefore void as offending s 116.
That is so, not because of the manner of the administration but because the statute, properly
construed, authorizes it.’ (emphasis in original).
82 On the meaning of ‘establishment’ of religion, see Ahdar and Leigh, above n 25, 75–84.
83 See DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 621 (Murphy J); See generally Reid Mortensen, ‘The
Unfinished Experiment: A Report on Religious Freedom in Australia’ (2007) 21 Emory
International Law Review 169
79
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religion guarantee. However, the other clauses of this section may still be
important for constitutional protection of such expression.

The first case in which the High Court showed signs of a narrow approach to the
interpretation of s 116 was Krygger v Williams.84 In this case, Edgar Krygger, a
Jehovah`s Witness, declined to participate in military training. He argued that
training for military service was, in his religious view, against the will of God.
The Court did not accept the defendant’s argument85 that any involvement, even
in non-combatant roles, would still be supporting the war effort which was in
conflict with his religious beliefs.86

Griffith CJ and Barton J dismissed Krygger`s claim. The Chief Justice held that
the right to free exercise of religion under s 116 was applicable to laws that
prohibit the `doing of acts which are done in the practi[c]e of religion` 87 but this
law did not prohibit the free exercise of Mr Kyrgger’s religion The interpretation
given was that a law that forces someone to act against their religious convictions,
in a scenario that is not religious, is not the same as prohibiting the free exercise
of religion.88 Therefore, the challenged law was held to not be a prohibition to Mr
Krygger’s religion. Barton considered Mr Krygger’s arguments to be `as thin as
anything of the kind that has come before us`.89 The s 116 prohibition referred
specifically to the exercise of religion in religious circumstances.

Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366.
Niel Foster, 'Religious Freedom in Australia' (Paper presented at the 2015 Asia Pacific JRCLS
Conference,
University
of
Notre
Dame
Broadway
Campus,
31/05/2015)
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2887798>.
86 Blackshield and Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials
(Federation Press, 6th ed, 2014), 1174.´, Evans, above n 1, 75.
87Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 369
88 Ibid. Griffiths CJ says that while ‘a law requiring a man to do an act which his religion forbids
would be objectionable on moral grounds ... it does not come within the prohibition of section
116’.
89 Ibid.
84
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In this sense, a law that may be interpreted as prejudicial to a specific religious
view, would not be in breach of s 116.90 The incompatibility of religious views
with the concept of traditional frames of religion, as pointed out in the case law,
is not sufficient to disregard the importance of one’s religious beliefs.91 When the
adoption of a law that goes against the religious conviction of an individual is
not considered to be the same as not respecting one’s religious manifestation, the
protection of Religious Freedom becomes shallow. Since the precedent
established in 1912, the High Court has continued to follow this narrow approach
to the interpretation of s 116 provided in Krygger v. Only twenty years later, in
Judd v Mckeon,92 Higgins J held that s 116 could possibly be a protection for
encroachments of religious belief that refer to acts which are not made in the
practice of religion.93

The next time the High Court considered the meaning of s 116 was in Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth, known as the Jehovah`s Witness
Case.94 The case was held in the heat of World War II and involved a challenge to
the National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations (Cth). According to the
regulations, if an association was declared unlawful it could be dissolved and
stripped of its properties.

Acting on behalf of the Cabinet, the Governor General used regulation 3 to find
that the Jehovah`s Witnesses’ actions were prejudicial to the defence of the

Ibid 371.
Human Rights Committee, General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience
and Religion (Art 18), 48th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (30 July 1993) [2] (‘General
Comment 22’).
92 Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380: a case in which the elector justifying it for all the candidates
at the election supported capitalism and, being a member of the socialist labour party which
worked for the ending of capitalism consequentially as a member he should not vote for any of
the candidates,
93 Ibid. It must be highlighted that the case was not pleaded under section 116.
94 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth [1943] 67 CLR 116.
90
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Commonwealth and the efficient prosecution of war. Following this, a
Commonwealth officer attempted to occupy the hall where meetings and
services of the Adelaide Company of Jehovah`s Witnesses Inc were held.95 The
High Court judges held that the relevant regulation went beyond the defence
power under s 51 (vi) of the Constitution but did not infringe s 116.

In his judgment, Latham CJ held that s 116 protects not only religious belief, but
also the ‘pursuance of religious belief as part of religion`. 96 However, the
argument espoused by the judge did not prevail against the narrow
interpretation of s 116 that was given in the final decision by His Honour and his
colleagues. Even though his honour defined religion broadly, that broad
definition did not allow citizens to do whatever they liked in the name of
religious belief or practice. That would allow all religious believers to become a
law unto themselves and that could not be the meaning of section. The wide
scope of s 116, if it had not been narrowed by the High Court, may have
represented an opening for the disobedience of the law for religious reasons,
which was not an appealing idea.

Latham CJ also recognised the difficulty of separating religious belief and
practices from politics and ethics.97 The assumption, according to him, is that
citizens from any religion can be good citizens and therefore the community
should have no interest in prohibiting the free exercise of any religion.98 His
arguments for the limits of religious protections under s 116 were based on the
standard of reasonableness, rather than the standard of necessity developed in
the more recent international standard. Accordingly, s 116 only protects religious

Ibid 117-119.
Ibid 124.
97 Ibid 125-126.
98 Ibid 126.
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observance from direct government interference, rather than guaranteeing
protection when religious beliefs are in conflict with legal obligations. In Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth, while Latham CJ interpreted
religion broadly, he and the court maintained gave it a quite narrow application
in the free exercise of religion.99

The context in which the case was brought to the Court was unfortunate, for it is
one of the few cases regarding s 116 in the High Court which was decided in the
political tensions of a war.100 The use of precedent made in the context of war as
a standard for everyday conflicts over Religious Free Speech is not a good
parameter. However, the modern ideal of necessity which would arguably
enable a broad interpretation of s 116 may be extracted from the judgment of
Rich, Starke and Williams JJ.101 It is understandable that in war periods, the scope
of necessity of interference by a government is wider. This is because extended
sacrifices are made for the war-effort in virtually all civil areas. Because the
necessity is wider, the use of the war-time precedent as a standard for the balance
of the protections given to human rights is not appropriate.

In the DOGS case102 Commonwealth financial aid to religious schools was
addressed. The High Court held that the fact that a law supports the acts of a
religious institution does not mean it was establishing a religion.103 This meant

Mitchell Landrigan, Can the Australian Constitution Protect Speech About Religion or by Religious
Leaders? (Doctor of Philosophy, University Of New South Wales, 2014) 86.
100 Rich, Starke and Williams JJ in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth
[1943] 67 CLR 116, 160 said: ‘When, therefore, the safety of the nation is in jeopardy, so that the
right to such free exercise can only survive if the enemy is defeated, laws which become necessary
to preserve its existence would not be laws for prohibiting the free exercise of religion.’
101 Ibid 149-160 (Rich, Starke and Williams JJ).
102 DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559.
103 Ibid 583 [34], Carolyn Evans (2009), Legal Aspects of the Protection of Religious Freedom in
Australia, paper presented at Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, Melbourne Law
School, 28, available at
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/frb/papers/Legal_%20Aspects.pd>
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that Commonwealth funding for religious schools was not an establishment of
religion and that s 116 did not provide an impediment to such aid in general.104
As has been discussed, ‘establishment’ can be understood differently. The DOGS
precedent prevents the Federal Legislature from purposefully creating a national
church or religion. However, it does not preclude the Federal Government from
passing legislation that provides financial assistance to non-governmental
religious schools.

Justice Murphy105 dissented and argued that s 116 should be interpreted more
widely, as not simply limiting the legislative power of the Commonwealth, but
also fundamentally guaranteeing the right of every Australian to freedom of and
from religion. He argued that even non-preferential aiding or sponsoring of
religion could be interpreted as establishing a religion.

Justice Murphy’s

approach drew on the interpretation of the American Constitution in regard to
freedom of religion but is represents only one dissented interpretation and not
the law in Australia.

Religious institutions such as schools provide services with governmental
financial aid and, specifically in the case of education, such institutions provide
educational services for people that the government school system itself might
not be able to embrace.

In the 1988 referendum, which proposed to extend the application of s 116 to the
states and territories, one of the arguments against such an extension was that it
would be directly against the precedent set by the DOGS case, and, therefore,

DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559
DOGS Case (1981) 146 CLR 559, 632-633 Murphy J rejected this narrow interpretation of
estabilishment defendind that the funding in the case did infringe the establishment clause.
104
105
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would threaten the funding of religious schools.106 This referendum failed in
every state in Australia.107 It seems that this massive failure may have had more
to do with the fear of such consequences for the funding of religious institutions
rather than the desire not to extend the protection of Religious Freedom. It can
also be argued that the extensive amount of issues to be decided by the same
referendum, lowered the possibility of an approval.108

In addition, the narrow interpretation of free exercise of religion under s 116 by
the High Court provides limited protection to Religious Free Speech. For this
reason, it can be argued that the potential benefit of expanding s 116 to the states
would not be so positive. This is because the states can give a more extensive
protection to Religious Freedom if they choose to do so, as they are not bound by
s 116 and the High Court’s interpretation109 being able to protect it better than the
Commonwealth if they chose to do so.

In Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Victoria),110 known as
the Scientology case, the issue was whether or not the Church of the New Faith was
entitled to tax exemption under a provision of the Victorian tax legislation on the
basis that it was a religious institution.111 Section 116 was not the focus of the case

Doogue, Michelle Grattan; Edmund, ' "Bishops to deal blow on referendum', The Age, 15
August
1988
<https://news.google.com.au/newspapers?id=U1kpAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gZYDAAAAIBAJ&pg=330
3,3701810&dq=referendum+religion+australia&hl=en>,
Seccombe, Mike, 'Bowen assurance to schools on 'yes' vote', Sydney Morning Herald., 16 August
1988?
107 Blackshield, A. R. et al, Blackshield and Williams Australian constitutional law and theory:
commentary and materials (Federation Press, 6th ed, 2014), 1184.
108 Other suppositions for the failure. See, eg, Scott Bennett and Sean Brennan, ‘Constitutional
Referenda in Australia’ (Research Paper No 2, Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia,
1999) table 1 www.aph.gov.au/library/ pubs/rp/1999-2000/2000rp02.htm , discuss the reasons
given for the failure of constitutional proposals and the lack of empirical research in this area.
109 Other cases in which s 116 was addressed by the High Court although interesting it seems not
to have a straight impact into religious free-speech.
110 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax (Vic) [1983] 154 CLR 120
111 Section 10 of the Payroll Tax Act 1971 (Vic).
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and the question was not what religion is, but what a religious institution is.
Nevertheless, the High Court judges sought to define the concept of religion and
decided that Scientology is a religion.112

The definition of religion chosen by the High Court in the case is broader than
the frame that would include traditional religions. Mason ACJ and Brennan J
held that there must be `belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle’,
`acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief` and that
`there may be a different intensity of belief or of acceptance of canon of conduct
among religions or among the adherents to a religion`. 113 In the case, Murphy J
was the only judge that declined to define religion, for he held that any attempt
to do so would pose a threat to Religious Freedom.114 It must be highlighted here
that the High Court had already decided cases about s 116 without defining what
it understood as religion. It is not within the scope of this thesis to define how far
the concept of religion should be taken and, for this reason, the definition of
religion of the High Court in the Scientology case will be adopted.115

It must be noted that s 116 was not the debated in this case, but the Court did try a definition
of religion that would solve the practical case. The concept of religion has previously been
addressed only by Latham C.J. and McTiernan J in Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v
Commonwealth. A broader understanding of what constitutes a religion was given by the High
Court, but the narrow understanding that to force someone by law to do something that is against
their religious beliefs is not an offence to the free exercise of religionstill stands as a great barrier
(the High Court also adopted this understanding in Krygger v Williams).
113 [1983] 154 CLR 120, 136.
114 Ibid 150.
115´Religious Freedom. Religious freedom is a fundamental theme of our society. That freedom
has been asserted by men and women throughout history by resisting the attempts of
government, through its legislative, executive or judicial branches, to define or impose beliefs or
practices of religion. Whenever the legislature prescribes what religion is, or permits or requires
the executive or the judiciary to determine what religion is, this poses a threat to religious
freedom. Religious discrimination by officials or by courts is unacceptable in a free society. The
truth or falsity of religions is not the business of officials or the courts. If each purported religion
had to show that its doctrines were true, then all might fail. Administrators and judges must resist
the temptation to hold that groups or institutions are not religious because claimed religious
beliefs or practices seem absurd, fraudulent, evil or novel; or because the group or institution is
new, the number of adherents small, the leaders hypocrites, or because they seek to obtain the
financial and other privileges which come with religious status. In the eyes of the law, religions
112
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The understanding of what protection to Religious Free Speech is provided by s
116 seems to point to an unhopeful future. The Australian Constitution seems to
ultimately fail to explicitly provide a personal or individual right to Religious
Freedom.116 Restrictions provided by the Commonwealth of Australia are not
consistent with the necessity requirement or with the substance of article 18 of
the ICCPR.117

Kruger v Commonwealth (Stolen Generations Case)118 concerned a constitutional
challenge by Northern Territory Aboriginals to the validity of a Northern
Territory ordinance that appointed the Chief Protector of Aboriginals as legal
guardian of every aboriginal child in the Northern Territory. This ordinance had
enabled Aboriginal children to be removed from their parents and families
without tangible cause and detained in Aboriginal institutions or reserves or
made wards of states and given to other families to raise. The plaintiffs argued
that this limited the free exercise of religion of those children, contravening s 116.
The High Court held that the Northern Territory Ordinance was not made for the
purpose of establishing religion as in s 116 of the Constitution. This is because
the interpretation of this section is focused on the law-making process.

are equal. There is no religious club with a monopoly of State privileges for its members. The
policy of the law is "one in, all in". In Ibid,7.
116 Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, 604 (Gibbs J); Adelaide
Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116; George Williams and David
Hume, Human Rights under the Australian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 268.
See also Tony Blackshield, George Williams and Michael Coper (eds), Oxford Companion to the
High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 93–4; Peter Radan, Denise Meyerson and
Rosalind Croucher (eds), Law and Religion (Routledge, 2005) ch 4 ALRC Report 129, 2015, 5.27.
117 See also Witte Green, above n 29, 261-62.; Silvio Ferrari,et al, Law, Religion, Constitution: Freedom
ofRreligion, Equal Treatment, and the Law (Ashgate, New ed, 2013), 29-30.; Chris Ronalds and
Elizabeth
Raper,
'Discrimination
Law
and
Practice'
Federation
Press,
<http://UNDA.eblib.com.au/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1170027>, 49.
118 (1997) 190 CLR 1.
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The constitutional provision that enables international instruments to be made
binding in Australian domestic law is s 51(xxix). This constitutional mechanism
has the potential to protect Religious Free Speech and other Human Rights under
s 51 (xxix), for the external affairs power allows the Commonwealth to legislate
about matters that are related to international matters and agreements. 119 As
mentioned previously, international commitments made by Australia are not
automatically domestically enforceable,

.120 The cases on the ability of the

Commonwealth to give effect to its international obligations are Koowarta v BjelkePetersen,121 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dams Case)122 and Queensland v
Commonwealth (Daintree Rainforest Case).123

In 2015, the Law Reform Commission submitted a report to the Attorney General
on the encroachments on traditional rights and freedoms by Commonwealth
laws. Among the items analysed were Religious Freedom and Free Speech.124 The
Commission noted there are not many provisions that interfere with Religious
Freedom , but it did recognise that ‘[t]he main areas of tension arise where
Religious Freedom intersects with Anti-Discrimination laws, which have the
potential to limit the exercise of freedom of conscience outside liturgical and

Sir Daryl Dawson, “The Constitution – Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?” (1984) 14
Melbourne University Law Review 353, 358- “there is no theoretical limit to what may be the subjectmatter of international agreement...[and hence] the external affairs power, may, as a matter of
constitutional theory, be regarded as open-ended”.
120 In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, Dixon J held that ratification of a treaty
committed Australia internationally but holds “no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the
subjects of the Crown” (ibid 477-478). The High Court has kept this understanding in cases such
as Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J) and Kiao v West (1985)
159 CLR 550 (per Gibbs CJ). Bradley v The Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557 at 582; Simsek v
Macphee (1982) 148 CLR 636 at 641-642; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 at 211-212,
224-225; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 305; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 286-287, 298, 303-304, 315; J H Rayner Ltd v Department of Trade and
Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 at 500.
121 (1982) 153 CLR 168
122 (1983) 158 CLR 1.
123 (1989) 167 CLR 232 at 238.
124 ALRC Report 129, 2015
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worship settings.’125 In practice, this causes unjustified interferences with
Freedom of Speech.126 In addition, the Commission observed that some terms in
the legislation lack clarity and, as a consequence, unjustifiably interfere with
Freedom of Speech.

The report did not commit itself to definitively stating whether the
Commonwealth Anti-discrimination laws significantly encroach on Religious
Freedom in Australia. It concluded that in future initiatives to consolidate the
Anti-Discrimination laws, whether Religious Freedom should be protected
through a general limitation clause in a new Commonwealth law protecting
Religious Freedom instead of exemptions should be considered.127 Religion plays
a major role in human life and has a fundamental role in people’s understanding
of right or wrong.128

Freedom of Speech is not protected by a specific statute in Australia, even though
the external affairs clause in the Constitution does make such protection possible
if the appropriate legislative measures are taken. The Law Reform Commission
pointed out that the principle of legality129 would provide some protection to
Freedom of Religion130 because, when interpreting a statute, the courts should
presume that Parliament did not intend to interfere with Religious Freedom.131

Ibid 1.29.
Ibid 4.207; 4.208.
127 Ibid 5.124.
128 See also Joseph Boyle, 'The Place of Religion in the Practical Reasoning of Individuals and
Groups' (Pt University of Notre Dame) (1998) 43(1) American Journal of Jurisprudence; Steven D
Smith, The Constitution and the Goods of Religion, University of San Diego School of Law Research,
131-133.
129 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, 523 (Brennan J): ‘a statute or statutory instrument
which purports to impair a right to personal liberty is interpreted, if possible, so as to respect that
right’.
130 See e.g. ALRC Report 129, 2015. 5.39-39; Denise Meyerson, ‘The Protection of Religious Rights
under Australian Law’ (2009) 3 Brigham Young University Law Review 529, 542; Lee v New South
Wales Crime Commission (2013) 302 ALR 363,[314] (Gageler and Keane JJ).
131 Meyerson, ibid 542.
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Nevertheless, the absence of an express protection opens the door for Religious
Freedom to be diminished or abrogated by any unambiguous law passed by the
legislature, such as the Anti-Discrimination laws.

In regard to the implied freedom of political communication,132 Aroney133 argues
that religious speech would be protected if such speech were political.134 This is
because political discourse is protected under the Australian Constitution and,
therefore, a religious speech that is also political speech would be protected.

The development in the High Court of the concept of the implied freedom of
political communication is reasonably recent. While there had been hints in
judgments over the previous decades, it was only affirmed in 1992.135 The High
Court has found that the freedom is actually a limitation on the legislative and
executive powers, rather than an individual right,136 and it includes not only
speech but nonverbal communication of political matters.137 There is uncertainty
of the range of speech that is actually protected by the implied mechanism. It
must also be considered that this protection could still be abrogated by an
unambiguous law passed by the legislature.

See Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd and New South Wales v Commonwealth 177 CLR 106; in
Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104, 123 the political speech was defined by
the High Court and remains unaltered.
133 Nicholas Aroney, ‘The constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification Laws: Implications
for their Interpretation (2006), 34 Federal Law Review 288, 292.
134 See also Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, [60] (French CJ)
135 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (‘Nationwide News’);Australian Capital
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106(‘ACTV’). Lange v Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 112 (‘the Lange test’): `First, does the law effectively burden
freedom of communication about government or political matters, either in its terms, operation
or effect? Secondly, if the law effectively burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate
and adapted to serve a legitimate end, the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance
of the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the
procedure prescribed by s 128 for submitting a proposed amendment of the Constitution to the
informed decision of the people.`
136 Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) C:R 508, 42 (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell).
137 See Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594-5 (Brennan CJ), 613 (Toohey and Gummow JJ), 6224 (McHugh J), 638-41 (Kirby J) (‘Levy’).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this chapter has been to identify and consider the importance of
Religious Free Speech in general, and in Australia. It seems that to overlook the
very principles which are foundational to our society is to disregard society itself
and to lose the cornerstones on which all other rights are based. Denying the
expression of fundamental beliefs of people’s lives is to condemn dialogue,
development and construction of rational thinking. Without the tolerance of
ideas, even the ones we disagree with, a door to persecution is left open.

International sources are relevant for domestic legislation on human rights and
to ignore them is to ignore the commitments made by Australia and the history
of respect of those rights. The sovereignty of nations138 is a cornerstone to the
existence of the international community and the existence and respect of the
covenants signed internationally pose no threat to the independence of each
nation. Human rights are not circumstantial and should not be addressed
differently depending on geographical areas, especially within a country.
Ultimately, as pointed by the Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘much of the
value of calling something a right will be lost if the right is too easily qualified or
diluted’. 139

Human rights as the common expression of Human Dignity cannot be
overlooked by a pluralistic society such as Australia.140 If Human Rights spell out

See eg, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th ed,
2008).
139 ALRC Report 129, 2015, 2.58.
140 Dr Keith Thompson, ‘Accommodating Rights? Religion, Speech and Equality in Australia’
(Speech delivered at the ALRC Freedoms Symposium, Adelaide, 21 September 2015)
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/accommodating-rights-religion-speech-equality-keith-thompson>: `
the only limitations on Freedom of Speech and conscience that can be justified in democratic
societies, are those which would interfere with public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others…[legislation or other government action which]
138
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the normative substance of the equal dignity of every human being´, Religious
Free Speech is necessary regardless of the specific protections provided. The
reason for people’s obedience to the law, and the rules that are fundamental to
the survival of society, commonly passes through religious views by a categorical
imperative.141 Religious Freedom brings about a more peaceful society142 and it is
a necessary tool for social stability.143

The inadequate level of protection of Religious Free Speech in Australia should
be of concern to its citizens.144 As Williams observes, Australia is the only
democratic nation that does not protect Freedom of Speech in its constitution.145
The international standard being recognised, Australia’s incomplete protection
is revealed in both the absence of Commonwealth and state/territory laws
protecting Freedom of Religion (including that of Religious Free Speech) and in
the narrow way the High Court has interpreted the free exercise of religion set
out in s 116 of the Constitution. This thesis takes the position that the quick
succession in which the various jurisdictions of Australia enacted Anti-

exceed[s] those limits overreach…because [they are] impatient. [They] overreach because they
penalize…speech that does not incite violence…[They are] impatient because [they] seek…to
impose a standard rather than to allow that standard to be accepted and become binding on the
nation’s conscience as the patient result of free and open debate… If [legislation or other
government action] succeed[s] in suppressing… debate, the opportunities to teach those who still
discriminate …[will] have been lost…[limitations which overreach international standards]
chill…more debate than [they] enable… Rawls’ idea of Public Reason, which undergirds some of
the opinion that would narrow the scope of our public dialogue, is subversive of freedom of
conscience and speech despite the endeavours of Rawls’ disciples to prove otherwise. Milton,
Adam Smith, Locke and their successors are correct that the market place of ideas will weed out
ideas that grow as tares in our democratic gardens.
141 See Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Harper & Row, 1963)
142 See also Frank B. Cross, Constitutions and Religious Freedom (Cambridge University Press, 2015)
5-7.
143 Schmidt, above n 4; Star, above n 4.
144 Brennan, above n 41, 85: 'Persons with religious views or religious motivations were treated
not only as if they held no trump cards at the table. They were treated as if they had no cards at
all. The only cards which could be played from the hand were cards which would be valued by
liberal atheists.
145 George Williams, 'Protecting freedom of speech in Australia' (2014) 39(4) Alternative Law
Journal 217.
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Discrimination laws, while lacking a consistent framework, has the potential to
undermine Religious Free Speech in this country. This will be explored in the
next chapter.
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3RD CHAPTER: THE NATURE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

Anti-Discrimination laws are the body of law that prohibit certain conduct,
which is considered discriminatory. The idea is that prohibiting the named
discriminatory conduct will provide equality. In Australia, the body of law
governing this area is of statutory creation and has no criminal development in
general, being a part of the civil law branch.146 This chapter intends to frame the
Anti-Discrimination laws themselves. Some provisions of Anti-Discrimination
law conflicts with Religious Free Speech and that conflict is the focus of this
thesis. This body of law has brought controversial opinions regarding the focus
of this thesis. Anti-Discrimination law in Australia has typically implemented
second tier Human Rights without working through and giving judicial officers
direction as to how conflicts with first tier Human Rights should be balanced.
This chapter will therefore identify the nature of the Anti-Discrimination laws
and highlight which of those laws come into conflict with Religious Free Speech
in Australia.

Commonwealth, state and territory laws often overlap in the areas addressed by
Anti-discrimination statutes. Nevertheless, both Commonwealth and state (or
territory) laws must be complied with to the extent that they are not
inconsistent.147 Some of the grounds that are covered in the domestic Antidiscrimination laws include: race, age, sex, nationality, disability, sexual
orientation and political opinion.

Ronalds and Raper, above n 117,.Neil Rees, Katherine Lindsay and Simon Rice, Australian antidiscrimination law: text, cases and materials (The Federation Press, 2008).
147 Australian Human Rights Commission, A quick guide to Australian discrimination laws
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/employers/good-practice-good-business-factsheets/quickguide-australian-discrimination-laws> (‘A quick guide to Australian discrimination laws’)
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According to Margaret Thornton, discrimination ‘consists of a plethora of formal
and informal practices modified by societal acculturation and intertwined with
messages from the inner consciousness`.148 In certain cases, the use of laws that
aim for equal treatment of people can be a source of unequal opportunity.
Australia’s state and federal Anti-discrimination laws have been passed to
resolve those cases of unequal treatment which have become socially
unacceptable (and which have become the focus of policy reform agendas). The
legislative purpose of Anti-discrimination law is to achieve a position of social
equal opportunity, trying to bring balance to discriminatory situations. But the
way balance is to be achieved when other Human Rights are implicated in the
balancing equation can be unclear especially when the relevant antidiscrimination statute does not direct judges how that balance is to be worked
out.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first provides an overview
of the rationale and general structure of Australian Anti-discrimination laws (II).
The second identifies how Australia’s Anti-discrimination laws relate to
recognised international Human Rights (III). The third examines if the Human
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006
(Vic) provide adequate protection to Religious Free Speech (IV) and is followed
by a short conclusion which introduces the next chapter (V).

Margaret Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia (Oxford
University Press, 1990) , 7.
148
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II.

AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: OVERVIEW OF THE RATIONALE
AND GENERAL STRUCTURE

Human Rights are not an Australian creation. They have a long history in the
international sphere where treaties have been created to protect them. Inside a
country it is impossible to talk about human rights without mentioning
international sources. Human Rights, as mentioned in the 2nd Chapter, are
sourced from Human Dignity. Both Human Rights and Human Dignity are held
to be universal. For that reason, the influence of international legislation as a
source to the solution of problems not yet solved in this country must naturally
be considered.

Though Australian law is separate and independent from the law of other
countries, it has been significantly influenced by legal development in both the
UK and the US. 149 Australia’s defence of its ‘White Australia policy’ in resistance
to US efforts to eradicate racial discrimination from the 1860s and particularly
after the 1940s .The international ideas and discussions around racial
discrimination drew increasing attention from the general public around the
world, particularly from the middle of the 20th century.150 This factor, joined with
the internal developments in Australian society, progressively influenced the
1967 amendment of the Australian Constitution, the ratification of the International
Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,151 the first state

The US Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241 and also the sex discrimination
laws passed by the UK parliament in mid 1970s have considerably influenced Australian antidiscrimination law.
150 For example, the practice of apartheid raised considerable attention at the time, not only in the
USA with the American Civil Rights Movement, but globally with a plurality of racial
discriminatory structures brought to question.
151 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) (‘International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’)
149
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Anti-Discrimination Act in South Australia and the passage of the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).

The White Australia policy was formally dismantled a year before the
Constitution was amended to remove the provision that distinguished indigenous
and non-indigenous Australians for specific purposes.152 Considering the
overseas ideological pressure which influenced these changes to Australian law,
the impact that international structures have on the law-making process will
therefore be addressed in the present chapter.

The first Anti-Discrimination law that was passed in Australia came from the
South Australian Parliament in 1966. The Prohibition of Discrimination Act 1966
(SA) prohibited racial discrimination in some aspects of employment and in the
provision of goods and services. This piece of legislation came shortly after the
end of the White Australia policy and represents the change of attitude that
began to develop in Australia regarding the previous prejudiced culture.

The first Anti-discrimination law in the federal sphere also targeted racial
discrimination. Even though the Commonwealth Parliament had no express
constitutional authority to enact Anti-Discrimination law,153 it relied on its
indirect external affairs and races powers in ss 51 (xxvi) and (xxix) of the
Constitution with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).154 In 1982 the Act

See also Ronalds and Raper, above n 117, 3; Neil Rees, Simon Rice and Dominique Allen,
Australian Anti-Discrimination Law (Federation Press, 2nd edition ed, 2014) vol 2nd 1.
153 While there is no express power that specifically authorised the Commonwealth to pass this
law, when the law was challenged in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, the
Commonwealth argued that the races power (s 51(xxvi) and the external affairs power (s 51(xxix)
authorised this legislation. The High Court held that the legislation was not authorised under the
races power but was indirectly authorised under the external affairs power
154 This Act is still the target of intense critiques e.g. Joshua Forrester, Lorraine Finlay and
Augusto Zimmermann, No Offence Intended: Why 18c is Wrong (Connor Court Publishing Pty Ltd,
2016) is an interesting and current approach criticizing s 18C. A 1995 amendment to the Act went
152
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survived a High Court challenge to its constitutional validity in Koowarta v BjelkePetersen. 155 As the federal legislation was substantially based156 on the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 157 the
government was able to rely on the external affairs power in s 51 (xxix) 158 of the
Constitution to establish its legislative competence to enact the statute.159

New South Wales passed its first Anti-discrimination law in 1977, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, sex and marital status relating to employment,
public education, delivery of goods and services and others.160 In 1981, physical

further than was allowed by the underlying international treaty and they argued that this single
provision about free speech should be struck down.
155 In Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 it was held that the relevant constitutional
provision did not give the Federal Pairlament the power to enact such an instrument.
156 In Australia's combined 18th-20th reports under the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination submitted in 2016 in its pg 6 item 22, specifically says ´The
principal way Australia implements the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination is through the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the work of the Australian
Human Rights Commission (AHRC).´
In Australia's combined 18th-20th periodic reports to the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination it expressly noted: ´The principal way Australia implements the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination is through the Racial
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and the work of the Australian Human Rights Commission
(AHRC).´ See, Australian Government, Eighteenth to twentieth periodic reports of States parties due
in 2014: Australia*, CERD/C/AUS/18-20 (2 February 2016), 6 [22].
157 Some of the cases which have recognised the Act’s reliance on the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination include: Viskauskas v Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280;
University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447; Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70;
Brandy v HR&EOC (1995) 183 CLR 245.
Other cases have held the reliance of such act on the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Viskauskas v Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280; University of
Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447; Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70; Brandy v HR&EOC
(1995) 183 CLR 245.
158 The two landmark cases on the capacity of the Federal Government to give effect to its
international obligations are Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 and Commonwealth v
Tasmania (Tas manian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 per Mason J at 124-4 and Deane J at 258.
159 See, eg, Ronalds and Raper, above n 112, 3.; Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 147, 1. The two
landmark cases on the capacity of the Federal Government to give effect to its international
obligations are Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 and Commonwealth v Tasmania
(Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1, 124 (Mason J) and 258 (Deane J)
160 Anti-Discrimination Board of NSW, History of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)
<http://www.antidiscrimination.justice.nsw.gov.au/Pages/adb1_antidiscriminationlaw/adb1_an
tidisclaw_history.aspx>
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disability was added and in 1982 intellectual disability and homosexuality were
also added. Impairment grounds were allocated later on and a broader ground
of disability in 1994. As time passed, other grounds continued to be added to the
New South Wales Act such as racial vilification (1989), compulsory retirement
(1990), age and homosexual vilification (1993), transgender (1996), carers’
responsibilities (2000) and breastfeeding (2007).

In 1977 a similar law to the New South Wales Act came into operation in Victoria.
The law prohibited discrimination on the grounds of marital status and gender
in the sphere of employment, education, accommodation and the provision of
goods and services.161 In Victoria, the matter of discrimination on the grounds of
religious belief or activity was combined with discrimination on the grounds of
race in the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic), which will be addressed
in greater detail in item IV of the present chapter. The Human Rights
Commission (HREOC) recommended a federal anti-religious discrimination law,
but the federal government took no action. South Australia considered it, but
again took no action. Only Victoria followed the HREOC 1998 recommendation.

Queensland produced the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld),162 adopting a
similar definition of religion to Victoria, namely that ‘religious activity means
engaging in, not engaging in or refusing to engage in a lawful religious activity’
and ‘religious belief means holding or not holding a religious belief.’ In 2001,
Queensland also passed legislation which introduced religious vilification; the

Equal Opportunity Act 1977 (Vic).
The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, relationship status, pregnancy, parental
status, breastfeeding, race, age, impairment, religious belief or religious activity, political belief
or activity, trade union activity, lawful sexual activity, gender identity, sexuality, family
responsibilities, and association with or in relation to a person who has any of the attributes
prescribed by the law when it occurs in work, education, provision of goods and services,
superannuation or insurance, disposition of land, accommodation, club memberships and affairs,
administration of state laws and programs.
161
162
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Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2001 (Qld). In this legislation, a person was
prohibited from publicly act in a way that would ‘incite hatred towards, serious
contempt for, or severe ridicule of a person or persons on the basis of their
religion’.163 The state also criminalised serious religious vilification in a manner
that is similar to Victoria.

Western Australia adopted broader legislation. The Equal Opportunity Act 1984
(WA) aimed to provide equality of opportunity and remedies in respect of
discrimination on different grounds.

164

In its Act, Western Australia merged

political and religious convictions into the same ground and stipulated that
‘religious or political conviction shall be construed so as to include a lack or
absence of religious or political conviction’. As such, in Western Australia,
political and religious view are weighed alongside each other, as though they are
of a similar foundation.

The Anti-discrimination legislation enacted in the Australian Capital Territory is
the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT).165 Regarding the religious sphere, it
stipulates that:
religious conviction includes— (a) having a religious conviction, belief, opinion or
affiliation; and (b) engaging in religious activity; and the cultural heritage and distinctive
spiritual practices, observances, beliefs and teachings of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people; and (d) engaging in the cultural heritage and distinctive spiritual

Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act 2001 (Qld) s 124A(1).
Discrimination is prohibited on the grounds of sex, pregnancy, race, religious or political
conviction, or involving sexual harassment. The initial grounds of the Act have been expanded
to include impairment (1988), family responsibilities, family status, age (1992), racial harassment
(1992) gender reassignment (2000) and sexual orientation (2002). The Spent Convictions Act of 1988
deals with the ground of spent convictions.
165 Discrimination on the basis of sex, sexuality, gender identity, relationship status, status as a
parent or carer, pregnancy, breastfeeding, race, religious or political conviction, disability,
including aid of assistance animal, industrial activity, age, profession, trade, occupation or
calling, HIV spent conviction, and association (as a relative or otherwise) with a person who has
one of the above attributes is prohibited in the spheres of in employment, education, access to
premises, provision of goods, services or facilities, accommodation, clubs, and requests for
information .
163
164
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practices, observances, beliefs and teachings of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples; and (e) not having a religious conviction, belief, opinion or affiliation; and (f)
not engaging in religious activity.166

As will be seen, states have brought some sort of definition of religion. However,
they have not, in general, actively protected Religious Freedom or its subset
Religious Free Speech which as seen previously is far from ideal.

The Anti-Discrimination legislation in force in the Northern Territory is the AntiDiscrimination Act 1992 (NT).167 In the religious sphere, it prescribes that ‘[f]or the
purposes of this Act, religious belief or activity shall be construed to include
Aboriginal spiritual belief or activity.’168

In Tasmania, the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas)169is the key AntiDiscrimination law. However, the Constitution Act (1943) (Tas) also contains a
section that protects Religious Freedom, which means that there is arguably no
need for a specific Anti-´Discrimination legislation. Such constitutional provision

Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT)
The Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) provides protection against discrimination on the
attributes of race, sex, sexuality, age, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, breastfeeding,
impairment, trade union or employer association activity, religious belief or activity, irrelevant
criminal record, political opinion, affiliation or activity, irrelevant medical record, and association
with a person with an above attribute. Discrimination on these grounds is prohibited from
occuring in the following contexts: education, work, accommodation, the provision of goods,
services and facilities, clubs, insurance, and superannuation
168 Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 147, ‘A quick guide to Australian discrimination
laws’ Australian Human Rights Commission, A Quick Guide to Australin Discrimination Laws
<http://www.humanrights.gov.au/employers/good-practice-good-business-factsheets/quickguide-australian-discrimination-laws>.
169 The Act protects against discrimination on the basis of age, breastfeeding, disability, family
responsibilities, gender, gender identity, intersex status, industrial activity, irrelevant criminal
record, irrelevant medical record, lawful sexual activity, marital status, relationship status,
parental status, political activity, political belief or affiliation, pregnancy, race, religious activity,
religious belief or affiliation, sexual orientation, and association with a person who has, or is
believed to have, any of these attributes in the grounds of employment, education and training,
provision of facilities, goods and services, accommodation, membership and activities of clubs,
administration of any law of the State or any State program, and awards, enterprise agreements
and industrial agreements.
166
167
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has not prevented cases concerning Religious Free Speech arising in the state, as
will be discussed in the 4th Chapter. Section 19 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998
(Tas) outlines certain restrictions on public actions, with the intention of
preventing religious vilification.

There have been a few attempts to internalise the protections to Religious
Freedom which were promised internationally. Examples of this are the ACT
Human Rights Act 2004 and the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities 2006 and Tasmania’s Constitution,170 all providing limited
protection. The limitation in these instruments occurs because the frame in which
Religious Freedom is set is not enough for the protection of Religious Free
Speech, as will be seen in the cases to be seen in the 4th chapter. This is similar to
what occurs in the case of s 116 of the Australian Constitution. The protection
promised by such statutes have shown to not be effective in practice, as the
protection provided by the mechanisms is limited when it comes to a court of
law.

In addition to passing the first Anti-Discrimination legislation in Australia, South
Australia was also the first Australian state to legislate to prevent the
discrimination of women. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SA) was also followed
by a new racial discrimination law in 1976 and a law for people with physical
disabilities in 1981. These laws were later replaced by the Equal Opportunity Act
1984 (SA).171

However, while South Australia was once the vanguard of Anti-discrimination
legislation, Acts have been passed by other states which provide greater

It should be noted that the section in the Tasmanian Constitution existed before the UDHR,
which shows an interesting vanguard in the matter.
171 See also, Ronalds and Raper, above n 117, 3; Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 152, vol 2nd 1.
170
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protections. Discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or activity, for
instance, is not subject to protection under the Anti-Discrimination laws of South
Australia. The legislative behaviour towards the theme gives cause for
uneasiness in the protection of religious liberties, a fundamental human right that
is becoming the subject of deep disqualification in secular society.172 173 A number
of Anti-discriminatory laws which clash with Religious Free Speech has
demonstrated that the current state of protection is not enough.

In the federal sphere, the Commonwealth has passed three other statutes which
prohibit discrimination on specific grounds: The Sex Discrimination Act 1984
(Cth), the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) and the Age Discrimination Act
2004 (Cth). In 1984 came the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) using the external
affairs power in s 51(xxix) which implemented the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman.174 This was influenced
by the international debate on the theme, which flamed after 1975 when the
United Nations declared the International Women’s Year. Relevant amendments
to the Act include the addition of family responsibilities and in 1992 the revision
of the definition of sexual harassment. Later in 1995 there was the revision of the
definition of indirect discrimination.175

The debate over the unjustified difficulty that people with disabilities have in
specific circumstances resulted in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth),
which was implemented using the external affairs power in s 51(xxix).176 This

See Ferrari, above n 117, 20-25.
See Ferrari, Silvio et al, Law, religion, constitution: freedom of religion, equal treatment, and the law
(Ashgate, New ed, 2013), 20-25.
174 The constitutional validity of that Act was confirmed in several decisions such as: Aldridge v
Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1; Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Styles (1989) 23 FCR 251;
Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217.
175 Ronalds and Raper, above n 117, 4
176 The validity of the Act was confirmed in X v Commonwealth (1999) 200 CLR 177 and
Soulitopoulos v La Trobe University Liberal Club (2002) 120 FCR 584, 599
172
173

65

followed partially the US with Disabilities Act.177Amendments to such Act were
made in August 2009. 178

The last Anti-Discrimination legislation passed on the federal sphere was the Age
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth)179 and it relies on four international instruments: the
ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Labour Office`s
Discrimination (Employment and Occupational) Convention. 180

Section 351 of the Fair Work Act 2007 (Cth) has provisions about discrimination
in the work place, although is not purely an Anti-Discrimination Act the Human
Rights Commission was established in 1981 and replaced latter in 1986 by the
current Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act.181 In August 2009,
HREOC was renamed the Australian Human Rights Commission and the title of
the legislation was changed to the Australian Human Rights Commission Act.

The general idea of introducing Anti-Discrimination legislation182 is that it would
bring balance to unequal discriminatory situations by discouraging certain
behaviours. This is done through binding civil penalties to discourage certain
behaviours. This is seen as a way to balance a relation that was unbalanced for
discriminatory nature and to bring equality.

Some believe that the idea behind such laws intended to radically change the
social structures by overcoming the exclusion of particular groups. Another

See also, Ronalds and Raper, above n 117, vol 4th 4; Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 147, vol 2nd 1
Ibid
179 Ibid
180 Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) s 10(7)-(11)
181 Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 147, ‘A quick guide to Australian discrimination
laws’
182 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 152, vol 2nd, 2.
177
178
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perspective is that the Anti-Discrimination laws are a mechanism designed to
silence the clamour of groups that perceive themselves mistreated for reasons of
unfair discrimination.

The ideal of equal opportunities has to take into account an entire social structure
and this might be the first weakness of the mechanism. Introducing legislation as
a main mean to achieve equality is to assure future inequality. Once the aimed
balance in the relations is achieved the harmonizing mechanisms will still be
active unbalancing the configuration for it will continue to give preferential
treatment to groups that no longer will need them.

Historically the changeability between suppressor and supressed points out that
mechanisms that blindly benefit one group might multiply minorities and this is
unlikely to change any time soon. In the scope of supressed becoming
suppressor, the narrow interpretation of religious liberty given in the Australian
scenario and the narrower implementation of the international mechanisms that
protect religious liberty points to a difficult future for Religious Free Speech in
Australia as to be seen by the developments of the cases in the next chapter.

The achievement of the general equality intended through the AntiDiscrimination laws is to be appreciated not only by academic critical analysis
but also the observation of the environmental relation of minorities. To work out
whether achievement of the Anti-Discrimination objective was worth the costs to
other Human Rights it must be reviewed what other important freedoms are in
society and make sure they have not been compromised to an unacceptable level.
An extensive number of critics to the political choice of the Anti-Discrimination
law is accessible183 but the branch that deals with the relating regards those laws

183

See Thornton, above n 143; Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 152, Vol 2.
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and the Freedom of Speech is short184 and regards the Religious Free Speech even
shorter. When the sensitive issues underlined by the Anti-Discrimination
legislation are confronted with the Religious Free Speech the outcome is
controversial. This is because two or more sensitive areas are being confronted
and there is no guidance in the legislation on how the sensitivities are to be
balanced.

Religion is important in Australia.185 Brennan asserts that that the religious views
or motivations of people that are not valued by liberal atheists are arguably too
often disregarded.186 As noted by Howard, ‘[i]t remains the fact that the Christian
religion is the greatest force for good and progress, and the dignity of the
individual in this nation’.187 Nevertheless negative experiences with religion and
personal convictions bring a shift to this. Accordingly, it is not correspondent to
the nature of Australia to undermine religion.188 There is a specific prejudice

, Ben O'Neill, 'Anti-discrimination law and the attack on freedom of conscience' (2011) 27(2)
Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas 3
185 See, eg, Anthony Gray, 'The reconciliation of freedom of religion with anti-discrimination
rights' (2016) 42(1) Monash University Law Review 72
186 See, Brennan, above n 41, 85; Carolyn Maree Evans, above n 1, 2
187 Kevin Rudd: The God Factor, (ABC Compass, 2005) <www.abc.net.au/compass/s1362997.htm>
Peter Costello also stated that ‘[w]e need a return to faith and the values which have made our
country strong’: Evangelist Christian Vote Wanted (ABC Lateline, 2004)
<www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1150747.htm>,
188 In their ‘Australian Values Statement’, the Australian Government Department of Home
Affairs lists “freedom of religion” as one of the key Australian values: See, Australian
Government Department of Home Affairs, Fact Sheet - Life in Australia: Australian Values
<www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/corporate/information/fact-sheets/07values>.
184
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towards religion in the current secular Australian society.189 The disregard for
religious views190 in society is translated in the little case offered to religion.

The short answer to the question of whether the equal opportunity laws achieve
their objective is no. They have not only endangered or harmed the freedoms of
others, but sensitive groups such as victims of racial discrimination have not been
using such mechanisms as was intended. Furthermore, they have not only been
an inadequate mechanism to ensure equality, but they have caused further
inequality. Besides this, it can be considered that the body of anti-discrimination
law created in Australia is underdeveloped and sometimes used as a mechanism
of mass litigation for political lobbyists, instead of protecting individuals in
unbalanced relationships. Such laws can be used as a weapon because the law
does not require tribunal judges to take other freedoms including Freedom of
Speech and its subsidiary Religious Free Speech into account.

The Parliaments and courts have not yet managed to successfully integrate rules
that require balance between competing human rights that must co-exist in order
to develop a solid and coherent basis for such laws.191 The body of law studied is

Fergus Hunter, '"At least I'm not a homophobe": Bill Shorten in tense exchange with Cory
Bernardi',
The
Sydney
Morning
Herald
(Online)
24
February
2016
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/at-least-im-not-a-homophobe-billshorten-in-tense-exchange-with-cory-bernardi-20160223-gn1xdl.html>); 'Xenophon won't give
up
on
Scientologists',
SBS
News
(Online)
24
February
2015
<http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2010/05/12/xenophon-wont-give-scientologists>.Natasha
Bita, 'Scientology criminal, says senator Nick Xenophon', The Weekend Australian (Online) 18
November
2009<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/scientology-criminal-sayssenator-nick-xenophon/story-e6frg6nf-1225799077820>. Joe Kelly, 'Andrew Denton tells church
to get out of euthanasia debate', The Weekend Australian (Online) 11 August 2016
<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/health/andrew-denton-tells-church-to-getout-of-euthanasia-debate/news-story/79d96ef36771d7591fa850304b600966>.
190 John H Garvey, 'Two aspects of liberty' (2016) 91(4) Notre Dame Law Review 1287, 1297-1297
sais: ‘The culture itself cares less about religion, and because it does, the proponents of religious
freedom find themselves asking for protection of an activity that is unimportant, or worse. There
is ample evidence of a shift in popular convictions about religion. We have not yet given up the
faith to the degree the French have but we are trending in that direction.’
191 Rees, Rice and Allen, above n 152; Rees, Lindsay and Rice, above n 146, 1.
189

69

not clearly integrated with other essential Human Rights not present in those
laws, which can result in a frustration of the objectives of such AntiDiscrimination laws.192 This is particularly true for Religious Free Speech. The
protection to Religious Free Speech becomes more important in society when
‘religious freedom is contested, or religious sectarianism or discrimination is
rife'193 for religious contention can be very destructive and should not be brought
back as the effort to help minorities to achieve equality is taken.

In Australia’s sixth report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee it noted that it is
not necessary to adopt the ICCPR in a single statute, and cited many anti-discrimination laws as
examples of how Australia is following the convention. See, Sixth periodic reports of States parties
due in 2013: Australia*, CCPR/C/AUS/6 (2 June 2016)
193 Evans, above n 1, 2.
192
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III.

HOW THE AUSTRALIAN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS RELATE TO THE
RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

International instruments are not directly enforceable in Australia unless they
have been domestically incorporated into law.194 There is a presumption called
´the principle of legality´ in the Australian common law, however, that
Parliament does not intend to breach international obligations made by the
executive.195 That means that international treaties should be considered by
courts, and the courts should apply domestic legislation in a manner that is
consistent with the commitments made by the executive, especially where the
Australian law is ambiguous.196In order to construe legislation in a manner that
conflicts with the international treaties signed by the Commonwealth it is
necessary that a clear statutory purpose exists to support such an
interpretation.197 Further, the legislation must continue to comply with
constitutional limitations.

198

Nevertheless a state parliament or the federal

parliament can overrule an international Human Rights norm by passing a clear
and unambiguous contrary law.

The external affairs clause in the Australian Constitution provides the
Commonwealth the power to legislate in respect to commitments made

In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, 477-478 Dixon J held that the fact that
Australia has ratified a treaty has ‘no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the
Crown’. This view subsisted in other cases such as Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (Mason
CJ and McHugh J) ; Kiao v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 (Gibbs CJ);Minister for Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287 (Mason CJ and Deane J)
195 See, eg, Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 (French, Branson and Stone JJ) As noted
by Evans, above n 1, 40: 'International human rights protection can also influence the
development of the common law, although so far it has not really done so in the sphere of
religious freedom.´
196 See, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287; Momcilovic v The
Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, [18]; Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners’Association (1908) 6
CLR 309, 353; Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576
197 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 581 (McHugh J), 643 (Hayne J), 661–2 (Callinan J)
198 Evans, above n 1, 40.
194
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internationally. That means that international treaties can be used as a basis for
internal legislation to protect certain human rights such as Religious Free Speech,
and to clarify the parameters in which the Commonwealth is permitted to
legislate about the issue.199 There is space in the external affairs clause for
legislation that implements article 18 of ICCPR.200 Furthermore, there is the
possibility of applying international protections to Religious Free Speech once
this is a subset of Religious Freedom and free-speech. Since Koowarta (1982) and
certainly after the Industrial Relation Act case (1996) it has been clear that the
Commonwealth’s power under s 51(xxix) was sufficient to implement the ICCPR
including Article 18 (plus the Religion Declaration) in Australian domestic law.
Once the legislative power to protect Religious Free Speech in accordance with
international norms exists, the absence of protection to religious discrimination
shows a clear inefficiency in the protection of Human Rights, suggesting either
that the issue is not politically important enough, or too hard. Regarding having
a specific Human Rights act or a specific legislation that protects Religious
Freedom, even the churches have been opposed until now for finding that it
could be more harmful than helpful to protecting this Human Right for a fear of
the weight and interpretation that may be given to it by the courts.

The introduction of legislation in the domestic forum based on international
sources can be problematic due to the protection of the national independence
that each nation like has. This is one of the reasons why the creation of such legal
mechanisms disseminated the debate regards the use of external affairs power to
provide basis to domestic legislation. The understanding of what each Human

As it can be seen in Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 (Brennan CJ, Toohey,
Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ) (‘Industrial Relations Act Case’) the existence of treaties
regards religious freedom possibilitates the federal legislative process but does not give carte
blanche. The legislation must be made whithin the treaty provisions in a way that do not
undermine the core existence for which the treatie exists.
200 Evans, above n 1.
199
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Right protected internationally mean to different countries might differ. This
means that slight cultural differences applicable in the legal protection of a right
in different countries are to be expected, but those differences cannot be so radical
that empties the meaning of the right protected in the first place.

As mentioned earlier, given the absence of a constitutional provision that
authorises the Federal Parliament to legislate on matters of anti-discrimination,
the Commonwealth is confined to relying upon the external affairs power.

To bolster the legislative power of the Commonwealth in such circumstances, the
High Court has given an expansive interpretation to the `external affairs’ power
in s 51 (xxix) of the Commonwealth Constitution.201 It has held that legislation that
aims to protect matters treated in international instruments does not have to
repeat the precise words of the international instrument, rather must merely be
‘appropriate and adapted’ to the purpose of implementing the obligations as
intended by the treaty.202 This independency from the wording of the specific
instruments gives the Commonwealth the possibility of developing the
appropriate mechanism that is suitable to its national conditions. It must be borne
in mind, however, that such power is not unlimited and the more closely a law
reflects the treaty provisions, the less likely it is to be subject to challenge.203

The obligation to protect Religious Freedom and Religious Free Speech, and to
prevent discrimination on the basis of religion or belief is set out in the ICCPR
and should be upheld by Australia.

Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501, 528; Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153
CLR 168; Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1, 124-4 (Mason J) and
258 (Deane J); Queensland v Commonwealth (1989) 167 CLR 232, 238 .
202 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416, 487 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and
Gummow JJ)
203 Evans, above n 1, 43.
201
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Although Australia has many Anti-Discrimination instruments204 the protection
of Religious Freedom and more specifically Religious Free Speech is very shallow
and when made has shown to be inadequate.205 The United Nations Human
Rights Committee has expressed concern regarding the lack of protection for
religious freedom in Australia.206 In its reports to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee regarding the ICCPR the Australian Government extensively
points to the Anti-Discrimination legislation all over the country as evidence of
Australia’s compliance with its international commitments.

The Anti-Discrimination law enacted by the Commonwealth of Australia,
namely: The Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 and
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 represent three of the seven core Human
Rights treaties that Australia has agreed to be bound by. 207 Not all seven of the
international instruments listed earlier however are incorporated into domestic
law.

See, eg, Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth); Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth); Disability
Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); AntiDiscrimination Act 1977 (NSW); Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991
(Qld); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA); Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA); Anti-Discrimination Act
1998 (Tas); Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT); Anti-Discrimination Act (NT).
205 The Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
206 Australian Human Rights Commission, UN Human Rights Committee: report on Australia's
human rights record (10 November 2017) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/unhuman-rights-committee-report-australia-s-human-rights-record>.
207 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January
1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 1 March 1980, 1249
UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981); Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515
UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85
(entered into force 26 June 1987).
204
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In terms of the States, the choice and justification to the creation of such laws is
more related to their political aims. The states have almost unlimited power to
pass Anti-Discrimination laws. They do not need to rely on international
conventions or treaties. They can pass any laws that suit them provided they are
not inconsistent with laws the Commonwealth government has validly passed.

The standards based on the international instruments and particularly the ICCPR
show a wide range of Human Rights to be protected. The political choice of only
legislating for those that are closer to the public eye and therefore more popular
goes against the idea of non-discrimination. Leaving some of the ICCPR rights
out of state Anti-Discrimination regimes is a problem. To get an appropriate
balance, all of the rights need to be protected. The choice that was made in
Australia of preferencing second generation (new) rights that are not even
mentioned in the ICCPR and leaving older rights that the UN has considered
more foundational out of the range of the specific protection are causing new
inequalities in society.

The next topic that requires discussion in this subchapter is the nature of the
Religious Freedom that is protected in the ICCPR. The ICCPR is the international
instrument that provides foundational protection to religious belief. The
protection given to Religious Free Speech in Australia is distinct from the
international standard as Australia adopts an alternative approach to the issue of
when a state is allowed to interfere in religious manifestation. While the gold
standard embodied in the ICCPR is based on the principle of “necessity” for such
intervention, in the Australian landscape the test is based on convenience. The
ICCPR comes with specific limitations for each right that it protects. 208In respect
to the right to religious freedom contained in article 18(3), a state can only enact

208

Evans, above n 1, 29.
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laws that interfere with ‘manifestations’ of religion or belief and not the internal
right to religion itself. There are two key aspects of article 18(3). First, any
interference with religious freedom must be ‘prescribed by law’, requiring clear
law regulating the area. Second, and most importantly, the interference with the
freedom must be ‘necessary’.'

Public good or convenience are not enough to justify a state’s limitation of the
right to manifest a religion or belief. It is necessary that the state shows the
measures taken which restrict the Religious Freedom are necessary and
proportional to the legitimate ends that it seeks to protect.209 A limitation on the
right to manifest a religion or belief can only be imposed if it is shown to be
‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary to protect public safety, order, health or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’. 210 This means that the
state cannot legislate to interfere with religious practice unless it is necessary; that
is, unless there is no other way.211

Ibid 29.
Ibid 33
211 According to Evans (ibid 34), ‘[w]hile international treaties recognise that freedom of religion
may be limited because it interferes with the rights and freedoms of others, the determination as
to when religious freedom should prevail over other rights has to be undertaken on a case-bycase basis.’
209
210
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IV.

DO THE HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS OF THE ACT AND VICTORIA
PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH?

There are two Charters of Human Rights currently operative in Australia, the
ACT Human Rights Act 2004 and the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities 2006. Although they are not technically Anti-Discrimination laws,
in order to accurately analyse the conflict between the Anti-Discrimination laws
and Religious Free Speech and the possible solutions to them it is important to
connect those legal mechanisms to the research theme and its effectiveness in the
protection of Religious Free Speech in Australia once this is a Human right.

The ACT Human Rights Act was the first Human Rights charter in Australia. In
its formation process, the consultative committee recommended that the charter
protect economic, social and cultural rights in addition to civil and political
rights.212 The final document was more conservative than what was originally
intended by the committee213 being limited to rights extracted from the ICCPR.
The ACT Human Right Act also failed to initially require of public authorities to
comply with Human Rights, but it is unlawful for public authorities to breach
rights214 and some remedies are available when they do so.215

The ACT Human Rights Act requires that the ACT courts interpret all legislation
consistently with its terms216 and when this is not possible, those courts must

ACT bill of rights Cosuktative Committee, Towards an ACT Human Rights Act (2003), 90.
See, Simon Bronitt, `Two visions of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT): A ´Claytons´ Bill of
Rights or the New Magna Carta?´(Paper presented at the Forum on the National Implications of
the ACT Human Rights Act, ANU, 1 July 2004).
214 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 40B(1)
215 Ibid s 40C(4). Damages are not usually available for breach of a right protected under the Act:
s 40C(4).
216 Section 30 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) provides: ‘So far as it is possible to do so
consistently with its purpose, a Territory law must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with
human rights’.
212
213

77

make declarations that a provision cannot be interpreted compatibly with
Human Rights.217 This does not invalidate such law as would be done if it was a
Constitutional Charter of Rights, rather it merely requires a notification to be
given to the legislative power informing them of such incompatibility. 218 This
ACT legislation prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion (among other
characteristics) and sets out a right to Religious Freedom. The provision presents
in s 14 of the ACT statute219 is very similar to the language used in the Victorian
legislation to be discussed below.

Cases under s 14 of the ACT statute generally do not examine or consider the
scope of religion,220 with the closest being Buzzacott v R221 This case involved a
man who was accused of dishonestly appropriating a bronze coat of arms from
outside Old Parliament House and was taken to the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. 222
Specificities of the reference to s 14 of the appeal in this case are not made clear
as affidavits submitted in the case contained sacred information that were
requested to remain only to the knowledge of the judge,223 what is known is that
the appeal was dismissed. 224

Ibid s 32.
Ibid s 33.
219 Section 14 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes—
a) the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his or her choice; and
b) the freedom to demonstrate his or her religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching, either individually or as part of a community and whether in public or private.
(2) No-one may be coerced in a way that would limit his or her freedom to have or adopt a religion
or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.
220 R v AM [2010] ACTSC 149 (15 November 2010); Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the
Archdiocese of Canberra and Goulburn & ACT Heritage Council (Administrative Review) [2012]
ACAT 81 (21 December 2012).
221 Buzzacott v R [2005] ACTCA
222 Ibid, 7
223 Ibid, 16
224 Ibid, 17
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The State of Victoria also legislated in 2006 the Charter of Human Rights. Like the
ACT legislation, the Charter requires that courts interpret all legislation consistent
with the Human Rights protections contained in the Charter225 and where this is
not possible, make declarations that a provision cannot be interpreted
compatibly with Human Rights.226 This does not invalidate such law as would be
the case if a law breached a Commonwealth constitutional Charter of Rights
which was binding upon states, rather the legislature is merely notified of laws
that are incompatible with Human Rights under the Charter.227

The Victorian Charter, like the ACT statute prohibits discrimination on the basis
of religion and sets out a right to Religious Freedom. The difference being that
the ACT uses the language of ‘everyone’, instead of ‘every person’ and only states
that no-one may be ‘coerced’ in a way that would limit his or her Religious
Freedom, rather than ‘coerced or restrained’ as stated in the Victorian Charter.

Turning now to the cases that have used s 14 of the Victorian Charter, the first
worthy of mention is Valentine v Emergency Services Superannuation Board (General)
in which a widow of a former ambulance driver had her pension terminated once
she remarried. 228 She was told that her pension would be reinstated if she
divorced her current husband or if he died. She consequently complained that
she was being penalised on the basis of her religion as her religious beliefs
prohibited her from obtaining a divorce. Ultimately, she was not successful with
the Tribunal ruling against her. In another case, s 14 of the Charter was raised in
a disciplinary hearing, where a dentist advised a patient suffering from mental

Section 32(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) provides: ‘Sofar
as it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be
interpreted in a way that is compatiblewith human rights’.
226 Ibid s 36.
227 Ibid s 37.
228 [2010] VCAT 2130.
225
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illness that she was afflicted by evil spirits and that she should attend church to
be cured.229 Section 14 was not successful in the case as the Charter was not in
force at the time the original decision was made.230

Another significant reference to s 14 of the Victorian Charter occurred in Hoskin v
Greater Bendigo City Council where the Court of Appeal held the Bendigo Council
was obliged to take into account important human rights provisions, including s
14 when deciding whether to allow the construction of an Islamic mosque in
Bendigo. Other cases have included: Canterbury Municipal Council v Moslem Alawy
Society Ltd,231 Rutherford & Ors v Hume CC232 and Fraser v Walker.233

Whilst both the ACT and Victoria have created Human Rights laws, their
respective instruments fail to implement the religious limitation contained in the
ICCPR as mentioned earlier in this thesis. As such, the Human Rights legislation
of these states permit secularist liberal interpretations of human rights laws to
relegate Religious Freedom to a low position in ‘an implicit hierarchy of rights
established not by international law, but by the intellectual fashions of the day’.234
Instead of affirming that Religious Freedom should only be limited in cases
where it is necessary ‘to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others’,235 what was used was a general
balancing provision that basically destroyed the “necessity” provision in article
18(3).236Furthermore, the interpretation of judges in the current grounds provides
an unconstrained discretion whether or not to take any account of international

Dental Practitioners Board of Victoria v Gardner (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2008]
VCAT 908
230 Ibid
231 (1985) 1 NSWLR 525.
232 Rutherford & Ors v Hume CC [2014] VCAT 786 (14 July 2014).
233 Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911 (19 November 2015).
234 Parkinson, above n 58, 121.
235 ICCPR Article 18(3).
236 Parkinson, above n 58, 98-101.
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law in carrying out that work of interpretation of other legislation when
balancing to those specific charters rights.

The Victorian Charter for instance does gain its moral authority from
international Human Rights law but does not comply with that body of law. The
Victorian legislation provides people less Religious Freedom rights than the
ICCPR. This is because the ICCPR offers no justification for a hierarchy of Human
Rights in which Anti-Discrimination provisions could possibly be above the
rights to Religious Freedom and freedom of conscience. Further, the ICCPR does
not offer any justification for the limitation of fundamental Human Rights 237 such
as seen in the parameters shown in the Victorian Charter, namely that those
limitations are ‘justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom’ subject to the discernment of the person appointed to
make such a judgment.

The ICCPR provides greater protection than this, article 18 being one of the few
rights in the Covenant that cannot be derogated from even in a time of public
emergency that threatens the life of the nation. 238This brings us to the conclusion
that freedom of religion in Australia is treated as trivial, as if religious beliefs are
not important.239 They are rarely positively protected and when they are
protected it is to a lesser extent than required by international standards. This
brings uncertainty to religious groups who may be wanting to support or petition
for a Religious Freedom Act federally, as will be discussed in the 6th chapter.

See also, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984).
238 ICCPR Article 4(2). See also, Paul Babie and Neville Rochow, Freedom of Religion under Bills of
Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 135-136.
239 See Parkinson, above n 58.
237
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The limitations to which Human Rights can be subjected both in the Victorian
Charter and the ACT Human Rights legislation are subject to the grounds of
reasonableness and not necessity.240 Neither the ACT nor Victorian legislation can
override legislative provisions that are against Human Rights preserving the
independence of the parliament,241 being only possible to notify the
inconsistency. An optimistic side of those treaties is that both of those characters
is the possibility of using international sources to base decision in domestic
tribunals. In practice this has not changed the problem with necessity in those
states although considering that the international protection shows a possible
larger ground than the Australian one as it is seen on chapter 2 being a doorway
to a more comprehensive interpretation. Especially when considering that the
case law shapes the behaviour in society.

Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 7(2); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT)
s 28.
241 Joanna Davidson, 'Incorporation of human rights in administrative decision-making: the
impact of human rights instruments in Victoria and the Act' (2012)(68) AIAL Forum 43, 44.
240

82

V.

CONCLUSION.

The equality aimed for by instruments such as anti-discrimination laws cannot
be adequately achieved by means that ultimately intersect and conflict with other
Human Rights. 242 Existing anti-discrimination laws in Australia do not provide
frameworks that allow tribunals and courts to balance and resolve these conflicts
in ways that respect Religious Freedom and its subset Religious Free Speech.243
Religion relates to virtually every corner of human life. The necessity of
constantly litigating and justifying religious speech are burdens or impediments
to Religious Freedom.

Instead of creating an even ground between secular and religious views, a battle
between those immensurable ‘values’244 takes place, a dispute in which religious
beliefs are progressively considered more suitable to a private sphere.245
Regarding the danger of overlooking religion in the public sphere, Ferrari points
out that focusing on non-discrimination, ignoring religious differences and
misunderstanding those two by neutrality of the State is likely to negatively
neutralize religion expelling it from the public space. 246

Australia has decided to adopt a large amount of Anti-Discrimination legislation
in a short period of time. The grounds in which such laws are based have become
larger and not much has been done to harmonise the many, and sometimes
overlapping, Anti-Discrimination acts or to translate effectiveness to this

See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 4.
Ibid
244 The possible inaccuracy of the word ‘values’ is extensively considered by Iain Benson, see: ‘Do
“Values” Mean Anything at All?’ (Paper presented at the Education at the Crossroads
Conference, University of Calgary, May 11, 2002); ‘Do “values” mean anything at all?
Implications for law, education and society’ (2008) 33(1) Journal for Juridical Science 33(1).
245 For more on the political discussions of religion in Australia, see: Evans, above n 1, 13-19; Frank
Brennan, above n 41, 85.
246 Ferrari et al, above n 117, 20-25.
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legislative rush brought to society and the mere optimistic idea that legal
mechanisms which ignore or trump them are the tools to lasting positive social
change is not appropriate. The use of legislation as a way of enforcing certain
social behaviour is valid in certain circumstances, but it is far from being the
appropriate mechanism to teach and assure the respect to be aimed in other to
reach an equality situation. Anti-discrimination legislation is not working as
effectively in Australia as it could because it is ignoring the adequate protection
of some fundamental Human Rights such as Religious Free Speech and creating
new and dangerous inequalities.

Although Anti-Discrimination legislation has proliferated in Australia, there is
not much protection in such acts to the religious sphere. Furthermore, the
approach adopted by Australia when imposing limitations on the religious
sphere (i.e. the “convenience” rather than “necessity” standard for interference)
has resulted in religious speech and practices being in an uncomfortable situation
that becomes motive of concern when clashed against Anti-Discrimination laws.

The protection of core human rights is not to be based on the agreeing with the
points of view or sharing the worldview but to protect them as part of Human
Dignity. An anti-religious feeling is growing with the accentuation of secularism
and changing social values. As a result, the protection the Religious Free Speech
in Australia is less hopeful than one would wish for.

International human rights instruments currently offer more protection for
Religious Free Speech than domestic legislation. It should not be accepted that a
multicultural country with zeal for equality and Religious Freedom, is providing
less protection than the international standard. This is concerning for a
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multicultural country that was once a great defender of human rights.247 Freedom
of religion including freedom of religious speech, is an essential human right in
international law, not an optional one. Article 27 of the ICCPR points out that
there is no contradiction between Religious Freedom and multiculturalism.248

An extremist attitude towards third generation rights in Anti-Discrimination
legislation, combined with a new negative view towards multiculturalism in this
new millennium has led to a view that equality is not compatible with the
recognition of anti-discriminatory rights.

249

It is easily forgotten that in

multiculturalism, respecting the rights of minorities includes acknowledgingf
diversity. 250

In the domain of Anti-Discrimination legislation there is a sensitive and has
signalised to be a backfire against the Religious Free Speech. Activists of different
branches of social point of views may make use of the tool designed to protect
minorities to create other minorities. The idea behind the policies surrounding
Anti-Discrimination legislation would not be to create a mechanism designed to
achieve relatively slowly a single voice regarding the most various topics,
polemic or not. To develop this way lies one of the dangers of the legislation, that
is, the risk of supressing free-speech on empowering a singular view to each topic
as considered the correct one. Furthermore, the lack of positive direction and
protection to the Religious Freedom when this is confronted with other rights
brings intrinsic to itself the expansion of restrictions to human behaviour and

There are arguments that point to a suspiscious attitude towards multiculturalism in the
advancement of the freedom and dignity of people and the promotion of individual rights. Susan
Moller Okin, for example, gave voice to these sentiments in her influential essay, ‘Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’ (1997) 22 Boston Review 8. For more views, see Will Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995); Babie and Rochow, above n
235, 126.
248 Ibid 147.
249 Ibid 127.
250 Ibid 130.
247
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public debate. The range of discrimination to which such laws are applied grows
wider and are being extended to prohibit activity-based discrimination in
addition to identity-based discrimination.251 Religious Freedom, like any other
Human Right, is not an absolute one and it may be restricted in specific
conditions. The restriction of Religious Free Speech cannot be treated lightly and
extended to a large number of topics.

The development of Anti-Discrimination legislation as a tool for the restriction of
Religious Freedom and particularly Religious Free Speech is not positive. Even
in delicate issues or recognisable just causes the suppression of speech cannot be
treated lightly and can only persevere in cases where a deep and irreversible
result is at stake. Dissonant thoughts should be protected by free speech. The
suppression of thoughts does not make them go away, au contraire, it allows them
to continue to grow, unchallenged, and to persevere or develop themselves into
absolute truths.

It is not defended here that incitation to vilification, violence or hatred towards
any individual should be tolerated into a society. Such violence-inciting speech
is much closer to a violent behaviour that the manifestation of a correct (or
incorrect) point of view for it aims to harm and to be translated as a violence.
Reaching deeper on the sphere of the Freedom of Speech and closer to the ground
studied in this thesis, is to allocate such in relation to another fundamental
Human Right: Religious Freedom. The right resulting of such equation is the
Religious Free Speech.

Ben O'Neill, 'Anti-discrimination law and the attack on freedom of conscience' (2011) 27(2)
Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas 3
251
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Religion as being the fundamental ground in to which the human being connects
spiritually with the reality in which in inserted reaches a fundamental form of its
manifestation. For this reason, Religious Free Speech has to be attended with care
when confronting with other rights. To assure that a human being is entitling to
connect and manifest the beliefs that translates the reason of existence without
being persecuted is an essential tool to avoid the rise of other minorities.

The history, mainly of the last two centuries has shown that Religious Freedom
is a fundamental principle and inalienable to the prosperity and success for a
society, which has been evident in the development of western societies. There
seems to be a preference as to which types of Human Rights are protected in AntiDiscrimination law. This preferencing of certain rights seems to be related to the
popularity of the demand, which is absolutely not what Human Rights and the
protection of minorities is about.

A key aspect of whether a limitation on a right can be justified is whether the
limitation is necessary and proportional to the objective it seeks to achieve. Even
if the objective is of sufficient importance and the measures in question are
rationally connected to the objective, the limitation may still not be justified
because of the severity of its impact on individuals or groups.252 The Australian
anti-discrimination laws are an excessive mechanism used by the states and
Commonwealth to achieve even relationships between their citizens without
having calculated the full results of that legal resource.

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Guide to Human
Rights (2014) 8.
252
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4TH CHAPTER RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH IN PRACTICE AND WHAT THE
CASES HAVE SAID ABOUT IT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters framed the Anti-Discrimination laws and Religious Free
Speech in the Australian context. The 2nd chapter focused on Religious Free
Speech, outlining its importance, relating it to Human Rights and Human
Dignity. It also identified international standards and how the treatment of
Religious Free Speech in Australia measures up against those standards. The 3rd
chapter explained the Australian approach to Anti-Discrimination laws and
examined the intersections between the third generation Human Rights often
protected by them and the Religious Free Speech that was declared in the UDHR
in 1948.

The present chapter advances the discussion by examining some of the cases in
which there has been a clash between Religious Free Speech and AntiDiscrimination law in Australia. This discussion will demonstrate that many
current Anti-Discrimination laws in Australia do not adequately respect
Religious Free Speech in practice.

This chapter is divided into the following sections: (A) introduction, (B)
discrimination laws that concern the provision of goods and services, (C)
discrimination laws that concern life expression and employment, and (D)
discrimination laws that concern life expression and speech.
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The first topic addresses the Victorian case of Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors
v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors253 and points especially to the
courts definition of religious and life parameters. The second topic addresses the
case Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force254 in which Major Gaynor lodged a
complaint against the Australian Defence Force for his termination for failing to
comply with the instructions not to make controversial comments. The
comments were not made while Major Gaynor was serving as an active member
of the Defence Force, rather they were made privately on his personal social
media.

In the topic ´Life expressions and speech´ several more cases are considered. The
first case is Fraser v Walker255 in which Michelle Fraser was charged with
‘displaying an obscene figure in a public place’ for standing in a footpath close to
an abortion clinic in Melbourne with a poster with images of dead unborn
children. The next case, Preston v Police256 draws on a similar problem, Mr Preston
was charged under s 9(2) of the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act
2013 (Tas) for protesting by holding a picture of an unborn child less than 150 m
away from an abortion clinic.

The third case in this subtopic is Burns v Corbett257 which involved a complaint by
Mr Burns, a gay Anti-Discrimination activist258, against Ms Corbett, who at the
time was a candidate for the federal seat of Wannon in western Victoria standing
for the Katter Party. Ms Corbett made controversial statements regarding

Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors [2014]
VSCA 75 (16 April 2014)
254 Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) [2015] FCA 1370.
255 Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911.
256 Police v Preston [2016] TASMC.
257 Corbett v Burns [2014] NSWCATAP 42.
258 See, eg, Garry Burns Gay Anti Discrimination Activist Australia
<https://garryburnsantidiscriminationactivist.com/>.
253
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homosexuals to a western Victorian newspaper and Mr Burns brought a
complaint against her in NSW under s 49ZT of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
(NSW). Mr Burns has multiple (over 200) cases lodged under AntiDiscrimination grounds such as this and Gaynor v Burns.259

The fourth case concerns a complaint lodged against Archbishop Julian Porteous
in Tasmania that was subsequently withdrawn. On November 2015, Ms Delaney
lodged a complaint under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) because of the
content of a pastoral letter that explained the Catholic Church’s teaching on
marriage called ‘Don’t Mess with Marriage’. The booklet was distributed in
Catholic schools in Tasmania.

The last case considered is Catch the Fire Ministry,260 where Catch the Fire
Ministries Inc was sued under the religious vilification clause in Victoria by the
Islamic Council of Victoria because of the content of some of their talks and
publications that presented views on Islam that were not pleasing for some
members of the Islamic Council.

259
260

Burns v Corbett; Gaynor v Burns [2017] NSWCA 3.
Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc [2004] VCAT 2510
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II.

CASE STUDIES: WHERE RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW CURRENTLY COLLIDE
A. Introduction

For people of faith, religion informs almost every aspect of their life. That does
not mean that every religiously motivated act is protected as an element of
Religious Freedom.261 One of the concerns is that as Australia becomes
demographically less religious, social conventions less consistent with religious
teaching will be pushed into a smaller and smaller realm and more laws may
interfere with Religious Freedom.262 This would mean that living a life that is
consistent with religious values in the public sphere may not be deemed as
something worthy of protection. Religious believers seek protection from laws
which they perceive as interfering with this freedom263 and in Australia there are
no particularly good regulatory or legal mechanisms for settling the conflict
between Religious Free Speech and the Anti-Discrimination laws.

Carolyn Evans, Religious freedom: One right among many, The University of Melbourne
<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/religious-freedom-one-right-among-many>
262 Ibid
263 Ibid
261
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B. Goods and services

The Australian case to be discussed regarding the provision of goods and services
is Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited
& Ors.264 The facts of the case are as follows. A Christian camping organization
and its representative, Mr Rowe, were sued for discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation under the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 (Vic).265 Mr Rowe’s
organization refused to approve a booking made by an entity that focused on
youth suicide prevention for same-sex attracted young people and presented
homosexuality as a normal and ordinary part of life. The group was seeking to
use the campsite facilities of Christian Youth Camps Limited (‘CYC’) to host one
of their events. The majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded that
“doctrines” of the Christian faith were to be confined to matters dealt with in the
historic Apostles’ Creed and Nicene Creed, neither of which mention specifically
sexual activity.266 The CYC was not considered ‘established for religious
purposes’ by both Courts.

Although considering the Victorian Charter of Rights, which contains a right to
freedom of religion and religious practice in s 14 and a right to freedom of
expression in s 15, the Tribunal ruled against the CYC and Mr Rowe, and held
that they had engaged in unlawful discrimination and were consequently
ordered to pay a fine.267 It must be added that the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic)

Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors [2014]
VSCA 75
265 Under ss 42(1)(a) and (c), and s 49.
266 Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors [2014]
VSCA 75, [276]-[277].
267 Cobaw Community Health Services Ltd v Christian Youth Camps Ltd & Rowe [2010] VCAT 1613 (8
Oct 2010)
264
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also contained exemptions based on religion268 but the tribunal held that none
were applicable in the case.

The idea that the religious freedom of the CYC should be restricted to the
parameters established by the court demonstrates the minimal respect accorded
to Religious Freedom. The Australian Court in this case followed the trend of
defining what religious beliefs are or should be, and therefore adjudicated
theological matters that are beyond their competence. In the appeal, the court
reiterated the view of the tribunal and held that to criticize homosexual sexual
activity was tantamount to an attack on those who identify as homosexual.269
Furthermore, by a 2-1 majority, the court held that both the company and the
employee who engage in discriminatory conduct can be held liable.

Sections 75 (2) of the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) provides: ‘Nothing in Part 3 applies to
anything done by a body established for religious purposes that – (a) conforms with the doctrines
of the religion; or (b) is necessary to avoid injury to the religious sensitivities of people of the
religion.’ Whilst, s 77 provides: ‘Nothing in Part 3 applies to discrimination by a person against
another person if the discrimination is necessary for the first person to comply with the person’s
genuine religious beliefs or principles.’
269 In Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited & Ors
[2014] VSCA 75, 274 [57] Maxwell P, quoting Judge Hampel in Cobaw Community Health Service
v Christian Youth Camps Ltd [2010] VCAT 1613, [138] stated: ´To distinguish between an aspect
of a person’s identity, and conduct which accepts that aspect of identity, or encourages people to
see that part of identity as normal, or part of the natural and healthy range of human identities,
is to deny the right to enjoyment and acceptance of identity.´ Furthermore, Maxwell P held that
‘her Honour was right to reject the distinction between ‘syllabus’ and ‘attribute’, for the reasons
which her Honour gave’: [59].
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C. Life expression and employment

In Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor270 the plaintiff, Major Bernard Gaynor lodged
a complaint against the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for the termination of
his position in 2013. Gaynor had a distinguished record of service in the
Australian Regular Army.

The reason for the termination was that Mr Gaynor failed to refrain from
remarking on controversial issues such as the support provided by the ADF to
the Gay and Lesbian Mardis Gras. Mr Gaynor also expressed strong opinions on
how Australia should deal with the threat of Islamic violent extremism. The
plaintiff was not claiming a right to make such comments while a full-time
member of the Army or in active service with the Army reserve, but while using
social media in his private capacity.271 Nevertheless, he was charged with
disobeying instructions to `refrain from [making] public statements contrary to
the ADF policy while he remained a member of the ADF.’272

The initial decision in this case indicated strong protection is accorded to freedom
of speech and the free exercise of religion in Australia when the relevant speech
involves political factors. Buchanan J upheld the legality of the orders given to
Mr Gaynor and analysed the constitutionality of orders when confronted with
the implied freedom of political speech273 and s 116 prohibition on the Parliament
to authorise unnecessary impairment of the free exercise of religion.274 In the case

Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] 246 FCR 298
Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) [2015] FCA 1370, 223
272 Ibid [215]
273 Ibid [220]
274 Ibid. The court noted, ‘[t]here were two challenges to the laws on constitutional grounds: one
based on the implied right to freedom of political speech, and the other based on the s 116
prohibition of the Parliament authorising undue impairment of the free exercise of religion.´
270
271
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Buchanan J gives an overview of previous decisions on the implied freedom 275
and applies the McCloy276 framework in determining whether or not the speech
restrictions in the case were serving a legitimate purpose `compatible with the
system of representative government for which the Constitution provides, where
the extent of the burden can be justified as suitable, necessary and adequate,
having regard to the purpose of those restrictions.’ The conclusion drawn by His
Honour in this case was that the burden applied to Mr Gaynor’s political
speech277 was not proportional.278

The claims made in regard to the free exercise of religion under s 116 of the
Constitution were quickly dismissed by his Honour as Buchanan J adopted the
narrow view of the High Court in Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic),279 namely that actions based on religion are not “protected” by s 116
if they ‘offend against the ordinary laws’. Again, the decision was based on a
narrow approach that effectively holds as the orders did not prevent Mr Gaynor
from “going to church” they were not breaching s 116.

Mr Gaynor speech, though may `offend` or `insult, ` is also political and for this
reason alone should still be protected. This show a potential value to the
protection of Religious Free Speech if this is reflected in the political
communication protection. The Full Court of the Federal Court (Perram,
Mortimer & Gleeson JJ) overturned the previous decision in the case and upheld
Mr Gaynors dismissal in 2017. The Full Court the analysis made previously in

Ibid [229]-[239]
McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34
277 Gaynor v Chief of the Defence Force (No 3) [2015] FCA 1370, [246]-[248]
278 ‘Membership of the ADF, while on service in one form or another, undoubtedly carries with it
obligations of obedience to lawful commands, and all the rigour and restrictions of military
service but it does not seem to me that it extinguishes either freedom of belief or, while free from
military discipline, freedom of expression.’: Ibid [287]
279 Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120
275
276
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the case, understanding that his Honour wrongly treated the “implied freedom”
as a personal right enjoyed by citizens. It was pointed that, the High Court
required that this freedom should be seen as a limit on legislative power.280 What
this suggests is that a reserve member of the Armed Forces who makes
controversial, religiously motivated, political comments on a private website
contrary to the policy of the defence force will have his or her service terminated.

280

Ibid [47]-[52]
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D. Life expressions and speech

The focus of this chapter is the Australian jurisprudence on life expressions and
speech. The first case is Fraser v Walker,281 which involved Michelle Fraser a prolife activist who stood outside an abortion clinic in Melbourne displaying a poster
with pictures of aborted babies. Fraser was charged and convicted of ‘displaying
an obscene figure in a public place’.282 The County Court decided that something
could be “obscene” even if it had no sexual connotations but was simply
‘offensive or disgusting’.283

In her defence, Fraser claimed that the displaying of the poster was part of her
‘right to freedom of conscience and religion’.284 This argument was rejected along
with other human rights defences.285 Lacava J was not satisfied with the claim
that the law contravened the implied freedom of political communication in the
Constitution or that the case was properly characterised as political
communication. Lacava J also said that:
the appellant’s right to Religious Freedom does not provide a legal immunity
permitting her to breach the provision of the Act in question. Assuming the
appellant’s stance on abortion comes from her religious belief, the display of obscene

Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911
Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic), s 17(1)(b)
283 Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911, [21]
284 Ibid [38]
285 Ibid. At paragraph [48] Judge Lacava stated:´I am not satisfied on the facts of this case that
what the appellant was displaying could properly be characterised as political communication.
That which was displayed by the appellant was not directed at government or those charged with
legislative responsibility. In my view, it was nothing more than a communication directed
squarely at those who operate the clinic in Wellington Street and those who attended as patients.
Section 17 of the Act exists for the purpose of ensuring, where possible, good order in public
places such as the footpath in Wellington Street. In the circumstances here, proper application of
the provision does not, in my view, burden in an inappropriate way the appellant’s right to
political communication and is thus enforceable’
281
282

97

figures is not part of religion nor can it be said the display is done in furtherance of
religion .´286

The view of the court in this case results in restriction to religious and political
manifestation in the controversial area of abortion in a case has an AntiDiscriminatory nature by its contents and for the implication of the Victorian
Charter of Rights.287

In another case related to abortion clinics, Police v Preston288, Mr Graham Preston
and two other protestors were charged under s 9 of the Reproductive Health (Acess
to Terminations) Act 2013 in Tasmania for holding up signs protesting against
abortions outside a clinic. The challenge on the basis of the implied freedom of
political communication failed.

After analysing the law in accordance with McCloy, the magistrate accepted the
prohibition was a “significant” burden on their freedom of speech on a political
matter.289 Her Honour concluded that the legislation in this case was a
proportionate response to a problem identified by the legislature. The onus
imposed on Mr Preston’s freedom of expression was not disproportionate as it
did not entirely remove the capacity of Mr Preston to express opposition to
abortion. 290

Ibid [49]
Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911, 37. The court noted: ´The appellant next argues that the Charter
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (“the Charter”) protects and promotes human rights,
including civil and political rights which are derived from the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Section 32(1) of the Charter provides that so far as it is possible to do so
consistently with their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is
compatible with human rights. If the words of a statute are capable of more than one meaning,
the Court should give them whichever of those meanings best accords with the human right in
question.´
288 Police v Preston [2016] TASMC
289 Police v Preston [2016] TASMC, [38]
290 Ibid [53]
286
287
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Section 46 of the Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) expressly protects Religious Freedom.
The defence raised an argument based on this section that the reason for the
protest was religious. The magistrate accepted that this was the nature of the
protest, but justified her orders based on the need for ‘public order.’291 This
public order analysis reasonably follows a trend of the moment instead of a neat
justification on the limitations on Freedom of Religion. Whilst this is a Tasmanian
case, similar exclusion zones have been put in place recently in the Australian
Capital Territory, the Northern Territory and in Victoria. They have also been
considered for introduction in Queensland292 and in New South Wales.293

The case of Burns v Corbett connects specifically with the freedom of political
communication. Ms Corbett, a candidate for the conservative Katter Party in
Victoria, said in an interview to a local paper:294
I don't want gays, lesbians or paedophiles to be working in my kindergarten.
If you don't like it, go to another kindergarten.
When asked if she considered homosexuals to be in the same category as
paedophiles, Ms Corbett replied "yes".
"Paedophiles will be next in line to be recognised in the same way as gays
and lesbians and get rights," she said.

The general content of her interview was republished online in the Sydney
Morning Herald in New South Wales (‘NSW’) as `she had told [the] reporter both
that homosexuality was “against the word of God” and that she was pleased to

Ibid 84. The magistrate noted: ‘[T]he protest activity which is prohibited by s 9(2) of the Act
clearly has the capacity to result in a disturbance to public order. Such conduct interferes with
the privacy, indeed the medical privacy, of patients attending the premises at which terminations
of pregnancies are conducted. The conduct has the potential to lead to some form of public
disturbance…’
292 Health (Abortion Law Reform) Amendment Bill 2016 (Qld) s24.
293 Summary Offences Amendment (Safe Access to Reproductive Health Clinics) Bill 2017 (NSW).
294 Corbett v Burns [2014] NSWCATAP 42
291
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have “got the front page” of the Hamilton Spectator.’295 In addition, the article on
the Sydney Morning Herald's website reported a statement by Ms Corbett to the
effect that 'gays and lesbians and paedophiles were "moral issues"'. 296

Even though the incident itself happened in Victoria and it was a NSW
newspaper that was publicising Ms Corbett’s comments, it was held that Ms
Corbett could be sued under s 49ZT(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
(NSW).297 The Appeal Panel said that the statements made by Ms Corbett met the
test of ‘incitement’ understanding that her ‘agreement with the proposition that
homosexuals are in the same category as paedophiles, ‘is “capable of”, or has the
effect of, “urging” or “spurring on” an “ordinary member of the class to whom it
is directed” to treat homosexuals as deserving to be hated or to be regarded with
“serious contempt”’.

There was an exception to this conclusion. Ms Corbett had made two additional
statements which did not appear in the Hamilton Spectator article but were
published on the websites of the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian,
respectively. The NSW Court of Appeal held that these two statements did meet
the requirements of s 49ZT (1). Those statements were that ‘gays and lesbians and
paedophiles were “moral issues” and that homosexuality was “against the word
of God”.’298

There are two main aspects to this case. The first is the jurisdictional issue, which
is not the main concern for our purposes (although the fact that Ms Corbett was
sued under the Anti-Discrimination instrument of a state other than the one

Corbett v Burns [2014] NSWCATAP 42
Corbett v Burns [2014] NSWCATAP 42, [10].
297 Burns v Gaynor [2015] NSWCATAD 211
298 Corbett v Burns [2014] NSWCATAP 42
295
296
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where she made her controversial declarations, should elicit astonishment and
concern). The NSW Court of Appeal ruled that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to issue the orders in this case.

It must be outlined that Mr Burns, the gay activist that sued Ms Corbett, has over
200 cases involving Anti-Discrimination claims.299 This shows that he uses a
mechanism intended to protect minorities as a weapon for mass legal activism.
This use of anti-discrimination legislation as a sword rather than a shield is
inappropriate. The structure of the anti-discriminatory body of law discussed in
the 3rd chapter enables the legislation to be used this way. What this means is that
tribunals and courts considering conflicts between Religious Free Speech and
other human rights protected under anti-discrimination laws possibly can and
will ignore the religious rights since the legislation does not specifically mention
it, or even exempt religious expressions. If any person in any state in Australia
can be sued under a law from any other state, the protection of Religious Freedom
will be profoundly weak.

The second aspect of this case is that the allegations made by a political candidate
during their campaigning should be protected under the implied freedom of
political communication. The purpose of this freedom is to allow an informed
public to fully participate in the election process as established by the High Court
in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation300 from ss 7, 24, 41 & 128 of the
Constitution.

The Archbishop Porteous case, unlike the others that have been presented in this
chapter, was not one that actually went to court. A complaint was made in the

Burns, Garry, <https://garryburnsantidiscriminationactivist.com/>.
(1997) 189 CLR 520. See, eg, Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional
Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials (Federation Press, 7th ed, 2018), chapters 27 and 29.
299
300
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Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Commission by former Greens candidate
Martine Delaney about the distribution in catholic schools of a booklet that
explained the position of the Roman Catholic Church regarding the traditional
view of marriage.

The complaint was withdrawn for apparent strategic reasons. Archbishop
Porteous has expressed disappointment over the case301 not being continued. In
his view, Tasmanians had been ‘left under a cloud of uncertainty’.302 The idea that
such case was presented in the only state that provides explicit constitutional
provision protecting the Religious Freedom brings uneasiness to the idea of an
actual protection of Religious Free Speech. The complaint was withdrawn before
any indication of the result could be predicted. In another similar case,
Presbyterian pastor Campbell Markham and street preacher David Gee had a
complaint lodged against them before Tasmania’s Anti-Discrimination
Commissioner.303 The complaint related to comments made about same-sex
marriage both on Markham’s blog and while Gee was street preaching. This case
was also withdrawn.

With the result of the same-sex postal vote delivering a victory for the “yes”
campaign, it is hard to predict if more controversy will be raised in the area of
same-sex relationships and religious freedom. Although same-sex marriage
became lawful in Australia, guarantees of Religious Free Speech were not

Augusto Zimmermann, ‘Same-Sex Marriage, Freedom of Speech and Religious Liberty in
Australia – A Critical Appraisal’ (2017) 7(1) Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and
Secular Ethics.
302 See, eg, Robert Hiini, 'Anti-discrimination proceedings dropped but Archbishop Porteous
disappointed' Catholic Weekly (Online), 7 May 2016 <https://www.catholicweekly.com.au/antidiscrimination-proceedings-dropped-but-archbishop-porteous-disappointed/>.
303 John Sandeman, 'Anti-discrimination case against preachers dropped', Eternity News (Online),
7 March 2018 <https://www.eternitynews.com.au/australia/anti-discrimination-case-againstpreacher-dropped/>
301
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defined, with no religious exemptions being made.304 The actual implications or
consequences of such legal changes will be observed in the next few months.
Predictions in this domain at this stage would be nothing more than speculation.

Exemptions were not put in place in the new marriage legislation and now the
Australian public must await the results of the Ruddock Committee to know
what legislative measures will or will not be taken by the legislature.

The case of Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot v Islamic
Council of Victoria Inc and Attorney General for the State of Victoria305 (‘Catch the Fire’)
exemplifies the religious speech of one religion conflicting with another religion.
This case is very interesting as it raised the possibility of Religious Freedom
clashing with Religious Free Speech. This demonstrates the complexities
associated with balancing the different freedoms that are part of a democratic
society.

In this case, the Islamic Council of Victoria (‘ICV’) lodged a complaint against
Catch the Fire Ministries Inc, an evangelical Christian church. The reason for the
complaint was the content of a seminar and published material containing
critiques of Islam that, according to the ICV, conflicted with s 8 of the Racial and
Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic).

Paul Karp, 'Same-sex marriage bill does not hinder religious freedom, says Turnbull', The
Guardian
(Online),
17
November
2017
<https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2017/nov/17/same-sex-marriage-bill-does-not-hinder-religious-freedom-says-turnbull>;
Paul Karp, 'Religious protection fight looms over same-sex marriage bill', The Guardian (Online)
15 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/nov/15/religiousprotection-fight-looms-over-same-sex-marriage-bill>
305 Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v, Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc
and Attorney General for the State of Victoria (2006) 206 FLR 56 (‘Catch the Fire’)
304
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Catch the Fire Ministries Inc argued that the actions taken by the evangelical
church were reasonable and undertaken in good faith and that the seminar and
publications were conducted and published for a genuine religious purpose and
in the public interest. The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal upheld
the ICV’s complaint finding the pastors breached the Act and ordered them to
publicly apologise for the beliefs expressed and promise not to repeat them. The
Tribunal order which restricted the Religious Free Speech of the pastors can be
considered a violation of Australia’s obligations towards the protection of rights
of conscience and freedom of expression as presented in the 2nd Chapter.

Catch the Fire Ministries Inc successfully appealed the decision to the Victorian
Court of Appeal, where the Tribunal`s findings of vilification was overturned.
The case was referred back to the Tribunal which set aside the original orders
and remitted the decision to be heard by a different Tribunal member. The matter
itself was eventually resolved by an out-of-court settlement. It should be noted
that the determination of this case clearly evidenced that the limits of the
Religious Free Speech in Australia remained blurred.

It is important to note that the final question of whether there was vilification in
the case remained unanswered. This does not mean that the case is not relevant
in the interpretation of the Racial and Religious Tolerance Act.306 Its relevance is
increased when considering that the Victorian Act is one of the few laws that
specifically touch on the matter of religious vilification.

In the Catch the Fire case, it was made clear that incitement includes both words and
actions that encourage or intend to encourage others.307 The interpretation of the
Victorian Act along the lines that it does not ‘prohibit statements concerning the
306
307

Evans, above n 1, 177.
Catch the Fire Ministries Case (2006) 15 VR 207, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 254 (Neave JA).
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religious beliefs of a person or group of persons simply because they may offend
or insult the person or group of persons’308 seems more adequate to the protection
to Religious Free Speech upheld by Australia in its international commitments.
Such an interpretation would be welcome when Religious Free Speech is in
competition with other aspects of Anti-discrimination law. Application of this
interpretation would mean that statements made pursuant to genuine religious
beliefs which may offend or insult a person or group should not be the object of
Anti-discrimination persecution. The open multicultural society309 envisioned by
the Commonwealth of Australia must be achieved not by homogenising different
social and cultural groups and diluting the multiculturalism discussed in the 2 nd
chapter, but from ensuring tolerance towards each other.

Hatred is not to be taken lightly and speech or actions that convey hatred will be
offensive. However, not all that is considered offensive is necessarily “hateful”
and diversity is to be expected and tolerated.310 In Catch the Fire, Nettle JA makes
it clear that s 8 goes ‘no further in restricting freedom to criticise the religious
beliefs of others than to prohibit criticism so extreme as to incite hatred’.311

It is troubling that a preacher’s misleading characterisation of works he had
authored should somehow lead to the conclusion that his beliefs about a religion
were not his real beliefs. Even more disquieting is a secular tribunal’s
determination
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where
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religious
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had

misconstrued

and

Ibid 211–12 (Nettle JA), 212 (Neave JA).
Ibid 211–12 (Nettle JA), 240-2 (Neave JA).
310 In Catch the Fire Ministries Inc & Ors v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc (2006) 15 VR 207, 242 Neave
JA noted: `They acknowledge that there will be differences in views about other peoples’ religions. To a
308
309

very considerable extent, therefore, they tolerate criticism by the adherents of one religion of the tenets of
another religion; even though to some and perhaps to most in society such criticisms may appear illinformed or misconceived or ignorant or otherwise hurtful to adherents of the latter faith. It is only when
what is said is so ill-informed or misconceived or ignorant or so hurtful as to go beyond the bounds of what
tolerance should accommodate that it may be regarded as unreasonable.´
311
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misrepresented another religion’s sacred writings, this also indicated an absence
of honest belief. Defining in court what a religious group really believes, rather
than

accepting

that

there

might

be

competing

interpretations

and

understandings, takes courts into a dangerous area.312 An incorrect interpretation
of scripture does not necessarily point to dishonest intent and the judiciary
should not be trying to rule on what is a correct and honest representation of
sacred writings.313 It is conceivable that there may be multiple ways of
understanding a religion and its requirements.

See, Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc [2004] VCAT 2510 [94], [162], [178]
and [212]–[214].
313 See, eg, Rex T Ahdar ‘Religious Vilification: Confused Policy, Unsound Principle and
Unfortunate Law’ (2007) 26 University of Queensland Law Journal 313; Evans, above n 1, 193
312
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III.

CONCLUSION

This chapter provided an overview of some cases in which Religious Free Speech
clashed with Australian legal mechanisms. The cases canvassed targeted
controversial areas, ones where it might be especially hard to accept that a group
or religion may have different beliefs and opinions than what is common or
`politically correct`. The protection of free-speech is an important aspect of a
democratic society314 and the current way that Australia is protecting this right is
concerning.

The concern caused by cases like this for people of faith is that religious groups
and individuals will not be able to speak out, identify other religions as false and
their own as exclusively true for they will be in danger of having legal action
taken against them. This is a complicated scenario that risks Religious Freedom
and its expression.315 Furthermore, speech proclaiming the truth or falsity of
important philosophical, moral and social issues will be intimidated for the
mentioned ´chilling effect´. Religions do tend to assert what is right and wrong,
and believing that a particular religion is true naturally requires one to believe
that all others are false. Therefore, restricting Religious Free Speech curtails the
right of the believers of one faith to argue or warn against the beliefs of another
faith.316

See eg, David Flint and Jai Martinkovits, Give us Back our Country (Connor Court Publishing,
2013), 166; Joe Dolce, ‘Free Speech and the Stokie Case’ (2014) 53(7-8) Quadrant 32.
315 Ivan Hare, ‘Crosses, Crescents and Sacred Cows: Criminalising Incitement to Religious Hatred’
(2006) Public Law 520, 537. See also, Joel Harrison, ‘Truth, Civility, and Religious Battlegrounds:
The Contest Between Religious Vilification Laws and Freedom of Expression’ (2006) 12 Auckland
University Law Review 71, 82–8.; John L Perkins, ‘Religion and Vilification’ (2005) 17 Dissent 53.
316 Amir Butler, ‘Why I’ve Changed My Mind on Victoria’s Anti-Vilification Laws’ The Age
(Online), 4 June 2004 <www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=2274>. See also, Evans,
above n 1, 191.
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In cases where Religious Free Speech clashes with legal mechanisms in Australia,
the result has not been positive for Religious Free Speech. Anti-discrimination
legislation should not be used as a way of hidden censorship317 over citizens who
do not agree with the governmental agenda. Controversial opinions expressed,
even when they have political roots, have been shut down more and more in the
last few years and this should be attended to with extra care.318

See, eg, Nicola Berkovic, ‘Tongue-tied By The Thought Police’, The Weekend Australian, 28-29
November 2015, 10.
318 See, eg ,Zimmermann, above n 297, 6.
317
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5TH CHAPTER: ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT

I.

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters approached the main points with which the discussion of
this thesis is concerning, covering Religious Free Speech in its sources and
justifications (2nd Chapter), the legal mechanisms that relate to the subject in
discussion (3rd Chapter) and a few of the cases involving Anti-discrimination
laws coming into conflict with Religious Free Speech in Australia (4th Chapter).
The previous chapter indicated that the conflicts between Religious Free Speech
and the legal mechanisms in Australia are real. However, the question that must
now be answered in the present chapter is: ´Does the Anti-discrimination
legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´. This question leads to an examination
of whether Anti-discrimination laws have decreased Religious Free Speech in
Australia.

This chapter will investigate the problem and further demonstrate the current
and future complications that arise when Anti-discrimination laws and Religious
Free Speech in Australia are in conflict. In order to achieve this objective, this
chapter is divided in three parts. The first part addresses the conflicts trough
themes, explaining the issues involved and why they might be detrimental to
Australian society. The second addresses the tangibility of such conflicts, in
essence, it will be considered whether there are negative effects resulting from
the reduction of Religious Free Speech in Australia. International examples will
then be thematically used and analysed to determine if the problems emerging
within the bodies of law surrounding Anti-discrimination are realistic and could
exist in Australia. This will be followed by a short conclusion.
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II.

WHAT ARE THE CONFLICTS? DOES THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION LIMIT RELIGIOUS FREE SPEECH?

A. Introduction

Previous chapter have identified the concept of Religious Free Speech and how
it comes into collision with other Anti-discrimination norms in contemporary
Australia. In this sub-chapter, those conflicts will be further explored, in a way
that identifies their negative impact negative impact on Australian society. This
sub chapter draws from international cases. The universality of Human Dignity
and of Human Rights makes these international examples of the relationship
between Religious Free Speech and Anti-discrimination laws relevant in
Australia, particularly where they contribute examples of potential solutions to
the conflict.
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B. Goods and Services: Artistic Manifestation and the Same Sex
Wedding Dilemma

The manifestation of religious belief in the provision of goods and services, has
caught the eye of the public in recent years. The loudest cases in the media and
the public eye are related to instances involving conscientious refusal to provide
services supporting the celebration of same-sex weddings. Internationally, cases
such as Lee v Ashers Bakery Co Ltd & Anor319 in the UK have raised questions
regarding whether vendors providing goods and services in the market place
should be required to use their artistic talents to promote a cause with which they
do not agree and whether they should be allowed to decline to provide services
at all.

In this particular case, a bakery refused to provide cakes with slogans supporting
gay marriage320 as it went against their Christian beliefs about what marriage
should be. In Lee v Ashers Bakery Co Ltd & Anor, it was understood that the Antidiscrimination provision sanctioning Ashers Bakery was not compatible with
Human Rights provisions which protect the manifestation of Religious Belief.321

It may be argued that in such cases involving deep beliefs, a deeper analysis may
be required. For example, the philosophical reasons for this expression of
Religious Freedom should have been identified and weighed against the

319

[2015] NICity 2.
The bakers lost the case, for it was considered that the refusal to provide such cakes was an act of
discrimination against the plaintiff.
321
Peter Tatchell, Why I changed my mind on the Ashers gay cake row (24 October 2016) Peter Tatchell
Foundation <http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/ashers-gay-cake-verdict-is-defeat-for-freedom-ofexpression/>. Regarding Lee v Ashers Bakery Co Ltd & Anor, the Australian-born gay activist Peter
Tatchell stated that `The equality laws are intended to protect people against discrimination. A business
providing a public service has a legal duty to do so without discrimination based on race, gender, faith,
sexuality and so on. However, the court erred by ruling that Gareth was discriminated against because of
his sexual orientation and political opinions. His cake request was not refused because he was gay but
because of the message he wanted on the cake. There is no evidence that his sexuality was the reason Ashers
declined his order.’
320
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philosophical reasons for the request that this baker create this cake. Without
such analysis, the competition between the dignity of the baker and the customer
were not examined and stayed in superficial parameters. This may be the reason
for such failing in sustaining a protection to Religious Free Speech that is founded
in the Religious sphere of the issue. If the importance of the baker’s separate and
legitimate conscience objections was taken into account and weighed against
those of the customer who had the opportunity to engage another baker without
these dignity concerns, it would not be surprising to have an outcome favouring
the baker.

Recently, in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s Creations Inc,322
Kern County Superior Court of California Judge held against this trend, finding
that a bakery cannot be required by discrimination law to make a same sex
wedding cake, where the owner has a religious reason for declining to do so.323
The decision was made on the basis of the Free Speech clause in the First

Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s Creations Inc (Cal Sup Ct, Kern Cty; BCV-17102855; Lampe J, 5 Feb 2018).
323
Ibid 5. Judge Lampe ruled that the protection given to the engaged couple should not overcome the right
to free-speech of others: ´Here, Miller’s desire to express through her wedding cakes that marriage is a
sacramental commitment between a man and a woman that should be celebrated, while she will not express
the same sentiment toward same-sex unions, is not trivial, arbitrary, nonsensical, or outrageous. Miller is
expressing a belief that is part of the orthodox doctrines of all three world Abrahamic religions, if not also
part of the orthodox beliefs of Hinduism and major sects of Buddhism. That Miller’s expression of her
beliefs is entitled to protection is affirmed in the opinion of Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 wherein the Court established that same—sex marriages are entitled to
Equal Protection. Therein, the Court noted: ”[f]inally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those
who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by
divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that
religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations to continue the
family structure they have long revered.” (Id at 2607.) (from pp 5-6) Again, I think this discussion needs to
be brought into the text of your thesis. It is core. I also observe that this issue of conflict between rights was
explored by a full Federal Court case in Queensland – Iliafi. There the plaintiffs argued that they had a right
to worship in the Mormon Church in their own language, but they could not point to any legal expression
of that right. With Justice Kenny presiding, the Federal Court found in that case that the alleged right to
worship in one’s native tongue had to be balanced against the church’s group right to worship according to
the directions of the leaders they had chosen in ethnically unified congregations. And when that balancing
was complete, the group autonomy right won in that case. The result is not as important for your discussion
as the way those Federal Court judges reasoned to their conclusions. While I don’t think they explicitly said
they were balancing two competing rights against each other, that is what they did. And it may signal how
a ‘balancing’ as opposed to an ‘exemptions’ approach would work in Australia if it were so legislated.
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Amendment to the US Constitution. Interestingly in this case, Judge Lampe
considered that forcing someone to bake a cake with a message that was contrary
to that person’s religious view is a form of `compelled speech’ 324 which offends
freedom of conscience. While the case was decided on the grounds of free speech
generally, rather than Religious Free Speech, according to the argument
sustained in the 2nd chapter of this thesis, Religious Free Speech is a subset of
Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech, and the understanding held by the
Californian judge is appropriate to the protection of this human right. What
raised questions here was that reasoning about Religious Freedom alone would
not have solved this case favourably, such as happened in other cases.325

Other cases which show this same conflict include the refusal to print material
supporting gay-marriage seen in the case of Ontario (Human Rights Commission)
v Brockie.326 In this case, the service provider made a complaint against the
requirement to offer services that would promote values that he considered
sinful, in particular, sexual relations between unmarried persons. 327 In the
decision, the service provider was required to offer his services but not to print
material which actively promoted a homosexual lifestyle and was dismissive of
Christian beliefs.

This decision is more promising for service providers who hold religious belief
than some of the other cases regarding this issue. If a refusal to provide particular

Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s Creations Inc (Cal Sup Ct, Kern Cty; BCV-17102855; Lampe J, 5 Feb 2018.
325
See, eg, Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (CA Or; Dec 28, 2017, — P.3d —-, 2017 WL
6613356; 289 Or App 507 (2017)); Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,370 P3d 272 (Colo App
2015), cert den, No. 15SC738, 2016 WL 1645027 (Colo Apr 25, 2016), cert granted sub nom Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S Ct 2290 (2017).
326
[2002] 22 DLR (4th) 174.
327
A similar case regarding t-shirt printing was held in the US Hands on Originals, Inc v Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Human Rights Commission (Fayette Circuit Court, Civil Branch, 3rd Div, Ky; Civil Action
No 14-CI-04474; James D Ishmael Jr, J; 27 April 2015); Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. 2015 COA
115, ~~ 1-2, 370 P.3d 272 (2015)
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services, which contravene a provider’s religious beliefs, results in the provider
not being able to offer any services, the result is a practical exclusion from society
of those who hold strong religious values. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v
Brockie328 signals a move away from this trend and offers grounds for service
providers to have a work life that is compatible with their worldview.

In the appeal, it was understood that forcing Mr Brockie to print material against
his religious beliefs went beyond encouraging equality of treatment in the
marketplace.329 In this decision the importance of balancing equality rights was
acknowledged. It was expressed that the refusal to print brochures which
included content against an individual’s religious belief was based on an inherent
characteristic of what had been requested and, as such, did not constitute
discrimination against an individual. This can be further seen in graphs 4 and 5
below.

It is important that in Australia the Anti-discrimination body of law does not
itself act as a source of discrimination. To do so would be to go against the very
nature of Human Rights and its objectives while creating an undesirable
orthodox secularism in which many would live as ´second class citizens’ with no
right to act or express their inner beliefs.

In another North-American case, Elane Photography, LLC v Willock,330 Elane
Photography refused to photograph a same sex wedding as doing so would
contravene the religious views of its owners. Photography is undoubtedly an
artistic expression, even though the Court surprisingly chose to ‘decline to draw
the line between ‘creative’ or ‘expressive’ professions and all other Courts cannot
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be in the business of deciding which businesses are sufficiently artistic to warrant
exemptions from Anti-discrimination laws.’331 Following the trend seen in
previous cases, the photographers lost the case.

The refusal of the Court to recognise photography as artistic expression was
peculiar. The Court’s refusal was based on the idea that an exemption ‘would
allow any business in a creative or expressive field to refuse service on any
protected basis.’332 Further, the Court not only declined to classify photography
as artistic but held that it was not the place of the courts to determine whether a
business was artistic in nature.

The carte blanc given in this case to the

restrictions of the Anti-discrimination is concerning for the protection of Free
Speech, and more specifically Religious Free Speech, proving again that the
concern that Anti-discrimination norms may trump first generational Human
Rights is a reality.

The local and historical settings of racial discrimination in the South of the US
may have negatively influenced the New Mexico Supreme Court’s comparisons
in Elane Photography’s appeal. The most radical part of the judgment in Elane
Photography, LLC v Willock333 is not the refusal to protect businesses in the artistic
sphere, as discussed above, but but the framing of religious beliefs as being of
equal value to racist beliefs. The Court held that giving the exemption to Elane
Photography would:

allow a photographer who was a [Ku Klux] Klan member to refuse to photograph an
African American customer’s wedding, graduation, newborn child, or other event if the
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photographer felt that the photographs would cast African Americans in a positive
light.334

The comparison drawn by the Court held above fails to give a fair expression to
Religious Free Speech. This issue could have been avoided if the recognition of
Religious Freedom was taken more seriously. To a certain extent, the concern of
the court and its comparison to other beliefs that might be held is understandable
but ignoring the full extent of this case and comparing Religious Freedom to
racism is a disservice to the protection of Human Rights.

Racist expressions are not a first generation Human Right and the equivalence of
that to the expression of Religious Free Speech shows that the Religious Freedom
dimension of this right such as demonstrated in the 2nd chapter was not achieved.
Instead, religious beliefs are consistently not given weight when in competition
with other current popular values. The court held that to allow the photographers
refusal to provide their services for the wedding would effectively “undermine
all of the protections provided by Anti-discrimination laws.”335 Unlike the
attempt to not overburden the Religious Free Speech observed in Ontario (Human
Rights Commission) v Brockie or the declining to support compelled speech such
as seen in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s Creations Inc,336 this
American Court demonstrated that the protection of Religious Free Speech is not
as important as the values framed in the Anti-discrimination body of law.

In another US case, State of Washington v Arlene’s Flowers Inc and Stutzman,337 it
was decided that a florist could not decline to prepare floral arrangements for a
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same-sex wedding. The florist had provided flowers to one of the members of the
couple for many years and had been aware that her customer was gay
throughout this time.338 This shows that there was no denial of the service due to
the person being homosexual. When requested to devote her artistic talents to
providing flowers for the same-sex marriage, she politely declined as it went
against her Christian faith. The florist was sued by the State of Washington
(under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, WLAD, which includes ‘sexual
orientation’ as a prohibited ground of discrimination) and, in separate
proceedings, by the couple themselves.

Matters involving the wedding industry are particularly interesting because the
celebration of a same-sex wedding itself is incompatible with religious beliefs of
several world religions. The refusal of the provision of services is not based on
the fact that a person is homosexual or is in a same-sex relationship, but is due to
the nature of the service itself. The refusal, in legitimate cases, has nothing to do
with a characteristic of the person who requires the service, but the fact that the
service itself endorses something that is against a religious conviction. The
analysis drawn specifically in Department of Fair Employment and Housing v Cathy’s
Creations Inc shows that the differentiation between the end to which the artistic
service is provided and the person who is providing such service is possible. If
there is discrimination in those cases, such as demonstrated bellow, it is not
against the person, but against the service itself.

The two graphs bellow illustrate the difference. The graphs below show the
deeper analysis and understanding that is enabled when the competing dignity
interests are both recognized and weighed against each other. It is justifiable that
a service provider can refuse to provide a service if the nature of the service itself
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Alliance Defending Freedom, The BaronelleStutzman Story (16 March 2014) Youtube
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is incompatible with the values expressed in their belief system. In that case, the
refusal has absolutely no connection with the person that desires the good or
service, but with the provision of the good or service itself. It is incompatible to a
free society to forbid restrictions based on the nature of the service provided
itself.

Graph 4: Incompatibility with the Service

The graph above shows that the incompatibility (illustrated by the red line) is
between the service provider (illustrated by the blue hexagon) and the service
(represented by the yellow star). The line between the customer (represented by
the violet diamond) and the service provider is just as compatible as the
connection between the customer and the service that is requested.

What should not happen is the option showed below, in which the negative to
provide the good or service is originated for a characteristic of the customer itself.
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Graph 5: Incompatibility with the Customer

In contrast to Graph 4, the incompatibility shown in this graph is
between the service provider and the customer which, in that case,
represents a discrimination, for it is against the person themselves.

In Gifford v McCarthy339 a same-sex couple tried to book their wedding at the
Giffords’ property. The denial of the hosts was immediate, explaining that they
could not host and coordinate same-sex ceremonies because of their Christian
faith teachings on marriage. However, they left open the invitation to visit the
farm and to consider it as a potential reception site.

The engaged couple filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights and
the agency found the Giffords guilty of ‘sexual orientation discrimination.’ The
Giffords were fined and ordered to undergo re-education training classes that,
by their nature, contradicted the couple’s religious beliefs about marriage.340 The
free exercise of religion claims made by the couple were rejected. The rejection
was made on the basis of the accepted US Supreme Court orthodoxy
339
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in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v Smith341 which holds that a
generally applicable and otherwise valid enactment which is not intended to
regulate religious conduct or beliefs, but may incidentally burden the free
exercise of religion, is not in violation of the First Amendment. The New York
court held that Giffords interests were not strong enough to overcome the wishes
of the couple to hold their wedding ceremony at the Giffords’ property.

A final and more sensitive case regarding same sex weddings is that of Miller v
Davis.342 Ms. Davis was a public servant in a registry office, who refused to issue
same sex marriage documents with her signature on them. Ms. Miller sued Ms.
Davis in the US Federal Court, claiming that pursuant to the provision of the
Federal law 42 U.S.C. § 1983,343 Ms. Davis was, in the position of an official,
depriving Ms. Miller of her right to same sex marriage. Ms. Miller filed an
injunction to require that Ms. Davis issue the same sex marriage licenses. Ms.
Davis was jailed for her refusal.

In her defence, Ms. Davis gave legal reason for her actions, arguing that
constitutional rights may be over-ridden in particular cases due to a sufficient
compelling interest. Ms Davis argued that her own right of Freedom of Speech
and freedom of religious exercise, granted by the First Amendment of the US
Constitution held greater weight than the requests to have marriage licenses
issued in that particular office. Furthermore, she argued that such rights were
being unduly interfered with by the Governor of Kentucky’s order that all clerks
had to personally issue same sex marriage licenses. She maintained that her
rights under Kentucky’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act were being breached.
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In his judgment, Judge Bunning stated that Ms. Davis was only required to sign
if

couples

met

the

legal

requirements

to

get

married.

Expressing

misunderstanding of the very meaning and importance of Religious Freedom,
the judge said that Ms. Davis was not restricted from her various religious
activities. She remained free to attend church twice a week, participate in Bible
Study and minister to female inmates at the Rowan County Jail. This
simplification of the meaning and scope of the religious aspect shows a
disturbing restriction to Religious Freedom and Religious Free Speech. The
comments made by the Judge try to define what it means and what is required
to hold to and live out religious faith, restricting it to only certain aspects of life.
In this judgment, Judge Bunning’s comments show that he took it upon himself
to decide if Ms. Davis’ beliefs meant what she said they did.

Ms Davis´ religious beliefs and Ms Miller´s right to get married could possibly
have been accommodated, without undermining Religious Free Speech. This
could have been facilitated by Ms Miller simply going to a different registry office
to obtain a marriage license, or by the administration providing another clerk to
sign the license. The preference to have the marriage license issued in a specific
town is not as relevant as a heavy and genuine conscientious objection of
someone who would rather go to jail than participate in something that goes
against their core religious beliefs. There was the need of a balancing regime that
in the specific case could have repaired the unsatisfactory result.

In the Australian context, the case that has most closely touched on this issue is
Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited &
Ors.344 In this case, there was a refusal by the Christian Youth Camps Limited to
provide the campsite services to an event that was to be held to provide support

344
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and suicide prevention services to same sex attracted young people. The majority
of the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded that ‘doctrines’ of the Christian faith
were to be confined to matters which dealt with in the historic Apostles’ Creed
and Nicene Creed, neither of which mention specifically sexual activity.345

The Australian Court also followed the trend of defining what the definitions of
religious beliefs are or should be, adjudicating theological matters that are
beyond their competence.346 In so doing, this further demonstrates that the trends
regarding the interpretation of Anti-discrimination mechanisms observed
internationally may be followed in the Australian sphere. This trend could be
answered by better analysis encouraged by more refined and focused legislation.
This further signals the importance of the current international approach of this
thesis.

Religious Freedom requires more than the freedom to simply believe, as this
thesis has already discussed. However, as this chapter has argued, there is a
growing trend in foreign jurisdictions of interpreting religious freedom in this
narrow way when confronted with Anti-discrimination laws. The trends that can
be observed in the interpretation of the body of Anti-discrimination law in
various countries can be expected to occur in Australia also. This is due to the
universality of Human Rights, for its essence is common to every human being,
and therefore can be observed in democratic societies the zeal for the welfare of
mankind. The conflicts and results that occur in the international community are
likely to also arise here.
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See paras [276]-[277].
There is a question whether it is desirable for secular judges and courts to be adjudicating theological
matters that are beyond their competence. I think you can refer to that argument briefly with fns without
fully engaging in an analysis that is beyond your purpose here. But I think you can then assume we don’t
want judges getting into areas where they are incompetent, but we don’t need to if we pass laws that require
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In view of the precedents arising internationally, it is to be expected that the
Australian interpretation of religious free speech regarding same sex marriage,
following the alterations made by Marriage Amendment (Definition and Religious
Freedoms) Act 2017 (Cth) on 9 December 2017, will bring complications to
Religious Free Speech in Australia, if no new protections to religious speech are
granted. It is important to remember that Religious Freedom, including freedom
of religious expression, informs every aspect of one’s life and it is not desirable
that this would be constrained to the private sphere or restricted to worship
activities in a temple, church or mosque by a society that upholds dignitary
standards.
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C. Life expression and employment

Trinity Western University (‘TWU’) in Canada has been involved in cases
concerned with Religious Freedom and Anti-discrimination law. In the first case
to be here addressed is Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of
Teachers.347 In such case, it was alleged that future graduate teachers were unfit to
be employed in the public sector due to the inconsistency of the promises
involving moral standards of the university, contained in the Community
Covenant of Trinity. 348 British Columbia College of Teachers argued that students
who undertook the covenant would be more inclined to acts of discrimination
and bigotry in their professional careers. The Supreme Court of Canada held that
such presuppositions about the teaching graduates of TWU were unfounded.
The Court held that appropriate balancing of Charter of? Religious Freedom and
“non-discrimination” rights had to allow those who chose to study in TWU to
fulfil such moral requirements. The Court was not convinced that students who
chose to study at the religious TWU would be more inclined to bigotry or
discriminatory acts.

The second case involving Trinity Western University concerned three law
societies, in Nova Scotia, Ontario and British Columbia. These law societies
passed resolutions with the intent of declining accreditations to graduates from
TWU based on the objection to same previously mentioned Covenant. In Nova
Scotia Barristers’ Society v TWU,349 the restriction was overturned by a trial judge.
The decision of the singular judge was upheld on appeal.
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In Trinity Western University v. The Law Society of Upper Canada,350 the decision to
maintain the restriction was upheld upon appeal. Finally, in Trinity Western
University v. The Law Society of British Columbia,351 the court of appeal considered
the decision of the Law Society of British Columbia to refuse accreditation to
practice law in the Province to the graduates of a new proposed TWU law school
to be unlawful.

The difference between the cases previously discussed concerning the provision
of goods and services, and the employment of religious bodies themselves is, as
is shown in the images below, the compatibility or incompatibility of the
employee as a part of the body.

Graph 6: Employment compatibility

The employee (illustrated by the beige rectangle with rounded tips in the table
above) when compatible to the teachings and doctrines exercised by religious
body (illustrated by the beige rectangle in the table above) becomes a
fundamental part of its structure, functioning harmoniously. The employee
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represents and functions as part of the body and, just like biologically, there
would be a requirement of compatibility for the sustainability of both, in the
living religious body it is the same.

Graph 7: Employment incompatibility

The employee (illustrated by the red rectangle with rounded tips in the table
above) when incompatible to the teachings and doctrines exercised by religious
body (illustrated by the beige rectangle in the table above) becomes a structural
problem for the spiritual integrity of the religious body. With this, the structure
of the religious body is not solid and coherent with the mechanisms that the
religion might consider fundamental.

In a note that concerns the personal way of life of people employed by religious
institutions, in the Australian case Kerry Anne Hozack v The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints [1997] FCA 1300 (27 November 1997),352 the applicant, who was
a member of and employed by the church as a receptionist, failed to obtain a
"Temple recommend", which is a "commendation issued annually to each eligible
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member of the Church to certify that he or she has lived by the Church's doctrines
and is considered by the Church to be worthy to worship at the ‘sacred Temple’.
When acquired, an individual is then considered to be ‘Temple-worthy’.
Although religious bodies do have exemptions and are allowed to maintain staff
members, people who qualify based on their faith, the Church in the matter had
other employees that did not fulfil such parameters. For this reason, the
termination was considered unlawful. Ms Hozack was the lead receptionist for
the Pacific headquarters and her observance was considered essential for the
Church, but the judge used the non-conformity of two employees in less
conspicuous roles, as a reason to decide that Hozack’s conformity was not as
essential as the Church had argued. In this case, as the receptionist was the only
person who did not receive the temple permit to be fired, it seemed that there
was indeed some sort of personal discrimination.

In South Africa, the case of Strydom v Nederduitse Gereformeede Gemeente,
Mooreletta Park,353 Mr. Strydom had his contract working for the Moreleta Park
congregation of the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) terminated because he was
in a same-sex relationship. The Court found the termination to be unfair
discrimination, unlawful under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination Act. In this case, unlike arguably Hozack v Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints,354 the spiritual leadership position was something that
was considered necessary for the exemption on base of religious grounds in the
employment of the church.355 Mr. Strydom was a contract worker356 for the church
but was nevertheless in a position of teaching. This seemed to be clearly a role of
authority that demanded a role model that was compatible with the principles of
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the institution. Again, it seems peculiar that a Court of law would decide the
sincerity and the extent357 to which religious beliefs are applicable.

The defence of the church in this case was based upon Canadian Supreme Court
case of Caldwell v The Catholic Schools of Vancouver Archdiocese and Attorney General
of British Columbia358 in which a Roman Catholic teacher of a Roman Catholic
school was not hired again after she married a divorced man in a civil ceremony.
The case was based on discrimination on the grounds of religion and marital
status. The court disagreed with the teacher, holding that the School was
permitted to prefer hiring members of the Catholic community. Besides that,
similarly to Ms Hozack case, the contract of employment of teachers did include
the teaching of doctrine and the observance of standards by teachers. The
requirement is to exhibit the “highest model for Christian behaviour”.

It seems odd that a music teacher did not have to act in accordance with beliefs
and doctrines of a church (considering the deep connection between music and
worship in Christian denomination), while a secretary would have the burden of
upholding the values of the church.

357
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D. Life Expressions and Speech

Religion should as a rule, be an ally to a good government.359 Religion informs
the worldview of many people360 in the world and Religious Freedom is a
fundamental Human Right that should be protected. The refusal to actively
participate in something that a person finds wrong is another difficult situation
that must be dealt with when analysing the Anti-discrimination laws and their
conflict with Religious Free Speech.

In the case of Wheaton College v Burwell,361 a nondenominational Illinois college
which required students to sign a “Covenant” requiring them to “uphold the
God-given worth of human beings, from conception to death”, challenged the
Affordable Care Act as violating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act362 and the First
Amendment. The reason for this is because the college believes, in accordance to
multiple Christian denominations, that “emergency contraception” (such as the
day after pill) is forbidden on religious grounds if it can destroy a fertilized ovum.
Intrauterine devices (IUDs) that prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum are
equally forbidden.

In 2018, the federal court ruled that the government was indeed violating civil
rights law by forcing the college to provide contraceptive methods that went
against its religious beliefs. This shows the possibility of excessive restrictive
power of the Anti-discrimination body of law. In the theme of abortion there, are

Jennifer A Marshall, ‘Why Does Religious Freedom Matter?’ (Working Paper, The Heritage
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a few cases regarding the manifestation and expression in outward forms such
as seen on part D of the previous chapter.

Religious manifestation through speech, signs and figures is the most obvious
expression of free speech. In the case Pastor Ake Green Case,363 Green was
persecuted for a controversial sermon on homosexuality. The Supreme Court of
Sweden analysed the necessity of restrictions on Religious Free Speech in light of
Swedish legislation and European Court jurisprudence.364 Freedom of Speech
may be limited when necessary,365 in order to achieve a purpose that may be
acceptable in a democratic society.

The Court held that a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the
sermon of Åke Green’s case, interpreted in harmony with the case law of the
European Court showed that there even the most extreme statements made by
the pastor could be protected in light of Religious Free Speech 366, and that the
Courts are not to engage in theological interpretations regarding systems of
belief:

‘sexual abnormalities are a cancerous growth, as that statement, viewed in light of what
he said in connection with this in his sermon, is not something that can be deemed to
encourage or justify hatred of homosexuals. […] Whether the belief approach on which
he has based his statements is legitimate should not be considered in the determination
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of the case (European Court’s judgment of 26 September 1996 in the case of Manoussakis
et al v. Greece, p. 47).’367

In the previously discussed Australian case, Catch the Fires Ministry Inc v Islamic
Council of Victoria,368 an appeal of findings of vilification were overturned.
However, the case itself never came to a final conclusion in the courts, being
settled out-of-court. The Victorian case did not result in a precedent that signals
a reassuring future regarding Religious Free Speech. This is unlike the Green
case, in which the Supreme Court of Sweden gave a very clear and sharp answer
that shows an optimistic approach to the Religious Free Speech even when this
carries in its content controversial and harsh material.

367
368
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E. What are the Consequences of Anti-Discrimination Legislation and Religious
Free Speech Conflicting?

Religious Freedom is not only an individual right,369 and its defence, as seen in
the 2nd chapter is important for the maintenance of a desirable multicultural
society. The protection given to Religious Free Speech should have a broad
extension once the religious belief informs all the areas of a persons´ worldview,
as it necessarily is associated or even forms their political view. Australia is the
only country in the world that has the Implied Freedom of Political
Communication, and though this shows early promise, it is a pretty small
freedom and is only a thin shadow of international Freedom of Speech.
Therefore, even if this protection adequately expresses itself when the Religious
Speech is political, it would still be unsatisfactory protection.

There is currently no provision in the Australian Anti-discrimination body of law
that recognises the primacy of Religious Free. If the subjective sphere of
offending becomes the ground of discrimination, preaching against sin becomes
discriminatory, for doing so will always be offensive to someone.370 The inability
to freely preach and express one’s religious views can develop a ´chilling
effect’.371 The attempt to narrow exemptions in the Anti-discrimination
legislation is not a solution to the compatible defence of Religious Free Speech.
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Expression’ (2006) 12 Auckland University Law Review 71, 82–8.; John L Perkins, ‘Religion and
Vilification’ (2005) 17 Dissent 53.
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Some suggest that a special protection for religion is likely to have harmful
impacts on non-religious people.372 Suggesting silencing the religious voices in
public life is not compatible to democratic principles and the most foundational
requirements of international Human Rights law.373

The law should not be used as an instrument of intolerance and the excessive
curtailing of free-speech is a sign of undemocratic political views. The rise,
recognition and protection of minorities should not develop tools to create new
minorities.374 The use of legal tools which aim to establish equality by targeting
certain groups in order to protect others is an incompatible means to the end
desired. It is ironic when Anti-discrimination law is used as a tool for persecuting
new minorities that arguably take the place of old minorities granted orthodox
status by Anti-discrimination law itself.

Offending, as a subjective sphere, is not harassing for even impetuous and
polemic speech, even like that seen in the Green case, is not the same as hate
speech. The common law has to stand in sufficiently objective standards to be a
source of law in a free and democratic society. For that reason, taking personal
subjective feelings and using them as a cause for restriction to fundamental
Human Rights, such as Religious Free Speech, that do not infringe criminal law
(e.g. defamation) and do not incite violence and hatred is not in the necessary

372

Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom: One Right Among Many (8 March 2018) Pursuit
<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/religious-freedom-one-right-among-many>.
373
Securalism is also enshrined in some national constitutions — albeit with a great variety of meanings.
See András Sajó, ‘Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional Secularism’ (2008) 6 International Journal
of Constitutional Law 605. In Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v Turkey (application nos 41340/98,
41342/98 and 41344/98) ECHR 3003-II, the European Court of Human Rights did uphold the right of the
government of Turkey to dismantle a party which was established to promote sharia law. Even this
controversial decision cannot support an attack on individual freedom of speech.
374
See Keith Thompson, ‘Should ‘Public Reason’ Developed Under U.S. Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence Apply to Australia?’ (2015) 17 The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 107,
109. ‘When the … establishment clause ideology is extracted from Rawls’ idea of public reason, public
reason can be identified as an anti-democratic Trojan horse with the potential to neuter the views of up to
4/5th of the world’s population in favour of a non-believing elite. As the anti-democratic nature of Rawls’
idea of public reason is exposed, its respectability and convincing power should fade’
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sphere of what should be targeted by the Australian legal system. In that sense,
a restrictive interpretation of Religious Free Speech in Australia would not be
compatible with the application of the Human Rights in a free democratic society.

Australian values include freedom of religion and of speech 375 and the religious
influences in the formation or the ethos of western society and the rights and
freedoms which are the foundations of the Anti-discrimination instruments
themselves cannot be overlooked and lost. An Anti-discrimination instrument
that, by targeting free speech, does not protect and respect the diversity and
multiculturalism in which the Australian society stands.

Furthermore, undermining religious values and speech introduces an extreme
secularism which is not compatible with the democratic standards characteristic
of post Second World War western civilization. A state that does such things is
vested in an orthodox secularism, working as an intolerant and unsuitable
religion, not recognising nor accepting the differences inside its own society.

375

Section 116 of the Constitution bars the Commonwealth from making any law prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion.’ Evans v NSW [2008] FCAFC 130 [79]. ‘[…]it is necessary to acknowledge that
another important freedom generally accepted in Australian society is freedom of religious belief and
expression.
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III.

CONCLUSION

This chapter addresses the major concerns regarding the expanding Antidiscrimination bodies of law in Australia and the narrowing of exemptions to the
Religious Free Speech, showing the trend of other western jurisdictions that
adopted similar legal mechanisms. By addressing major controversial themes, it
points out the real concerns to the restriction of Religious Free Speech in
Australia.

The reasoning in Elane Photography saw only a relationship between customer
and service provider and sought to achieve the law’s objective by regulating that
relationship. The Cathy’s Creation logic in the other hand recognised the laws
interest in an additional relationship which was ignored or at least obscured in
the Elane Photography analysis. That is, the reasoning present in Elane Photography
was one dimensional by comparison to Cathy’s Creation. A Religious Freedom Act
or any other solution that may be adopted in Australia requires a threedimensional analysis to better address the relationship between Religious Free
Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws

In keeping with the aforementioned, Australia has the normative authority in the
federal sphere to protect Religious Freedom and its ramifications through its
external affairs power. 376 There are a few avenues that Australia can explore to
mitigate the conflicts between Religious Free Speech and the Anti-discrimination
laws. Those measures will be the theme of next chapter.

376

Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, (the ‘Religion Declaration’) Proclaimed by General Assembly of the United Nations on 25
November 1981 (resolution 36/55); reaffirmed by the United Nations by resolution 48/128 in 1993, and
declared “an international instrument relating to human rights and freedoms for the purposes of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) by Michael John Duffy as Commonwealth
Attorney-General on February 8, 1993.
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6TH CHAPTER: RECOMMENDATIONS

I.

INTRODUCTION:

The previous chapters framed the conflict between Religious Free Speech and
Anti-discrimination law. The previous chapters approached Religious Free
Speech in its sources and justifications (2nd Chapter), the legal mechanisms that
relate to the subject in discussion (3rd Chapter), some of the Australian cases
involving Anti-discrimination laws in conflict with Religious Free Speech (4th
Chapter) and the analysis of the conflict between Religious Free Speech and Antidiscrimination law, showing how the problem has been shaped in other
jurisdictions and using it as a reference for the analysis of the development of
such conflict (5th Chapter). After analysing the problems addressed earlier in this
thesis, the next question to be considered is: ´how can the conflicts between
Religious Free Speech and Anti-discrimination law be minimised?

The present chapter will present some of the possible solutions to the conflict (II),
identifying possible advantages and disadvantages in the adoption of each
option. In order to achieve this objective, the second subsection of this chapter is
divided by a short introduction (A) followed by each possible solution: making s
116 of the Australian Constitution binding for the states (B); extinguishing the
Anti-discrimination laws (C); passing Federal legislation to implement the seven
core international Human Rights instruments ratified by Australia, in a way that
would trump inconsistent law (D); passing a national bill or charter of rights (E),
or a detailed Religious Freedom Act (F).
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II.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

A. Introduction

The increasing conflicts involving Religious Free Speech observed globally and
internally point to the need for complete solutions, or remedies to minimize the
problems. As was pointed out in the Concluding Observations of the Sixth Periodic
Report of Australia,377 Australia has not shown sufficient protections to the rights
and freedoms that it has internationally committed itself to protect.

Currently there is an expert panel, called the Ruddock Religious Freedom Review
(the Ruddock Committee), which received over 16,000 submissions from across
Australia. The submissions were sent from experts, groups, and concerned
citizens voicing their opinion on the examination of whether Australian law
adequately protects the human right to freedom of religion. The Ruddock
Committee was called to consider the intersection between the enjoyment of the
freedom of religion and other Human Rights, having regard to any previous or
ongoing reviews or inquiries that it considered relevant, and consult as widely
as it considered necessary.

There is no way of saying for sure what result will come from such a panel in the
next few months. All analysis of what may or may not be suggested would be
Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of Australia 121st
sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6 (16 October–10 November 2017), 17 – 18 said: “17 The
Committee is concerned about the lack of direct protection against discrimination on the basis of
religion at the federal level, although it notes that a parliamentary inquiry is under way on the
status of the human right to freedom of religion or belief. […] 18. The State party should take
measures, including considering consolidating existing non-discrimination provisions in a
comprehensive federal law, in order to ensure adequate and effective substantive and procedural
protection against all forms of discrimination on all the prohibited grounds, including religion,
and intersectional discrimination, as well as access to effective and appropriate remedies for all
victims of discrimination.”
377
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only a supposition, since the panel is consultative in nature. Furthermore, there
is no telling what course of action the current Federal Parliament will take after
considering the panel’s recommendations.

The existence of the panel itself is the result of a substantial concern regarding
the lack of provisions that protect Religious Freedom and Religious Free Speech
in practice within Australia. As pointed out in the submission of George
Williams, Dean of University of NSW Law, freedom of religion received
“inadequate protection under Australian law” and, in contrast to other nations,
“protection of these rights is weak or even non-existent”.378 Other submissions
warned that religious institutions were at risk of being driven from public life. 379
Some may think that this eventuality is beneficial to Australia.380 However, a
more intolerant society results in a higher persecution of free speech.

As mentioned in the 2nd chapter, faith covers almost every aspect of a devout
religious believer’s life. As also addressed in previous chapters, religion has a
broader relevance than being just about rituals behind closed doors, but instead
informs the worldview of its members. If society society kept all religious aspects
behind closed doors, this could result in marginalization of religion and of
religious believers. Its contributions will not be valued in the public sphere.
Accordingly,

some

Australian

legal

judgments

have

shown

a

poor

understanding of Religious Freedom and little sympathy with it. 381

Joe Kelly, ‘Ruddock Inquiry into Freedom of Religion Puts Bill of Rights Back on the
Agenda’, The Australian (online), 31 March 2018, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/ruddock-inquiry-into-freedom-of-religion-puts-bill-of-rights-back-on-the-agenda/newsstory/b3254dc18f37d361c7303a15b18b3800>.
379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom: One Right Among Many (8 March 2018), Pursuit
<https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/religious-freedom-one-right-among-many>.
378
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Taking into consideration all that has been addressed in the present thesis, there
are several options available which could solve the conflict between Religious
Free Speech and Anti-discrimination laws, which will be addressed in the
following subchapters.
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B. Making s 116 of the Australian Constitution binding on the States

Placing s 116 of the Constitution in Chapter V, concerning the States, seems to
suggest that the original intention was that the section would also apply to the
States.382 Nevertheless, this understanding has not been adopted. Section 116 of
the Constitution, as seen in chapter 2, does not give significant protection to
‘freedom of religion’. Section 116 only forbids the Commonwealth from making
a ‘law’ establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.383

S 116 of the Constitution provides a sparse protection, since it only constrains
theFederal Legislature, and does not extend to the Executive. Furthermore, it
does not provide an individual right, as evidenced by the lack of ramifications
for any violation.384 Section 116 falls short of creating a positive obligation for the
Federal Parliament to protect Religious Freedom. The section simply prohibits
the Federal Parliament from enacting certain laws and does not apply to the
States.385

Several attempts to extend s 116 of the Constitution to bind the States as well
have failed. Previously, a 1944 proposal to deal with Religious Freedom failed,386
and again a 1978 motion at the annual Constitutional Convention to make s 116

In fact, Mr Higgins original proposal was that his clause should apply to the states. It was
intended to protect both states and Commonwealth from the possibility that reference to God in
the preamble (inserted at the instance of Patrick Glynn from South Australia that the
Commonwealth was established under Almighty God) would lead to the establishment of a
national religion. Mr Higgins modified his proposal (so that the clause did not apply to the states)
so as to preserve the right of the states to regulate religion within their jurisdiction even though
the Commonwealth would not be able to do so.
383 S 116 has two other subclauses. One forbids compelling any religious observance and the other
forbids the imposition of any religious test, but these are inconsequential for the purposes of this
discussion.
384 Cf. Gaudron J’s comments in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1.
385 Above n 1 71– 72
386 See Constitutional Alteration (Post-war Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) Bill 1944 (Cth).
382
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binding on the States and Territories was rejected. In 1988 a referendum was
proposed387 which proposed extending s 116 to the States and Territories,388 and
also extending the constitutional provision to all governmental acts, rather than
just the legislative process. This referendum also failed.

Later, HREOC’s 1998 Report, Article 18: Freedom of Religion and Belief came to
the conclusion that the protection given to Freedom of Religion and Belief under
Commonwealth, State, and Territory laws was ‘relatively weak compared to
many other countries´389 and that Australia fails to satisfy the international
standard, as seen on the 3rd chapter of this thesis. Although the extension of s 116
to the states would be a good start, this action alone would not be enough to
adequately change the structure of the protection given to Religious Free Speech
in Australia in practical terms. This is because there is “virtually no guarantee of
Religious Freedom or equality to the churches” Regarding s 116.390 Religious
Freedom holds relevance to the Constitution if “the practice of such freedom does
not offend against the accustomed community rights of other Australians. “ 391
Considering such, the extension of s 116 to the states would be insufficient to
solve the issues raised in this thesis.

Constitutional Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) Bill 1988 (Cth) cl 4.
Scott Bennett and Sean Brennan, ‘Constitutional Referenda in Australia’ (Research Paper No 2,
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 1999) table 1 discuss the reasons given for the
failure of constitutional proposals and the lack of empirical research in this area.
389 Submissions, p. 575. HREOC’s role and powers, and its Report on Article 18, are considered
in more detail in the next section of this Chapter.
390 Michael Hogan, ‘Separation of Church and State: Section 116 of the Australian Constitution,’
(1981) 53(2) The Australian Quarterly 214, 226– 277.
391 Ibid.
387
388
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C. Extinguish all the Anti-Discrimination laws

The extinction of Anti-discrimination laws in Australia is the less realistic option
of those considered in the present thesis. The concern is that an over production
of norms is not only non-characteristic of a common law regime but is also
negative in the process of legislating for specific groups and, overtime, could
create new inequalities. The positive effect that such measures would have in the
Australian legal system would be in the original sources of common law: that the
legality can be extracted by rationality.

Negatively there is the unlikelihood of the repeal of this body of law that has
taken place across Australia, although it has not been neatly consolidated. It also
would not be politically wise as it would be a sign of stepping back in the defence
of Human Rights by the Australian government. Legislating for the specific issue
of Religious Freedom including Religious Free Speech might appear as a way of
solving the issues but improving the application of existing legislation should be
the first step.

The uncoordinated legislative process regarding the Anti-discrimination norms
all over the country does not adequately defend all Human Rights which need to
be protected. What happens is that preference has been given to those that are
currently in the spot light and, therefore, are politically interesting. This is contra
sensus to the protection of minorities that the Anti-discrimination body of law
initially intended.

In regard to repealing the Anti-discrimination laws, the second option would be
to extinguish the Anti-discrimination laws in the states and leave the matter for
the federal sphere or to harmonize the legislation across the States. The logic
behind those suppositions provides that Human Rights should not be differently
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protected inside the same country. However, this option is impeded by the lack
of legislative power, since there would have to be an agreement among the
Federal government and States that is virtually impossible to achieve.

392

Given

the independent nature of the States in Australia, it is also unlikely that the
Federal government and the States would be able to reach the required
agreement.

Extinguishing the State Anti-discrimination laws is also problematic because,
generally, the States have gone further than the Commonwealth in the Antidiscrimination body of law. The Federal Parliament so far has not enacted the
totality of the provisions within the ICCPR and the UDHR as seen on 2nd chapter.
Furthermore, the states have greater power to legislate than the Commonwealth
if a specific ground is not cover by an international treaty.393 Nevertheless, if the
problem is solved federally, then the States would not need to do so.

The challenge to face an unbalanced ground of protection in different States
remains, and the balancing of such with both an overriding constitutional
provision seems impossible. The most viable solutions to this issue appears to be
the passing of Federal legislation that implements the seven-core international
Human Rights instruments, which were ratified by Australia, in a manner that
would trump inconsistent law; alternatively, passing a Bill or Charter of Rights,
or a detailed Religious Freedom act.

It can only be done if the state laws continue, and by using the Federal power that already
exists under s 51 (xxix) of the Constitution.
393 For instance, there is no treaty that covers the ground of HIV positive.
392
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D. Pass Federal legislation implementing the international Human Rights instruments
ratified by Australia in a way that would trump inconsistent law.

The external affairs power in the Constitution, as seen on the 2nd chapter,
provides the Commonwealth with the power to pass any domestic law that is
required to comply with international treaties that Australia has ratified. Based
on the external affairs power and the international Human Rights agreements
Australia has entered, the Commonwealth has the power to legislate for the
protection of fundamental rights. This includes Religious Freedom and free
speech, and therefore Religious Free Speech.

For this solution to resolve the conflicts concerning Religious Free Speech,
legislation must be passed in a manner that would trump inconsistent law. This
would have the effect of adding Religious Free Speech rights to those currently
protected by Federal legislation. Alternatively, a comprehensive charter or bill or
rights could be passed. Since the protection of Human Rights in Australia has
been called inadequate, and that the Commonwealth has constitutional power to
pass such laws, the legislative silence is alarming.
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E. Pass a Bill or Charter of Rights

It is not a new idea to suggest the implementation of a bill of rights in Australia
to address this issue. Such implementation is one of the possibilities for solving
the conflict between Religious Free Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws
considering the absence of national mechanisms that properly balance such a
conflict.394 The implementation of a Bill of Rights would give an application to
the totality of the rights addressed in the ICCPR in national territory.

Currently, Australia is the only democratic society that does not have a Bill or
Charter of Rights.395 As seen in the 2nd chapter the Commonwealth has not fully
applied any of the Human Rights instruments. A few attempts were made over
the last century to introduce a bill of rights or similar provisions into the
Australian Constitution. Some of the provisions in the Australian Constitution
are somewhat similar to bill of rights provisions, such as s 92,396 s 51 (xxxi),397 s
80,398 s 116 and s 117.399 However, nothing sufficiently corresponds to the integral
protection of the rights that a bill or charter of rights would provide.

The first obstacle to a Human Rights Act legitimated by the people is the
impracticality of the process in Australia. 400 The approval of constitutional

Evans, above n 372.
And such data still prevails. On his submission to the Ruddock´s 2018 Religious Freedom
Review Committee NSW Law Dean George Williams stated that freedom of religion received
“inadequate protection under Australian law” and, in contrast to other nations, “protection of
these rights is weak or even non-existent”. H Professor Williams noted Australia was the lone
democracy without “some form of national human rights act or bill of rights incorporating
protection of freedom of religion”.
396 Of the constitution that trade, commerce and intercourse would be free.
397 The requirement that acquisition of property for the purposes of the Commonwealth, must be
on just terms.
398 Concerning trial by jury.
399 Non-discrimination amongst Australians in different States.
400 M D Kirby, 'A Bill of Rights for Australia—but Do We Need It?' (1995) 21(1) Commonwealth
Law Bulletin 276.
394
395
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changes by referendum in the country are not common. According to Kirby J, a
judicial Bill of Rights is being created by the courts in Australia. 401 Whether or
not this corresponds to reality, such jurisprudential creation is not necessarily
positive to Religious Free Speech for there is no balancing measurement between
the rights presented to the courts. If there is an ambiguity in a statute, or a gap in
the common law a judge may use international jurisprudence of Human Rights
if such is not contrary to a clear statute enacted by the Parliament.402

Whether or not the enactment of a charter or bill of rights in Australia is
supported, neither the instrument alone, nor the majority in Parliament would
be sufficient to protect the rights of the people. 403 The decision regarding the
introduction of a bill of rights in the national territory rests ultimately on the
decision of the electorate. There is no precedent to demonstrate an agreement
that has been made to this effect. This reason alone should indicate that the wait
for a National protection of Human Rights is not the way to protect Religious
Free Speech from potential harm.

The Hon Mr. Justice M D Kirby AC CMG says that the need for a bill of rights
arises from the fact that democracy works imperfectly. 404 The imperfection of
democracy can generate a lack of attention given to fundamental principles, and
consequently raises the need for basic rights to be ‘enacted and spelt out´ in
constitutional text for its protection. The over enactment of statutes and over
delegation of legislation by the Parliaments makes it easier to overlook
fundamental rights. For this reason, the constitutional statement on specific

Kirby, above n 391, 276.
In his Byers Memorial Lecture, former HC Justice Dyson Heydon said that of 20+ HC judges
who had considered whether we should take international laws into account when we make
Australian
decisions,
Kirby
J
was
the
only
one
who
said
yes.
<
https://www.samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/html/volume18/v18dinner.html>.
403 Kirby, above n 391, 276.
404 Ibid.
401
402
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matters is necessary. This would put the protection of Human Rights in the
constitutional sphere and protect the Australian citizens against political
turbulences in their fundamental rights.

The question is not if Human Rights should be protected, 405 but rather if the law,
and specifically a Human Rights Act, is the most appropriate mechanism to
achieve it. The assumption that a Bill of Rights or enacted constitutional
provisions would educate the people and the legal society is at least naïve. Other
experiences have shown that a bill of rights or constitutional provisions by itself
is not enough for the protection of Religious Free Speech.

In 1944 there was the attempt to pass a broader protection of Human Rights
through a referendum.406 This did not address a bill of rights per se, but instead
an enhancement of the Federal Parliament's powers in the post war context. The
proposition was that the Commonwealth would be given four extra powers in
the post war. Inserted into the propositions were the guarantees of free speech
and expression, and extension to the states of the provision on s 116 of the
Constitution.407 The referendum lost even though the provisions would be
limited to five years. 408

In 1973 an attempt was made to introduce a general bill of rights in the form of a
non-constitutional statutory enactment. 409 This called for a Human Rights bill
that would have implemented the provisions of the ICCPR. The government did

David Kinley, ‘Human Rights Fundamentalisms’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 545, 562–
3.Kinley cites rights sceptics such as Jim Allen, Tom Campbell, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour, Keith
Ewing, Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron.
406 Constitution Alteration (Post-War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights) 1944 Bill (Cth).
407 George Williams, A Charter of Rights for Australia (University of New South Wales Press, 3rd
ed, 2007), 57.
408 Ibid.
409 Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth), introduced by the Attorney-General Lionel Murphy
405
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not press for the incorporation of the ICCPR and at the time had not yet received
a number of ratifications necessary to come into force.410 A decade later, in 1983
another attempt was made to pass a bill of rights for Australia.411 The model was
considered weaker than the 1973 predecessor and would only be applicable to
governmental action. This same bill was latter redrafted, and its provisions
weakened

further.

Although

the

proposition

passed

the

House

of

Representatives it was withdrawn in 1986.412

Another attempt was in 1988 with the constitutional commission and
referendum. The Constitutional Commission established at the time of the
Bicentenary of European, proposed the adoption of a Charter of Human Rights.
A referendum was held to try and follow the recommendations made by this
Commission, whereby four categories were put to vote. It seems that the
referendum held with the electorate the impression of centralistic approach of
the Commonwealth government trying to appropriate more political power to
itself, which was perceived with great suspicion.413 It failed to be approved by the
population.

Later in 2008 the Government commissioned a National Human Rights
Consultation414 that recommended the adoption of a Human Rights Act by
Australia. Religious groups415 expressed concern that a Human Rights Act would

Williams, above n 399, 59-60.
Australian Bill of Rights Bill 1984 (Cth), introduced by Attorney-General Gareth Evans.
412 Williams, above n 399, 60.
413 Scott Bennett, ‘Constitutional referenda in Australia’ (Research Paper No 2, Parliamentary
Library, Parliament of Australia, 1999 – 2000)
414 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, Parliament of Australia, National Human
Rights Consultation Report (2009), chaired byJesuit priest and human rights lawyer Father Frank
Brennan..
415 The ACL presented a petition to government with 21,000 signatures in November 2009: Nicola
Berkovic, ‘Clergy unite over charter’, The Australian (Sydney), 23 October 2009. The
author accompanied the delegation. Dissident: Anglicans General Synod Standing Committee of
the Anglican Church of Australia, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation (2009) 1.
410
411
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ultimately sacrifice Religious Freedom in deference to other rights, particularly
to rights of a non-discriminatory nature.416 The suspicions were justified in the
lack of positive protection of Religious Freedom offered under the proposed
legislation, which combined to lead to the shortening of exemptions to religious
expression under the Anti-discrimination laws, seen in the last few years.

The idea of a national Human Rights act is not positively exemplified by the
Victorian and ACT charter, as mentioned in the 3rd chapter. For instance, the
limitations seen in s 7 of the Victorian Charter are far from what is prescribed by
the article 18(3) of the ICCPR in their practical and legal effect.417 The Victorian
Charter does not provide the same limitations as the ICCPR, affirming that
Religious Freedom should only be limited in cases which such is necessary “to
protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others”,418 instead what was made was a general balancing provision
unfit to the parameters of necessity present in Article 18(3) of the ICCPR.419
The restrictions under the Victorian charter, as seen in the 3rd chapter subchapter
IV merely require that the limits imposed on the Religious Freedom to be
reasonable, not necessary. As seen before the ground of reasonableness is less
protective than necessity. In the experience seen inside Australia such as the
mentioned Victorian Charter the only requirement is that the restrictions may be
reasonable and possible to be ´justified in a free and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom’.
Something that can be reasonably justified is attached to subjective parameters that
makes an important right able to be restricted through malleable justifications. That

Babie and Rochow above n 235, 117.
Presbyterian Church of Australia, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation (11 June
2009) 50.
418 ICCPR Article 18(3).
419 Parkinson, above n 78, 98-101.
416
417

150

is, Religious Freedom is undervalued when it is too easy to change. The necessity
standard obliges lawmakers to weigh the importance to society of new social
measures before they decide to marginalize Religious Freedom and possibly
create the new inequalities. Thus, the examples provided nationally in Australia do
not provide a positive example for Religious Freedom.

The ICCPR offers a high value to freedom of religion and belief. Freedom of Speech
and Religious Freedom are fundamental enough that they should not be
abrogated or even partially set aside because a ‘new’ Human Right comes in
conflict with them. When that happens a real weighing of objective necessity
must occur. It is not prudent to establish a hierarchy of Human Rights in which
Anti-discriminatory provisions would be above Religious Freedoms. The
Victorian example causes extreme concern to the future of Religious Free Speech
in Australia if a Bill of Rights like such is made nationally. Furthermore, in the
Victorian model there is no attachment to the interpretation model. The Victorian
Charter requires other Victorian legislation to be interpreted in a way compatible
with Human Rights when possible420 but judges have an unconstrained
discretion to take or not international law into account when making such
interpretation.421 As pointed out by Parkinson “[i]f international human rights
law is not the body of law that should guide judges, what should inform and
constrain their interpretation of what ´human rights´require?”422 The Victorian
and ACT Bill of Rights give too much discretion to the decision-maker to define
what precisely is required of Human Rights.

A Human Rights Act drafted strictly, like the ICCPR, would give Human Rights
much greater protection. This is not only unlikely to happen in Australia when

Charters of Rights and Responsabilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32 (1)
Application No. 44774/98, 29 June 2004
422 Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concearns about an Australian Charter of Rights (University of
Adelaide Press, 2012) 99.
420
421

151

observing its national examples of Human Rights legislation, but also would not be
enough to address the concerns expressed by people who mistrust the idea of such
charter. This is because in the current Australian context in which intellectual
fashions disregard Religious Freedom even a literal application of the text of the
ICCPR and its article 18 would still be subject to an inadequate interpretation.423 The
recommendations drafted in 2008 by the National Human Rights Consultation say
that freedom from coercion or restraint in relation to religion and belief should be
non-derogable,424 but freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs – the Religious
Free Speech addressed in this thesis – should be subject to a limitation clause
modelled upon the Victorian and ACT charter provisions,425 and a federal bill
would most likely be based on the form of the Victorian and ACT Charter of
Human Rights.426 This shows that a charter of Human Rights alone may not be the
ideal solution that could be applied to the conflict between Religious Free Speech
and Anti-discrimination laws.

Respecting the provisions of the ICCPR would mean that the protection of Religious
Freedom presented in its Article 18 is one of the few that cannot be derogated from
even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation.427 Note that
some authors428 have doubted that the ICCPR’s theoretical line between the forum
internum and the forum externum really exists. There are many religious acts or
manifestations that are so closely connected with conscience that it is not really
possible to separate them. Nevertheless, the antipathy of secular liberals to the
exemptions given to faith-based organizations in the Anti-discrimination

It is expressed in Babie and Rochow above n 235,,136 that in communist countries of the old
Soviet bloc, the same amount of respect for freedom of religion was given as well
424 Brennan Committee 2009, 367.
425 Brennan Committee 2009, 372; Babieand Rochowabove n 407, 136
426 National Human Rights Consultation Commitee, National Human Rights Consultation Report
(2009) xxxiv (Recommendation 18), 377.
427 ICCPR article 4(2). Babieand Rochow, above n 407, 135 – 136
428 Carolyn Evans and others, including Paul Taylor.
423
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legislation429 points that having a comprehensive bill of rights now and not having
an Anti-discrimination legislation specific for religion might lead to unbalanced
interpretations regarding the Human Rights.430 As seen in the previous chapters
there are many possibilities in which freedom of religion might be disregarded
in favour of other Human Rights. Exemption laws do not contribute to society in
the long term because they mire us in two-dimensional thinking about competing
Human Rights.

As observed in the previous chapter the protection of Religious Free Speech in
other jurisdictions that do have a charter or bill of rights has not proven to be an
adequate response for isolating religion to the private sphere. In the US for
instance, as pointed by Mary Ann Glendon:431
The current [US Supreme] Court majority has pressed forward with a sixdecadelong trend of cabining religion in the private sphere while eroding
protections of the associations and institutions where religious beliefs and
practices are generated, regenerated, nurtured, and transmitted from one
generation to the next. 432

Similarly, in Canada, Margaret Ogilvie points that Canadian courts protect
Religious Freedom by isolating it from the public sphere, which effectively

Nicholas Aroney, ‘The constitutional (in)validity of religious vilification laws: implications for
their interpretation’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 287; Patrick Parkinson, ‘The freedom to be
different: religious vilification, anti-discrimination laws and religious minorities in Australia’
(2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 954; Rex Ahdar, ‘Religious vilification: confused policy, unsound
principle and unfortunate law’ (2007) 26 University of Queensland Law Journal 293; Babie and
Rochow above n 235, 120
430 Babie and Rochow above n 235, 138
431 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘The Naked Public Square Now: A Symposium’ (2004) 147 First Things 12,
13.
432 Ibid.
429
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restricts protection of religion in Canada.433 As Paul Babie and Neville Rochow
point out, these examples do not plead in favour of a charter of rights. 434
Of course, there are optimistic interpretations around the world towards freedom
of religion435 but the dominant approach under a bill or charter of rights is to
narrow Religious Freedom. 436 As seen in the last chapter, it is not uncommon that
cases that deal with Religious Free Speech when positive are defended through free
speech instead of Religious Free Speech or even the broader Religious Freedom.437

Religious Free Speech is often seen as a `poor cousin` among the family of Human
Rights.438 In other countries, as evidenced in the previous chapter, the existence
of a bill or charter of rights has not stopped the conflict between Religious Free
Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws and are one example of society’s
reduced assessment of the importance of Religious Freedom generally. The
existence of a bill of rights, while Religious Freedom is not seen as an important
human right, does not fix the current lack of protection.

According to Patrick Parkinson,439 groups in 2008 that were against a national
Charter of rights would possibly now support some sort of legal provision that

M H Ogilvie, ‘Between Liberté and Egalité: Religion and the State in Canada’, in Peter Radan,
Denise Meyerson and Rosalind Croucher (eds), Law and Religion: God, the State and the Common
Law (2005) 134, 160.
434 Babie and Rochow above n 235, 138
435 See, eg, Kokkinakis v Greece [1993] ECHR 20.
436 Paul Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Julian Rivers, ‘Law, Religion and Gender Equality’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical
Law Journal 24.
437 See also Mark Evans (2009), ‘The Freedom of Religion or Belief and the Freedom of Expression’
(2009) 4 Religion and Human Rights 197; Robin Hopkins and Can Yeginsu, ‘Religious Liberty in
British Courts: A Critique and Some Guidance’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal Online
28.
438 Evans, above n 372.
439 Sydney University Professor of Law
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protects the right to Religious Freedom.440 This change occurred for Religious
Freedom being undermined when confronted with Anti-discrimination rights.441
The possible support would be a result of the perception, especially on the part of
religious groups, that their Religious Freedom in the current state of affairs is being
reduced rather than on the belief on the benefits an specific Religious Freedom
legislation or on a bill of rights itself.

Carolyn Evans, who supports the idea of a Bill of Rights for Australia, addresses
the notion that some Australian decisions have dealt with religious matters on a
poor understanding of religion matters.442 The argument in favour of a specific
Religious Freedom Act could show that some legal ground would at least be
raised in favour of Religious Freedom that at present are ignored or swept under
the carpet. It must be pointed out though that raising them by an act would
eventually create momentum towards the overall Bill of Rights that Carolyn
Evans wants to see, or if one waits until enough support for a full Bill of Rights,
considering the Australian history, it may be that nothing will ever properly
protect Religious Freedom.

Evans also addresses the complexity of the conflict, pointing out that specific
legislation that would provide for the detailed protection of Religious Freedom
would raise the same issue that the Anti-discrimination laws have with the
Religious Freedom.443 This points to another justification for the introduction of
a bill of rights without being accompanied by specific legislation protecting
Religious Freedom would be inadequate. Since the Anti-discrimination laws
presenting issues with Religious Freedom already has a place in Australia,

such as the Australian Christian Lobby, Presbyterian Church of Australia, Baptist Union, and
Sydney Anglicans.
441 Babie and Rochow above n 235, 121
442 Evans, above n 372.
443 Ibid.
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having these laws and a bill of rights without also providing specific protections
to Religious Freedom would make this right less protected when compared to
other Human Rights.

As seen in the previous chapter freedom of religion has been disregarded by
statutory bodies responsible for protecting Human Rights because, in the absence
of other statutory direction telling tribunals to take Religious Freedom into
account when they adjudicate other Human Rights, they have no practical option
but to ignore Religious Freedom when they are weighing rights. This disregard
is shared and extended to other Human Rights advocates.444 Current secular
liberal interpretations of Human Rights charters tend to undermine Religious
Freedom, as happens even in countries that have Religious Freedom protection,
for the legislation that protects Religious Freedom must be clear, unambiguous
and either emphatic or insistent that it be properly and fully taken into account,
otherwise the Religious Free Speech is put it in the lowest place in an implicit
hierarchy of Human Rights to be protected.445 There are even interpretations
suggesting that religion should be submitted to the full scope of discrimination
laws, even core religious practices446 should be regulated in the name of equality
rights.447 It must be mentioned that such a hierarchy of Human Rights as
fashioned in the cases seen in previous chapters is not drawn from international
law itself but by current intellectual fashions.

A great concern with the enactment of a Human Rights Act refers to the
neutrality of its provisions and interpretation. The concern regarding the
protection of Religious Free Speech in a bill of rights is justified by the political

Babie and Rochow above n 235, 120-121.
Ibid, 121
446 Such as the ordination of clergy
447 Carolyn Evans and Beth Gaze, ‘Between religious freedom and equality: complexity and
context’ (2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal Online 40, 41.
444
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interpretation of courts that do not seem to grasp the importance of such concept.
There is a fear that the adoption of such legal mechanism may be used against
Religious Free Speech such as the United Kingdom case with the Human Rights
Act 1998 that led to diminution of Religious Freedom.448

Ultimately the creation of a Bill or Rights by itself on the shape that has been seen
in Australia so far is not the solution for the conflict addressed in this thesis.
Although the protection of Human Rights in Australia is fragmented, and a bill
would give some sort of coherence for their protections the fact is that the Antidiscrimination body of law has shown that the interpretation and understanding
of Religious Free Speech is far from ideal.449 As mentioned before religion informs
all aspects of life and it is important for Religious Free Speech to enable believers
to disagree and preach their beliefs peacefully. The understanding of the
relevance of Religious Freedom, and therefore Religious Free Speech as well as
its importance for the democratic society, indicates that, at this stage, the
implementation of a bill of rights will likely not be beneficial for Religious Free
Speech in Australia.

Julian Rivers, ‘Law, Religion and Gender Equality’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 52:
Churches and religious associations find themselves boxed in by its obligations, benefiting only
from narrowly drafted exceptions narrowly interpreted by an unsympathetic judiciary
449 As said in Stanley Fish, ‘Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner’s Jurisprudence’ (1990) 57
University of Chicago Law Review 1447, 1466: “tolerance is exercised in an inverse proportion to
there being anything at stake.”
448
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F. Detailed Religious Freedom Act

The last possible solution to be discussed in this thesis is the implementation of
a detailed Religious Freedom act. There have been previous attempts in Australia
for the enactment of specific legislation that would focus on the protection of
Religious Freedom as a positive right.450 Many religious bodies would currently
agree that this is the best viable solution to diminish the conflicts,451 as can be
extracted from current submissions to Ruddock´s Religious Freedom Review
Committee in 2018.

There are obvious complications to the solution of the conflict between Religious
Free Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws. As pointed out by Carolyn Evans
‘[e]very right has its core cases and the grey areas, but that is even more so the
case with Religious Freedom. ´452 The rights addressed in the Anti-discrimination
laws are generally sensitive in nature and the clash of those with religion, which
informs the worldview of many people and its representative of their identity, is
a difficult balance to achieve.

According to the last census Australia is becoming a less religious country. This
by itself already suggests that religious speech is losing its place in the public
sphere. It also suggests that Religious Free Speech will not be important in the
future for is not a concern of the majority. When considered in addition to the
advancement of concepts and laws that conflict with religious beliefs, it is to be
expected that religious opinions and expressions will be considered as less
valuable and unworthy of protection.

Evans, above n 372.
Ibid.
452 Ibid.
450
451
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The adoption of a broader and detailed Religious Freedom act ought to consider
the numerous conflicts rising from Anti-discrimination legislation and the
religious sphere, and the perception that such laws interfere with Religious
Freedom. This would be a substantial step to show and recognize that Religious
Freedom stands in its suitable place as a Human Right worthy of protection in
the Australian legal system. The enactment of specific legislation is a better way
of protecting basic rights such as Religious Freedom since it can express the
protection with greater detail and specificity.453 The specific legislation can deal
with ways of affecting the Religious Free Speech in Australia instead of leaving
it to the courts’ discernment of the importance of such Human Rights.

A detailed Religious Freedom Act was before seen with great suspicion by
religious groups themselves. However, since 1988 some of the opponents to
specific legislation protecting Religious Freedom in Australia started to change
their position with regards to the legislation considering the increasing conflicts
with the national legislation. As mentioned in the introduction of this subchapter,
the debate surrounding the postal vote regarding the same sex marriage pushed
for the discussion.

Many of the old opponents are now calling for a specific law to protect Religious
Freedom based on ICCPR article 18. There is the need for a specific protection for
Religious Free Speech to make such protection exclusively through an instrument
such as a Bill of rights.

A Human Rights Act by itself brings the fear that Religious Freedom would be
sacrificed when competing with non-discrimination rights and that people who
hold religious beliefs would be charged for expressing them. 454 As mentioned
453
454

See also Kirby, above n 392, 276.
Evans, above n 372.
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before, leaving Religious Freedom to stand protected in a bill of rights only,
especially considering the wording of existing bills in Australia, would not solve
the problem. Rather, a specific Religious Freedom act that balances the
importance of Religious Free Speech when competing with other rights would be
more appropriate.
Freedom of religious belief and expression is generally accepted in Australian
society as an important freedom.455 Considering all the concerns expressed in this
thesis with the concerns of curtailing Religious Free Speech in Australia a Religious
Freedom Act seems to be the best of the viable solutions. A detailed Religious
Freedom Act based, on those international instruments, would trump
inconsistent state law and require that existing Anti-discrimination law be
interpreted in a manner consistent with it.

455

Evans v NSW [2008] FCAFC 130, 79
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III.

CONCLUSION:

The reasoning in Elane Photography saw only a relationship between customer
and service provider and sought to achieve the law’s objective by regulating that
relationship. The logic in Cathy’s Creation on the other hand recognised the law’s
interest in an additional relationship which was ignored or at least obscured in
the Elane Photography analysis. That is, the reasoning present in Elane Photography
was one-dimensional by comparison to Cathy’s Creation. A Religious Freedom
Act or any other solution that may be adopted in Australia requires a threedimensional analysis to better address the relationship between Religious Free
Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws

As addressed in this chapter, there are a few possibilities to solve the conflict
between Religious Free Speech and Anti-discrimination laws. Regardless of
whether the solution chosen would be more adequate to solve the conflict, a
solution must be adopted. It is relevant that in the attempt to solve one problem
the Australian Parliament ought not to create another. Religious Free Speech is a
relevant factor for the life of many Australians and is a core element to the
defence of free speech and Religious Freedom that must not be overlooked. After
examining all the elements of this thesis, the next chapter addresses the
conclusion of the thesis.
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7TH CHAPTER: CONCLUSION

I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis aimed to identify and consider the conflicts between Religious Free
Speech and the Anti-discrimination norms. It identified two main subjects of this
relation: ´Religious Free Speech´ and ´ Anti-discrimination laws´ in its nature
developing the work to answer the main research question: ´Does the Antidiscrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´

In seeking answers to this question, it was necessary to address some other
specific questions: ´Why is it important to protect Religious Free Speech? ` and
`Why is it important to protect Religious Free Speech in Australia? ` were
understood as relevant to lay the foundational ground of this thesis. The question
´How to minimize the conflicts between Religious Free Speech and the Antidiscrimination body of law? ´ was also considered relevant and answered in this
work, for it’s a consequential result of the main question being made and makes
itself necessary in order of a complete analysis with tangible applications.

This thesis was designed so that addressing those more specific inquires would
assist to answer the main research question ´Does the Anti-discrimination
legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´. It was also considered that this layout
would be useful for once the answers to the detailed inquiries were developed
the analysis laid on later chapters, in the Case Studies and proposed solutions.

This thesis found that the Anti-discrimination legislation does limit Religious
Free Speech. Although the laws aim at providing equality through legislation,
the existing laws operate in a manner that do not allow courts and tribunals to
balance and resolve conflicts in ways that respect Religious Free Speech. As is
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demonstrated by a survey of Australian case law surrounding Religious Free
Speech, it can be seen that Religious Free Speech has been limited by the Antidiscrimination legislation, and the courts are unable or unwilling to protect
Religious Free Speech when a conflict arises under the Anti-discrimination
legislation.

Below there is set out the findings in each of the individual chapters that helped
to reach the conclusion on the analysis of each research question.
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II. RESEARCH FINDINGS

A. Chapter 2: Religious Free Speech in Australia.

The 2nd Chapter investigated the first key element of the thesis, ‘Religious Free
Speech’ in answering the specific questions of `why is it important to protect
Religious Free Speech? ` and `why is it important to protect religious free-speech
in Australia? `

In this chapter, it was seen that even though Religious Freedom can be
considered to be ‘the bedrock for every [H]uman [R]ight´ and that ´it provides a
sturdy foundation for limited government’456 many now doubt that religion is a
human good. 457 As a result, Religious Free Speech is not seen as serving a good
human purpose and consequently should not be protected. Equality among
people is an important common ground upon which western society rests.
Human Rights, as explained in the 2nd chapter are founded on Human Dignity,
which, for the purpose of the current thesis, has two justifications: religious and
historical. The first can be traced to the Judaeo-Christian concept that all men
were made equal by God.458 The second justification is the practical experience of
the 20th century where the conflicts of the I and II World Wars demonstrated the
relevance of such a concept in order that the atrocities committed during this
period would never be repeated.

Jennifer A. Marshall, ‘Why Does Religious Freedom Matter?’, The Heritage Foundation
(Washington DC) 20 December 2010, 8.
457 Lori G Beaman, Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2017),
29-30; Eliyabeth Shakman Hurd, ´The International Politics of Religious Freedom´ (Pt Tavinder
Datta for india International Centre) (2013) India Internationaö Center Quarterly 225.
458 Augusto Zimmermann, Christian Foundations of the Common Law - Volume 3:
Australia (Connor Court, 2018), forthcoming.
456
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Religious Free Speech is a fundamental Human Right, going further than the
national experience being a right to all human beings. Such universality, as
described in the 2nd chapter, justifies the incorporation of international law and
the experiences of other jurisdictions in this thesis. 459 The expression of religious
beliefs is part of the essential human identity, without which, freedom of
expression would be sterile and meaningless.

Australia has international commitments to protect the Human Rights present in
the instruments that is has agreed to be bound by. However, the provisions of
those instruments must be internalised by the sovereign legislative process of
Australia before becoming domestically binding. Consequentially some of the
protections in the Anti-discrimination laws derived from international
instruments that aim for the protection of Human Rights. Australia does not
protect Freedom of Speech though a specific statute, even though such protection
is possible under the external affairs clause in the Constitution. The absence of an
express protection of Religious Free Speech in Australia today is concerning. This
right can be diminished or abrogated by an unambiguous law passed by the
legislature, such as the Anti-discrimination laws.

The concrete existence of human rights does not form a consensus in political-philosophical
discussions: see eg, Robert Alexy, 'Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights' (2012) 25(1)
Ratio Juris 2.
459
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B. Chapter 3: The nature of the Anti-Discrimination body of law.

Anti-discrimination laws are the body of law which prohibit certain conduct that
is considered discriminatory. Complementary to the research question of ‘why it
is important to protect Religious Free Speech in Australia’, the 3rd chapter
identifies the nature of the Anti-discrimination laws, putting in perspective why
this body of law comes into conflict with Religious Free Speech in Australia. Laws
that aim for equal treatment can be a source of unequal opportunity in seeking
to solve this, Australia’s state and federal Anti-discrimination laws have been
passed to mediate unequal treatment which has become socially unacceptable.
The choice of what grounds are relevant, and therefore the focus of Antidiscriminatory laws, is based on the focus of policy reform agendas.

This part of the thesis lays out how the internal experiences in Australia fall short
in implementing the parameters seen in the ICCPR, specifically in regard to
Religious Freedom and, consequentially, Religious Free Speech. Instead of
affirming that Religious Freedom should only be limited in cases in which it is
necessary “to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others”,460 what is in place is a general balancing provision
that basically destroys the necessity provision in Article 18(3). 461 A less protective
ground is taken in the national examples of an equivalent to a Bill of Rights, that
allows limitations which are ‘justified in a free and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom’ subjected to the discernment of the person
appointed to make such a judgment.

ICCPR Article 18(3).
Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concearns about an Australian Charter of Rights, (University of
Adelaide Press, 2012), 98-101.
460
461
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The Anti-discrimination body of law is not as effective in Australia as it could be
for it fails to provide adequate protection of some fundamental Human Rights,
such as Religious Free Speech. The equality intended by such, body cannot be
adequately achieved through means that overlook this important Human Right.
Existing Anti-discrimination laws in Australia do not provide frameworks that
allow tribunals and courts to balance and resolve conflicts in ways that
adequately respect Religious Freedom and its subset, Religious Free Speech.462
An assurance that a human being is able and entitled to express and manifest
their inner beliefs, without being persecuted, is essential.

462

See Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia University Press, 1990) 4.
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C. Chapter 4: Religious Free Speech in practice and what the cases have said about it

The 4th Chapter advances the discussion by approaching the research question
´does the Anti-discrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech´. This is
done by examining some of the cases in which Religious Free Speech and the
legal approach to the Anti-discrimination law in Australia clashed. This
demonstrates the relevance of addressing the conflict between the Antidiscrimination laws and the Religious Free Speech for it further demonstrated
that this Anti-discriminatory mechanism does not necessarily present itself as a
protection to Religious Free Speech.

In the area of goods and services the case discussed was the Victorian case
Christian Youth Camps Limited & Ors v Cobaw Community Health Services Limited &
Ors.463
The majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded that “doctrines” of the
Christian faith were to be confined to matters dealt with in the historic Apostles’
Creed and Nicene Creed, neither of which mention specifically sexual activity.464.
The Australian Court in this example demarcated what the definitions of
religious beliefs are or should be, adjudicating theological matters that are
beyond their competence.465

In the employment sphere the Australian case addressed was Chief of the Defence
Force v Gaynor.466 While the initial decision indicated a strong protection to

[2014] VSCA 75 (16 April 2014)
Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] FCAFC 41; 246 FCR 298 [276]-[277].
465 There is a question whether it is desirable for secular judges and courts to be adjudicating
theological matters that are beyond their competence. I think you can refer to that argument
briefly with fns without fully engaging in an analysis that is beyond your purpose here. But I
think you can then assume we don’t want judges getting into areas where they are incompetent,
but we don’t need to if we pass laws that require analysis and then balancing of the competing
human rights and dignity interests.
466 [2017] FCAFC 41; 246 FCR 298
463
464
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Freedom of Speech and the free exercise of religion in Australia when this speech
would involve political factors the Full Court of the Federal Court (Perram,
Mortimer & Gleeson JJ) overturned that previous decision and upheld in 2017
understanding that his Honour wrongly treated the “implied freedom” as a
personal right enjoyed by citizens. It was pointed that, the High Court required
that this freedom should be a limit on legislative power.467 The conclusion is that a
reserve member of the Armed Forces that makes controversial, religiously
motivated, political comments on a private website contrary to Defence Force
policy will have service terminated.

Life expressions and speech was the item with most cases presented for is the one
that more cases can be observed in the Australian scenario. The first case is Fraser
v Walker,468 where Michelle Fraser, a pro-life woman protested outside an
abortion clinic. The view held in this case results in a restriction to religious and
political manifestation in the controversial area of abortion. The case has an Antidiscriminatory nature by its contents and for the implication of the Victorian
Charter of Rights.469

Another case related to abortion clinics was addressed in Police v Preston.470 This
public order analysis reasonableness follows a political understanding trend of
the moment instead of a neatly justification on the limitations on Freedom of
Religion. It should be mentioned that restrictions to manifestations in exclusion

Chief of the Defence Force v Gaynor [2017] FCAFC 41; 246 FCR 298 [47]-[52]
[2015] VCC 1911 (19 November 2015)
469 Fraser v Walker [2015] VCC 1911, 37: “The appellant next argues that the Charter of Human Rights
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (“the Charter”) protects and promotes human rights, including civil
and political rights which are derived from the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Section 32(1) of the Charter provides that so far as it is possible to do so consistently with
their purpose, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with
human rights. If the words of a statute are capable of more than one meaning, the Court should
give them whichever of those meanings best accords with the human right in question.”
470 [2016] TASMC (27 July 2016, Mag C J Rheinberger)
467
468
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zones have been put in place in several states in Australia to restrict protests close
to abortion clinics.

The case Burns v Corbett471 also addressed in this chapter is one of over 200 cases
regards Anti-discrimination legislation lodged by Mr Burns. This shows that the
Human Rights protection legislation of the Anti-discrimination laws are being
used as a sword rather than a shield to restrict speech.

The last case is the Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot v
Islamic Council of Victoria Inc and Attorney General for the State of Victoria472 The
tribunal order that restricted the Religious Free Speech of the pastors can be
considered a violation of Australia’s obligations towards the protection of rights
of conscience discussed in this thesis. Catch the Fire successfully appealed the
decision and the case was referred back to the tribunal which set aside the
original orders and remitted the decision to be heard by a different Tribunal
member. The dispute was eventually resolved by an out-of-court settlement and
the controversy on this case of the limits and protection of the Religious Free
Speech in Australia remained blurred.

In the Catch the Fire case, it was made clear that incitement includes both words
and actions that encourage or intend to encourage others.473 The interpretation of the
Victorian Act that it does not ‘prohibit statements concerning the religious beliefs
of a person or group of persons simply because they may offend or insult the
person or group of persons’474 is seems more adequate to the protection to

[2017] NSWCA 3 (3 Feb 2017)
Catch the Fire Ministries Inc v, Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot v Islamic Council of Victoria Inc
and Attorney General for the State of Victoria (2006) 206 FLR 56 (‘Catch the Fire Ministries Case’).
473 Catch the Fire Ministries Case (2006) 15 VR 207, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 254 (Neave JA).
474Ibid, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 212 (Neave JA).
471
472
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Religious Free Speech upheld by Australia is its international commitments. Such
an interpretation would be welcome when Religious Free Speech is in
competition with other aspects Anti-discrimination law. Application of this
interpretation would mean that statements made in genuine religious belief
which may offend or insult a person or group should not be object of Antidiscrimination persecution. The open multicultural society475 envisioned by the
Commonwealth of Australia must be achieved not by homogenising different
social and cultural groups and attempting against the multiculturalism seen on
the 2nd chapter but from the management of tolerance towards each other.

Hatred is not to be taken lightly and speech or actions that consist of hatred will
be offensive. However, not all that is considered offensive is necessarily hatred
and diversity is to be expected and tolerated.476 In this case Nettle JA makes it
clear that section 8 goes ‘no further in restricting freedom to criticise the religious
beliefs of others than to prohibit criticism so extreme as to incite hatred’.477

It is troubling that a preacher’s misleading characterisation of works he had
authored should somehow lead to the conclusion that his beliefs about a religion
were not his real beliefs. Even more disquieting is a secular tribunal’s
determination

that

where

a

religious

leader

had

misconstrued

and

misrepresented another religion’s sacred writings, this also indicated an absence
of honest belief. Defining in court what a religious group’ ‘really believe’ rather

Ibid, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 240-2 (Neave JA).
In Catch the Fire Ministries Case (2006) 15 VR 207, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 242 (Neave JA).` They
acknowledge that there will be differences in views about other peoples’ religions. To a very
considerable extent, therefore, they tolerate criticism by the adherents of one religion of the tenets
of another religion; even though to some and perhaps to most in society such criticisms may
appear ill- informed or misconceived or ignorant or otherwise hurtful to adherents of the latter
faith. It is only when what is said is so ill-informed or misconceived or ignorant or so hurtful as
to go beyond the bounds of what tolerance should accommodate that it may be regarded as
unreasonable.`
477 Catch the Fire Ministries Case (2006) 15 VR 207, 211–12 (Nettle JA), 219 (Neave JA).
475
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than

accepting

that

there

might

be

competing

interpretations

and

understandings takes courts into a dangerous area.478 A wrong interpretation of
scripture does not necessarily point to dishonest intent and the jurisdictional
body should not to be trying to rule on what are correct and honest
representations of sacred writings.479 It is conceivable that there may be multiple
ways of understanding a religion and its requirements.

In the search for the answer to if Anti-discrimination legislation does limit
Religious Free Speech the cases shown in the Australian ground point to a yes.
The protection of free-speech is an important aspect of a democratic society480 and
the current way that Australia is reason for concern. This points to the necessity
of a clearer balancing mechanisms to protect Religious Free Speech when such is
conflicting with the Anti-discrimination laws.

Ibid.
R T Ahdar, ‘Religious Vilification: Confused Policy, Unsound Principle and Unfortunate Law’
(2007) 26 University of Queensland Law Journal 293.313; Carolyn Maree Evans, Legal Protection of
Religious Freedom in Australia (Federation Press, 2012) vol 1, 193.
480 See eg, David Flint and Jai Martinkovits, Give us Back our Country (Ballarat/Vic: Connor Court
Publishing, 2013), 166; Joe Dolce, ‘Free Speech and the Stokie Case’ (2014) 53(7-8) 32, 32.
478
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D. Chapter 5: Analysis of the conflict.

The research question that was answered in the 5th chapter was: ´Does the Antidiscrimination legislation limit Religious Free Speech? ´. Through this question,
this chapter discussed whether Anti-discrimination laws have shown the general
characteristic of limiting Religious Free Speech, and if this should be a bigger
concern. The aim of the 5th Chapter was to more deeply investigate the problem
and further demonstrate the current and future complications in the conflict of
Anti-discrimination laws and Religious Free Speech in Australia by looking at
the general aspects and cases as seen internationally.

In the subsection titled ´Goods and services: artistic manifestation and the samesex wedding dilemma´ a few international cases were addressed which had been
in the public eye in recent years for some aspect of religious conscientious refusal
to provide services which supported the celebration of same-sex weddings. This
had raised questions of whether or not people can refuse to provide goods and
services, even when to do so would go against their religious belief. The
difference between a refusal on the grounds of the nature of the service requested
and the refusal based on the person who has requested was argued, showing the
differences from both and explaining why a refusal that is based on the nature of
the service requested might not necessarily be discrimination.

Cases in which the decisions support both perspectives were presented,
addressing the conflicts of Anti-discrimination norms and Religious Free Speech.
It was noted that the defences of Religious Free Speech based on the ground of
Religious Freedom have shown less effectiveness when compared to defences
based on Freedom of Speech. This is the case especially when a person is
compelled to provide a service, this is the previously identified compelled
speech.
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It is important to point out that if a refusal to provide particular services, which
contravene a provider’s religious beliefs, results in the provider not being able to
offer any services, the result is a practical exclusion from society of those who
hold strong religious values. It is important that in Australia the Antidiscrimination body of law does not become source of discrimination, for this
would be incompatible with the nature of Human Rights. It is undesirable that
people of faith would become a sort of ´second class citizens’ with no right to act
or express their inner beliefs or being systematically punished for doing so. The
general trend observed in the cases discussed in this section showed that the
concern of Anti-discrimination norms trumping first generational Human Rights
is a reality. This is especially the case when the protection of Religious Free
Speech is not as important as the values framed in the Anti-discrimination body
of law.

It was pointed out that as seen on the 4th Chapter the Australian Courts have
shown signs of following the trend of international interpretation of Antidiscrimination mechanisms, which further signals the importance of the current
international approach of this thesis. Religious Freedom requires more than the
freedom to simply believe. Nevertheless, there is a growing trend in foreign
jurisdictions to interpret Religious Freedom in this narrow way when in conflict
with Anti-discrimination laws.

As Religious Freedom is not only an individual right, and its defence is important
for the sustain of a desirable multicultural society, the protection given to
Religious Free Speech should have a broad extension. Nevertheless, Australia
still presents unsatisfactory protection. There is currently no provision in the
Australian Anti-discrimination body of law that recognises the primacy of
Religious Free Speech. The law should not be used as an instrument of
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intolerance and the excessive curtailing of free-speech is a sign of undemocratic
political views and, in that sense, a restrictive interpretation of Religious Free
Speech in Australia would not be compatible with the application of the Human
Rights in a free democratic society.
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E. Chapter 6: Recommendations.

The 6th chapter finalises the reflection on problems addressed in this thesis,
answering the last question to be considered: ´how can the conflicts between
Religious Free Speech and the Anti-discrimination body of law be minimised? ´

The first solution would be to extend s 116 of the Australian Constitution to the
states. It is seen that, as discussed in the 2nd chapter, s 116 does not give a large
protection to ‘freedom of religion.’ Restrictive in function, it only forbids the
Commonwealth from making a ‘law’ establishing a religion or prohibiting the
free exercise of religion. The provision seen in the Constitution does not stand as
an individual right, but rather as a limitation on the federal legislative power. In
addition, ramifications are not provided for the violation of this section. It was
also mentioned that attempts to extend this section to the states have previously
failed. While the extension of s 116 to the states would be a good beginning, this
solution alone would not be enough to protect Religious Free Speech in Australia
in a satisfactory level.

Another solution presented in the 6th chapter is the extinction of the Antidiscrimination body of law in Australia, which in practical terms is a less realistic
option. This solution could be interpreted by critics as a sign of a step backwards
in the defence of Human Rights by the country. Nevertheless, the uncoordinated
legislative process regarding the Anti-discrimination norms, which do not follow
all the Human Rights that need to be protected, is a source of problems to those
rights not yet protected.

Following the repeal idea, a subsidiary solution would be to extinguish the Antidiscrimination laws in the states and leave the matter for the federal sphere.
Alternatively, the body of law could be harmonized among the states. Human
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Rights should not be differently protected within the same country. However,
this option is impeded by the lack of legislative power and the improbability that
the federal government and the states would be able to reach the required
agreement. Another negative aspect of this idea comes from the fact that the state
Anti-discrimination laws have, in some cases, gone further than the
Commonwealth in the Anti-discrimination body of law.

The next solution would be utilising the external affairs power to pass federal
legislation implementing Human Rights instruments, that have been ratified by
Australia, in a way that would trump inconsistent law. This could include
protections of Religious Freedom and Freedom of Speech and, consequentially,
Religious Free Speech.

Another solution presented is the implementation of a Bill or Charter of Rights
by the Commonwealth. This would give application to the totality of the rights
addressed in the ICCPR. Australia is the only democratic society that does not
have a Bill or Charter of Rights. The attempts to accomplish such a task in
Australia have, so far failed. The relevant discussion is not whether Human
Rights should be protected but rather if a Human Rights Act is the most
appropriate mechanism to achieve this. The subsection also addresses that the
experiences of a Charter of Rights seen inside Australia of the ACT Human Rights
Act (2004) and the Victoria`s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (2006). In
both acts the limits imposed on Religious Freedom merely had to be reasonable
rather than ´necessary´ which does not provide a positive example for the protection
of the Religious Free Speech.
The ICCPR offers a high value to freedom of religion and belief. However, the
Australian experience does not seem to support such understanding. Freedom of
Speech and Religious Freedom are fundamental and should not be abrogated or
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even partially set aside because a ‘new’ Human Right comes into conflict with
them. A Human Rights act that is drafted strictly as the ICCPR and its article 18,
would still be subject to an inadequate interpretation, judging by precedential
examples. This can be illustrated by the recommendations drafted in 2008 by
Brennan Committee, which said that freedom from coercion or restraint in relation
to religion and belief should be non-derogable, but freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs (the Religious Free Speech) should be subject to a limitation
clause modelled upon the Victorian and ACT charters. This outlined the fact that a
charter of Human Rights alone may not be the ideal solution to the conflict of
Religious Free Speech and the Anti-discrimination laws.

Religious Free Speech is often seen as a `poor cousin` among the family of Human
Rights. In other countries, as evidenced in the 5th Chapter the existence of a Bill
or Charter of Rights has not stopped the conflict between Religious Free Speech
and Anti-discrimination law and reduced the assessment of the importance of
Religious Freedom generally. While Religious Freedom is not seen as an
important Human Right, the existence of a Bill of Rights would not fix the current
lack of protection.

The legislation that protects Religious Freedom must be clear, unambiguous and
either emphatic or insistent in order for it to be properly and fully taken into
account. Without this, Religious Free Speech is vulnerable to being put in the
lowest place, in an implicit hierarchy of Human Rights, to be protected. Although
the protection of Human Rights in Australia is fragmented, and a Bill would give
some sort of coherence for their protections, the creation of a Bill of Rights by
itself (as the kinds that have been seen in Australia so far) is not the solution for
the conflict addressed in this thesis.
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The last possible solution to be discussed in this thesis is the implementation of
a detailed Religious Freedom act. The adoption of a broad and detailed Religious
Freedom act would consider the substantial number of conflicts arising between
Anti-discrimination legislation and the religious sphere as well as the perception
that such laws interfere with Religious Freedom. Importantly, it would be a step
to substantially show and recognize that Religious Freedom stands in its suitable
place as a Human Right worthy of protection in the Australian legal system. The
improbability of an enactment of a Bill of Rights in Australia makes the call for
the enactment of specific legislation even louder, as a better way of protecting
basic rights such as Religious Freedom for it can express the protection with great
detail and specificity, instead of leaving the question of the protection of such an
important Human Right to the courts discernment.

A Human Rights act, by itself, brings with it the fear that Religious Freedom
would be sacrificed when in competition with non-discrimination rights, and
that people who hold religious beliefs could be prosecuted for expressing them.
Leaving Religious Freedom to stand protected only by a Bill of Rights, especially
considering the bills currently in existence in Australia, would not solve the
problem. Rather, a specific Religious Freedom act that balances the importance
of Religious Free Speech, when competing with other rights, would be more
appropriate. Freedom of religious belief and expression is generally accepted in
Australian society as an important freedom, and considering the concerns
expressed in this thesis of the curtailing of Religious Free Speech in Australia, a
detailed Religious Freedom act, based on the relevant international instruments,
which trumps inconsistent state law and requires that existing Antidiscrimination law be interpreted in a manner consistent with it, seems to be the
best solution.
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III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Religion should, as a rule, be an ally to a good government.481 Religion informs
the worldview of many people482 and Religious Freedom is a fundamental
Human Rights that should be protected. To curtail Religious Free Speech in the
defence of ´new´ Human Rights points to a suppression of thought and opinion
does not bring positive results in the advancement of knowledge. It is beneficial
to add new perspectives on issues with an analysis and solutions rather than to
forbid discussion.

To suggest ideal ways in which laws should respect freedom of conscience, it is
important to identify how religion is a core element of human identity and
dignity and why it should not be compromised. In order to minimise the negative
impact of Anti-discrimination laws on religious free speech, one must be
prepared to change them.

‘In a free society, religion is an ally of good government as it forms the moral character of
individuals and communities. ‘ Jennifer A. Marshall, ‘Why Does Religious Freedom Matter?’, The
Heritage Foundation (Washington DC) 20 December 2010,8.
482 There are religious influences in the foundations of common law in Australia. See Augusto
Zimmermann, Christian Foundations of the Common Law - Volume 3: Australia (Connor Court, 2018),
forthcoming.
481
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